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ART. I.—*Life of John Knox, the Scottish Reformer; abridged from M'Crie's Life of Knox.* Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication. 1839.

To anticipate much, and reflect but little, is characteristic of the present age. We are far more occupied with the promises of the future than the facts of the past. While eagerly pursuing allurements in prospect, we are in great danger of forgetting the conditions upon which we hold the good we now possess, and of neglecting the experience necessary to teach us how to value and how to preserve it.

The power-press has been greatly instrumental in driving to excess this natural disposition of the human mind. It has often stimulated, when it should have strengthened; roused to action, when it should have furnished materials for regular and permanent exertion.

For some time, books almost ceased to be works. Literature came to be a thing of confectionary and spices, rather than aliment; the substitute for reflection, rather than material for thought. Happily, this evil is beginning to be corrected. The general distribution of the Bible is creating a better taste. The purity and simplicity of its style, the sublimity of its doctrine, and the habit of lofty reflection which its study begets, are leading men once more to prefer substantial to showy literature, and the press is beginning to multiply copies of valuable and most interesting works.

History is resuming its place in the library and the drawing-room. The mind, wearied with vain efforts to penetrate the future, or dizzy with gazing upon the rush and whirl of passing events, is led away to the calm contemplation of things that have been. The student of history looks back upon a vast scene where all is still and motionless, as though some petrifying blast had suddenly blown over the living world and chilled it into stone.

Death has been there, and at his icy touch every moving thing has stiffened and congealed. From all that vast multitude there comes up no clink of the hammer, no warrior shout, no laughter of gladness, no wail of lamentation. There is no sound, no change, to distract the observing mind or confuse the deliberate judgment. The false lights that threw their deceitful glow and shade upon the living actors in those once animated scenes have all grown dim or expired, and the sun of truth pours, through mist and coloring, its unsparing rays upon the naked realities of the past.

There the architects of the present stand before us. We see the men who, in a great measure, constructed the moral edifice in which we dwell. We look upon the artizans of the good and evil of our present world. We learn how all that is valuable in the institutions we inherit has been won for us by the courage and self-devotion, the labor and the genius, of some that have passed away; and from the closet and the battle field, and the scaffold and the stake, we gather their estimate of the legacy they have bequeathed us, and their warnings, more eloquent than words could convey, to cherish and defend it.

Of all the publications of the day none are more interesting, or more likely to produce great and happy results, than popular histories of the early reformers, and books which throw light upon the all-important scenes in which they were actors. With the hope of attracting the youth of the country to the study of those extraordinary times when infant liberty was cradled in iron, and thus fortifying them against the deceit of popery and Puseyism, the Presbyterian board of publication have printed abridgments of the lives of several of those eminent Scotchmen who, under God, were the authors of modern liberty. The board seem to be more concerned for the defense of the Protestant faith than the Presbyterian creed, and they deserve the gratitude of all the churches for the efforts they are making to vindicate the honor of the reformers and the Reformation from the odium that is so diligently heaped upon them by all who hate the beauty of holiness.

No period of history can be more interesting to us than that of the Reformation. This was by no means a merely religious change. The Reformation was not only the deliverance of mind from superstition, but man from tyranny. It was simply the restoration of the Bible to its place, as the great charter of personal rights, as well as spiritual privileges. There is, therefore, no man, Protestant or Romanist, in the whole civilized world, who is not indebted for a great part of the liberty he enjoys to the forcible developments of human rights, and the bold resistance to tyranny,



made in the days of the Reformation by the men of the Bible, and especially by John Knox. To deny this is to state absurdity. It is to say that modern liberty has no origin, and free institutions no history.

We glory in liberal opinions. We look abroad over the world and see them everywhere loosening the shackles of mankind; breaking down the prejudices that have walled in communities; extending the circle of human sympathies; thrusting down the proud, and raising up the humble. Their controlling power has reached the chosen habitations of cruelty. They have restrained the barbarity of the Turk, even when his victim was a Jew. We exult in the spread of these glorious doctrines; we talk of their power; we anticipate their universal triumph. But what are they? They are John Knox's opinions.

The mighty multitude slumbered, unconscious of their strength, until he evoked the disenchanted spirit of the resistless mass. Like some powerful magician, he stood by the sleeping sea of nations, and stretching his wand over the dead and putrid waters, stirred them into life. It was his voice that heaved from the depths the giant wave, whose onward roll, bearing down thrones and dominions, and tossing crowns and sceptres on its scornful crest, is now beating with resistless fury upon every hold of usurpation.

We do not say that Knox originated liberal opinions. In all ages some have had correct views of human rights. But Knox was the apostle who preached what others trembled to think; and it is, mainly, to his preaching that the world is indebted for the prevalence of liberty without licentiousness.

The history of some men is the history of their age. The name of Pericles is identified with the palmy days of Athenian glory, and that of Napoleon with the terrible time when all Europe resounded with the clangor of the trumpet, and trembled under the tread of armed nations. The story of John Knox is also, to a great extent, the story of his times, but in a sense far more honorable. Pericles and Napoleon shone in the splendor of the ages whose glory they respectively represent. Pericles is, to us, the focal point where the scattered rays of Grecian genius are concentrated and distributed to posterity. Bonaparte appears in the grand panorama of history, as a man of iron, glaring out of a furnace of fire. He lived when the hell of human passion was let loose, and with the superior power of a higher fiend, he played with firebrands, and sported in blood. But Knox owed his glory to no attending circumstances. Catching the pure light of truth as it streamed un-

sullied from the throne of the Eternal, he scattered the heavenly radiance far and wide over a land of darkness and of death. He was a beacon lighted by the Almighty hand, and sustained in unquenchable brightness by the breath of God.

The religion of Jesus, which had been introduced into Scotland soon after the ascension, became prevalent in that country in the latter part of the second century. Though the greater part of Britain had been subdued by the Roman arms, the inhabitants of the Highlands still maintained their independence, and when the second terrible persecution was proclaimed against the Christians, multitudes of them fled from the lower countries, and sought refuge in the Scottish hills. Among these fugitives were men of learning and exalted piety; some of whom becoming attached to the rude people who had protected them in the day of trouble, remained after the persecution had ceased.

Imitating the custom of the Druids, they made their homes in caves and recesses of the forests, and to these retreats their well-deserved reputation for learning and piety attracted many whom they instructed in letters and in the religion of the Bible. These Christians were called *Cultores Dei*, or worshipers of God, and hence, by abbreviation and corruption, *Culdees*.

By their efforts Christianity was gradually propagated in the country, notwithstanding fierce opposition from the Druids; and when subsequent persecutions drove many other pious and learned men from the adjoining countries to Scotland, they were gladly received by the king, Crathalinh, who was himself a Christian, and by their aid the true religion was completely established throughout the kingdom; so that, before the death of Crathalinh, which occurred in 312, idol worship was abolished, the sacred groves cut down, and Christianity acknowledged as the national religion.

In the mean time, some of the more learned and pious refugees, misled by the mistaken notions then prevalent about the superior sanctity of hermit life, withdrew to distant parts of the country, and especially to certain islands, where they formed communities. From their retired life, they were called *Movaxoi*, *Monachoi*, and, by abbreviation, "Monks."

But few points of similarity are to be discovered between these *Movaxoi*, and the monks of later days. The retired *Culdees* took no vows. Like Abraham and Enoch, they married wives; and besides these differences, they were the very antipodes of our monks in another respect, for they were burdensome to none, but supported themselves by the labor of their own hands. In their

retreats the Culdees founded schools, which long were celebrated, and much resorted to. In fact, their societies were rather colleges than monastic establishments.

In order to maintain discipline among themselves, the Culdees selected certain men, eminent for piety, learning, and wisdom, to oversee the rest, and keep them to the discharge of their duty to the people, to whom they appear to have acted as pastors as well as teachers. These superintendents, or "*Episcopoi Scotorum*," as they are called by papal writers, performed their functions in any part of the kingdom, indiscriminately, as delegates from the body that appointed them, never assuming rank superior to that of their brethren. By this arrangement, which, doubtless, was that generally adopted by the primitive church, the religion of Christ was happily maintained in Scotland for nearly two centuries.

In the year 452, one Palladius, who had been sent from Rome by Celestine, the bishop of that city, to arrest the progress of Pelagianism in Britain, was invited to Scotland by the reigning prince, to assist in combating the same error, which had gained ground in that country also.

By the intrigues and influence of this man, the primitive ecclesiastical establishment was modified by little and little, until prelacy was established upon the ruins of Culdee episcopacy. For a while, indeed, the Culdees were permitted to nominate the prelatish bishops, but after the latter had managed to get possession of large property, they became too powerful for the poor and pious Christians of the primitive church, and the appointment of bishops became a privilege of the pontiff at Rome.

The admission of prelatish episcopacy proved to be the "first downward trembling into ill," and for nearly a thousand years subsequently, the Scottish church continued to plunge deeper and deeper into darkness and corruption. The prelates set themselves, perseveringly, to increase their wealth and importance, and with the augmentation of property, and the addition of privileges, they increased in arrogance, ignorance, and sensuality. Thick darkness fell upon that once enlightened country. Superstition took the place of faith, and wickedness reveled unrestrained, even by the presence of virtue.

The Culdee church, however, was not extinguished. True worshipers of God still bowed the knee in the solitary places of the hills; and when, in the beginning of the fifteenth century, some of the persecuted followers of Wiclif and Huss fled to Scotland, they were received with open arms by many a sincere lover of the truth.



Under the teaching of these men, the gospel began again to make progress in Scotland, and the frightened prelates determined to crush it in the bud. To effect this, they seized upon two of the Lollards, as these Christians were then called, Paul Craw and James Risby, and burned them at St. Andrews. The doctrines of the Bible, nevertheless, continued to spread. Copies of the sacred Scriptures were hidden in many houses. In the darkness of the night, the neighbors assembled around the hearth of the possessor of the priceless treasure, and then the venerable book was brought forth from the secret place, and the waters of life were eagerly quaffed, pure from the fountain.

In this way the little flock was kept together under the guardianship of the almighty Shepherd, and notwithstanding the power and cruelty of the enemies of the truth, it continued to spread, as is proved by the arraignment of thirty persons, sixty-five years after the murder of Craw and Risby, for holding opinions at variance with the dogmas of the papal church. The articles of accusation against these persons have come down to us in the form in which they were recorded, and are interesting as showing how completely the opinions of Bible Christians of that day coincide with the Protestant doctrines of the present. Thus Scotland was prepared for the mighty revolution that was speedily to come.

The corruptions which, before the Reformation, had everywhere destroyed the spirituality and beauty of the Christian religion, had progressed to a more insufferable extent in Scotland than in any other country overshadowed by the raven wing of papal supremacy. The people were sunk in the grossest ignorance. Of religion, they had nothing but the name, while they were chained to the chariot wheels of the priests by the most degrading superstition. The clergy had monopolized full one half of all the property in the kingdom, and all the principal offices of state. They were not amenable to the civil law, and thus were free to wallow in licentiousness, setting at defiance the authority of God and man. The inferior benefices were openly put up to sale, or conferred upon men of infamous character, the pot-companions or illegitimate sons of the bishops, while the higher places in the church were prizes contended for with the utmost violence, and often seized by force of arms.

The profligacy of the clergy was open, shameless, and unbounded. So much so, that decency forbids more than a general allusion to their conduct. The people groaned under the burden of supporting swarms of lazy monks, who, like Pharaoh's frogs, were in every man's oven and kneading trough. There were friars



black, and friars gray ; canons regular, and of St. Anthony ; Carmelites and Cartusians ; Cordeliers and Dominicans ; Franciscans and Hospitallers ; Jacobines and Observantines, with others too numerous to mention, besides nuns of various kinds, and colors to match the motley brethren.

The clergy and monks were, for the most part, grossly ignorant, not only of letters, but of the elementary principles of religion. The Bible was not read, either by priests or people. Even bishops were not ashamed to confess that they had never read more of it than they found in their missals. The higher clergy never deigned to preach, but contented themselves with mumbling over the services of the church in a dead language, which they understood but imperfectly, and the people not at all.

Some idea of the ignorance of the clergy may be derived from an anecdote of Andrew Forman, bishop of Murray, and papal legate for Scotland. When this prelate was in Rome, he gave an entertainment to the pope and cardinals. In attempting to ask a blessing, he blundered so grossly in his Latinity that his holiness and their eminences lost their gravity, which so disconcerted the bishop, that he suddenly wound up by giving "the fause carles to the deil, in nomine Patris, Filii, et Sancti Spiritus," to which imprecation his guests, not comprehending his Scotch more readily than his Latin, devoutly responded, Amen !

The clergy had managed to transfer the hearing of all important civil cases to Rome, and for the conducting of these, and the purchase of benefices, immense sums were constantly drained from the country, and for this money the people received no other return than "palls, images, old bones, and similar consecrated trumpery." Thus the land was impoverished by the taxation necessary to provide for the intellectual degradation and moral corruption of its people.

We have observed that the bishops never deigned to preach. This duty was intrusted to the friars, who performed it in a manner peculiar to themselves, and impossible to be described. Their sermons were farragos of disgusting lies, intolerable twaddle, and gross buffoonery, and as destitute of doctrine as the howls of a bacchanal, or the responses of the Delphic oracle. Under such a ministry, it is needless to say, the people perished for lack of knowledge.

Such was the state of things when Patrick Hamilton returned from the continent, and began to proclaim the truth in his native land. This young man was of noble birth, and well-cultivated mind. Having embraced the reformed religion, while traveling

abroad, he burned with an irrepressible desire to preach it to his countrymen. Though perfectly aware of the consequences of such a step, he embarked for Scotland, and immediately, on his arrival, began to avow and enforce his opinions. But the term of his apostleship was short. He was soon seized by Cardinal Beaton, who then ruled the country with a sceptre of iron, and, notwithstanding his noble birth, committed to the flames, in the twenty-fourth year of his age.

This inhuman murder resulted in consequences very different from those which Beaton and his coadjutors expected. The dust of Hamilton seemed to possess a vivifying power. In every quarter toward which the winds of heaven could waft his ashes, multitudes started up to confess the doctrines for the sake of which the young martyr had died. The attention of the whole country was aroused to these new opinions. Bibles were sought with avidity, and read with intense interest, and believers multiplied so rapidly, that the cardinal and his Satanic clergy were driven to that extreme of madness which is the immediate forerunner of destruction. Despising the lessons of experience, these blind and ruthless men breathed out nothing but threatening and slaughter. Christians were seized and burned in every part of the country. The fierce bigotry of the clergy, urged on by the terrors of their coward hearts, demanded nothing less than the thorough extermination of all who dared to differ from their teachings.

The tiger may be gorged with blood until he loathes the banquet. Even the wolf may tire with slaughter, and turn from the gory feast. The fiercest instinct of the most ravenous beast may be appeased by repletion; but an apostate priesthood, fired with bigotry and trembling with fear, have ever been insatiable. Millions have been sacrificed to their unholy lusts, and when even trained soldiers have sickened with fullness of blood, and the very vultures have loathed the too abundant carnage, the Romish priests have still clamored for their prey, and lapped the blood of the last victim with an appetite as fierce as when they gloated upon the first.

In other countries the bishops and monks had been careful to throw around their diabolical proceedings the forms of civil law. With a demure hypocrisy, scarcely less hateful than their infernal cruelty, they declined to shed the blood for which they thirsted. They hunted the miserable victim from every wretched hiding place with the pleasure and patience of well-trained hounds; but when they had seized their prey, and sported with his agony until exhausted nature could yield no further pleasure to its tormentors, they washed their hands, like conscientious Pilate, and delivered

their victim to the secular arm for execution. But Beaton put no screen between him and the execrations of mankind. He was a bold and shameless villain, who scorned to pay to virtue even the compliment of hypocrisy. While living in open and unblushing profligacy, trampling under foot all the laws of almighty God, this sanctimonious butcher was filling Scotland with the blood of innocence: on one occasion ordering four men to be hanged, and a woman, with a nursing infant at her breast, to be drowned, because they had wounded the delicacy of his priestly conscience by being suspected of having eaten a goose on Friday! Yet even this fiend has found defenders; and so has the bloody Claverhouse; and so has Laud! When shall we have the defense and eulogy of Ahab, and Jezebel, and Judas Iscariot?

Notwithstanding these atrocious cruelties, the good cause continued to spread. Like the bread which Jesus blessed, the persecuted body of Christ multiplied as it was broken, and in 1540 the reformed doctrine numbered among its converts many persons of rank and influence, besides multitudes of the common people. It was in vain that the clergy plotted to destroy all the Protestants at a blow. God baffled their designs, and greatly multiplied their sorrow by the rapid increase of his worshipers.

While things were in this state there appeared one in the north of Scotland, whose name should be enshrined upon the heart of every man who reveres what is noble, and loves what is good. This was George Wishart.

Gentle in temper, modest and meek in deportment, profound and sagacious in judgment, of powerful mind, well-cultivated intellect, ardent piety, and dauntless courage, this extraordinary person united in his character all that is amiable and admirable in man.

In full expectation of martyrdom, he preached Christ, openly and powerfully, with the eloquence of an angel, and the calmness of self-immolation. Crowds flocked to hear him, and multitudes were converted to that Jesus whom he preached. Among these was a young man, a priest, who already had been led to doubt the dogmas of popery, and whose willing heart gladly drank in from the holy lips of Wishart the glorious doctrines of Christ. This young man was John Knox.

George Wishart had but one business to do on earth. Deliberately and solemnly he had devoted himself to God, though he knew well that a terrible death must end the work which was given him to do, and God, who accepted the sacrifice, crowned the willing victim with the garlands of his love, and poured upon him the oil of consecration. George Wishart was honored with marks of

divine approbation seldom vouchsafed to man; and by these his spirit was sustained unbroken in the midst of the horrible tempest that incessantly beat upon him, from the time that he unfurled the standard of Jesus, until that standard was planted in his grave, and waved gloriously over his dust.

Under the bold and powerful preaching of this very remarkable man, multitudes were converted to the truth. Wherever he went, crowds flocked to hear him, and Beaton, in whose heart the venom of the old red dragon was ever active, devised various schemes to entrap and destroy him. From all, however, he was delivered, until the time approached, when, according to his unwavering presage, he was to seal his testimony with his life.

Being at the house of Joseph Watson, of Innergowrie, Wishart was observed to rise before day and walk out to the garden. Certain circumstances led two of his friends to follow him. At first he was observed to pace the walk for some time, uttering deep sobs and groans, and then he fell upon his face, and in this posture continued for an hour to agonize in prayer. On the next morning, being interrogated as to the matter which weighed so heavily upon his heart, he replied, "I am assured that my travail is nearly ended. Pray God, that now I shrink not when the battle waxes most hot."

Soon after this he was seized and carried to St. Andrews, and an ecclesiastical court was immediately summoned for his trial. This proceeding was altogether illegal, and in open contempt of the authority of the regent, yet none dared to lift hand or voice against it.

When brought before this self-appointed tribunal, Wishart defended himself with great power and boldness against the various specifications of heresy. Charge after charge was screamed in his ears by a furious priest, who, his mouth foaming with rage, and his face running with sweat, shouted the allegations, mingled with abuse and execrations; but with the utmost calmness Wishart drew from Scripture such pointed replies, that the crowd that filled the body of the church were astonished, and many of them convinced, while the prelates writhed like detected felons.

To the thunder of their terrible anathemas, he made no other answer than the words of Malachi: "I will curse your blessings, and bless your curses, saith the Lord;" and to the charge of heresy, he replied by proving clearly, from the book of inspiration, that the Romish Church, and not himself, was heretical.

Maddened by his calmness, and the marks of approbation exhibited by the admiring crowd, the prelates condemned him to immediate death.



While the stake and pile were in preparation, Wishart was re-committed to the castle. The captain of the fortress, who was a devout man, asked him if he would breakfast with him and some friends. Wishart replied that he would do so with pleasure, as he knew them to be godly men.

After all were seated around the table, Wishart requested them to bear with him for a little while, and then discoursed for half an hour concerning the Lord's supper, and the death and sufferings of Jesus. Then, giving thanks, he blessed the bread and wine, and bidding them remember that Christ died for them, and exhorting them to feed spiritually upon him by faith, he administered to each of them, and partook himself, the memorials of our dying Lord. He then returned thanks and prayed for them, and saying that he would eat and drink no more in this life, he left the table.

Immediately afterward he was led forth to execution, being first clothed with a black robe, hung around with bags of gunpowder. The pile was prepared at the west gate, and, immediately opposite, the windows of the castle were hung with rich hangings, and velvet cushions were placed for the cardinal and prelates, who lolled upon them to enjoy the torments of the noble martyr.

Just before Wishart expired he looked toward the cardinal, and said, "He who in such state, from that high place, feasteth his eyes upon my torments, within a few days shall be hanged out at the same window, to be seen with as much ignominy as he now sitteth there in pride!" This prediction was literally fulfilled a short time afterward, when Norman Leslie, and a little band of sixteen desperate men, surprised the castle, which the cardinal had fortified with great care, and driving out ten times their number, killed the prelate in his bed-chamber. His body was hanged out of the window in order to convince the populace that the tyrant was really dead.

The preaching and martyrdom of Wishart wrought a wonderful change in public sentiment. The common people, as well as the higher classes, were led to examine the pretensions of the priests with boldness, and when once the charm of superstitious reverence was broken, the native shrewdness of the people was sufficient to detect the falsity of the doctrines they had been taught to regard as sacred. An amusing anecdote has been preserved, which may throw some light upon the state of public feeling at that time.

Shortly before the death of Wishart there came a man from Rome bringing a quantity of relics, and other wonderful things, which he exhibited for sale. Being near Haddington, on a holyday, he opened his pack, and offered his sacred wares to the country

people who gathered round to hear his wonderful stories, and see his miraculous merchandise. Among other things, the man exhibited a little bell, to which he ascribed the singular power of detecting perjury. "If," said he, "any man shall swear, with his hand upon this bell, if he swear the truth, he may remove his hand, and the bell will present no difference of appearance; but if he swear falsely, his hand shall stick to the bell, and, stranger still, the bell will split asunder." At this statement the simple people began to wonder, and admire the blessed bell which was possessed of such mysterious and awful power; but among them there happened to be a farmer who had been somewhat enlightened by Protestant teaching. He stepped forward, and requested leave to take the bell in his hand and examine it. This being granted, he asked the owner of the holy wares if he would permit him to make oath upon the bell in presence of the company, as he wished to swear concerning a very important matter. The man, of course, consented. Then the farmer, laying his hand upon the talismanic bell, turned to the people, and said, "I swear in the presence of the living God, and before these good people, that the pope is anti-christ, and that all the rabble of his clergy, cardinals, archbishops, bishops, priests, and monks, with the rest of the crew, are locusts come from hell to delude the people and withdraw them from God: moreover, I promise they will return to hell." Then lifting his hand from the bell, he cried, "See, my friends, my hand does not stick, and the bell is not changed! it follows, therefore, according to this man's declaration, that I have sworn the truth." The conclusion was irresistible: the pious pedler made off, and none after this ventured to import relics and other Romish trinkets into Scotland.

On the night that Wishart was apprehended, John Knox begged to be permitted to accompany him to prison and to death. But this Wishart refused, saying, "No; return to your bairns"—meaning God's children—"May God bless you! One is sufficient for the sacrifice." Accordingly, Knox sought refuge in the house of a gentleman to whose children he acted as tutor, while he laboured diligently to propagate the truth, and watch over the feeble and persecuted church which Wishart had bequeathed him. Soon, however, he was obliged to take refuge in the castle of St. Andrews, which was still held by the party who had seized it. It was in this castle that he was first induced to take upon him the office of a preacher. The persons who held it were not Protestants; but as they were in arms against the Romish clergy, they permitted the reformers, as well as the papists, to preach under the protection of their cannon.

After accepting the ministerial office, Knox was not long idle. A certain dean, John Annan, a Romish ecclesiastic, had been very troublesome to John Rough, the reformed preacher, who acted as pastor to the little band of fugitives who had fled from persecution to St. Andrews. Knox, who was a far more able disputant than Rough, undertook, in his behalf, the controversy, which was first conducted in writing. Upon one occasion, however, Annan rose in the church, and denounced the Protestant doctrine in no very measured terms, and refusing to dispute with Knox, declared that the authority of the church damned all Lutherans and heretics, and therefore no disputation was necessary. Knox replied, "Before we hold ourselves convinced, we must define the church by the marks of the true church given to us in Scripture. We must discern the immaculate spouse of Jesus Christ from the mother of confusion—the spiritual Babylon—lest we submit ourselves to Satan, thinking that we submit to Christ: for as for your Roman Church, and the authority thereof, I no more doubt it to be the synagogue of Satan, and the head thereof, called the pope, to be that man of sin, of whom the apostle speaketh, than I doubt that Jesus suffered by procurement of the visible church of Jerusalem. Yea, I offer myself, by word or writing, to prove the Roman Church this day to be further degenerate from the purity which was in the days of the apostles, than was the church of the Jews from the ordinance given by Moses, when they consented to the death of Jesus Christ."

This was startling language, and such as had never before been openly spoken in Scotland. Casting aside every hope of remodeling the Church of Rome, Knox laid the axe at the root of the enormous upas. He boldly declared the dominant church to be a synagogue of Satan, the predicted Babylon, the apostate antichrist—and this, too, when all Scotland was prostrate at the feet of the pope, except a feeble band shut up in a solitary fortress, which they only held until the best conditions could be obtained from their enemies. But Knox was a stranger to fear. Though feeble in body, his spirit was as daring as ever animated a mortal frame.

As soon as he had made the bold declaration above mentioned, the people cried out, "If this be so, we have been miserably deceived, therefore we require you, in the name of God, that you prove what you have affirmed." Knox readily agreed, and the next Sunday was appointed for his first sermon. At the hour agreed upon, he ascended the pulpit, and took for his text Daniel vii, 24–26, "And another *king* shall rise after them; and he shall be diverse from the first, and he shall subdue three kings. And



he shall speak great words against the Most High, and shall wear out the saints of the Most High, and think to change times and laws : and they shall be given into his hand, until a time and times and the dividing of time," &c.

The sermon was plain, pointed, and conclusive, and well worthy of record did our limits permit. Suffice it, however, to say, that it was a plain avowal of Scripture doctrine, illustrated by the canon law and the well-known state of the Romish Church. It was listened to by the university, the sub-prior, and many canons and friars, to whom the preacher boldly referred for the truth of his quotations.

This was taking the bull by the horns in earnest. People were astonished at the daring of the man, as well as the cogency of his argument. The clergy summoned a convention to meet in the town, and called Rough and Knox to answer for their heresy. They both complied, and certain accusations were made against them, when Knox defended himself so ably, that the friar, who was put up to confute him, was driven from all his positions, and finally asserted, in defense of the sacraments, that the apostles had not received the Holy Ghost when they wrote the epistles, but that after the reception of this divine Instructor they instituted the sacraments. For this assertion he was immediately reproved by the prior ; and being much confused, he plunged on from bad to worse, and attempted to prove the doctrine of purgatory from the sixth book of Virgil's *Æneid*. At last, beaten out of every other defense, the discomfited friar appealed to the authority of the church, that unanswerable argument against all reason and revelation. "The church," said Knox, "has no authority against the word of God." "Then," said the friar, "you will leave us no church." "Indeed," replied John, "I read in David, that there is a church of the malignants—that church you may have without God's word, and directly fighting against it ; but as for me, I will be of none other church but that which has Christ for its pastor : which hears his voice, and will not hear a stranger." The result of the bold and able preaching of Knox was the conversion to the reformed doctrines of every man in the castle, and numbers of the inhabitants of the town. The clergy, being terribly alarmed, called a French force to their assistance, and invested the fortress so closely, that it surrendered upon certain conditions, which, however, were not observed, for Knox and many others were sent to the French galleys, contrary to stipulation.

In this terrible condition the Scotch prisoners remained for nearly two years, suffering what none can tell. Every effort was made



to induce them to renounce their opinions, or, at least, conform externally to the usages of the Church of Rome ; but it is a fact as extraordinary as honorable to their memory, that none of these wretched prisoners could be induced, by promises or threatenings, to pay even the slightest respect to the host and images of the saints. Though chained to the oar, these fearless men treated the paraphernalia of popery with as much contempt as if their feet had been upon the heather, and their hands on the claymore. Whenever the host and images were paraded, those that had hats put them on, and those that had none covered their heads with whatever they could. At last the priests painted an image of the Virgin on a board, and caused it to be passed through the galleys with the command that each prisoner should do it reverence. One of the Scotchmen, feeling the same sort of abhorrence of the idols as a Jew might have felt at the contact of pork, watched his opportunity when the image was passed by him, and threw it into the sea, with a gruff admonition to her "ladyship to save herself by swimming, as she was light enough." After liberation from the galleys, Knox was invited into England to assist in the effort, making by Edward VI. and Cranmer, to reform the church, which Henry VIII. had merely modified. Here he rendered very important services, and, as a mark of royal approbation, was made one of the chaplains to the king, and offered a bishopric. The latter, however, he declined upon conscientious grounds. Upon the accession of bloody Mary, Knox was compelled to fly to the continent, and it was during this banishment that he wrote several powerful pamphlets, and, among others, the famous one entitled, "The First Blast of the Trumpet against the monstrous Regiment of Women"—the word regiment meaning government. This was an argument to prove that it is contrary to reason, experience, and the will of God, for a woman to rule a nation, and though the matter is not very complimentary, nor the style very elegant, the reasoning is of a kind not easy to be refuted. Knox did not believe a word about the divine right of kings. He regarded monarchy as a matter of mere expediency, and he perceived, as clearly as we now do, the absurdity of investing a female with legislative or executive power. As to the style of the pamphlet, it was abundantly polite enough for the Jezebel to whom it was addressed. Knox did not take up his trumpet to make sweet music for royal ears, but to blow a warning blast, and he was more anxious that it should give a certain sound, than agreeable melody. The publication, however, proved impolitic, as it brought down upon him the bitter hatred both of Elizabeth and Mary of Scotland.

While our reformer was abroad, circumstances occurred which led to an insurrectionary movement on the part of the Protestant nobility, who assembled in arms, and pledged themselves to protect each other in the enjoyment of the rights of conscience. Knox hurried to their assistance, and was greatly instrumental in bringing about the events which resulted in the deposition of the queen regent, and the establishment of Protestantism as the religion of the land.

His honesty and disinterestedness were above suspicion; his piety could not be questioned; and his daring courage, founded upon invincible fidelity to principle, was of so extraordinary a kind that, even in a time and country where almost all were courageous, he was reputed the "bravest of the brave." The intrepidity of Knox was not of that brutal or instinctive kind that springs from an incapacity to estimate danger; his boldness was reflective and calm. He knew when to fly from his enemies, and when to confront them; and he did neither without mature deliberation. It was during this revolutionary movement that he persisted in his design of preaching in a certain church, though forewarned that a party of soldiers had orders to fire upon him as soon as he commenced. This was not the rash act of a mad enthusiast. He knew that such an example of fearlessness and unwavering faith was needed at that time, to inspire courage in the timid, and excite emulation in the brave.

John Knox has been decried by some historians as a very Vandal; a rude, inconsiderate savage, who delighted in the destruction of noble buildings and beautiful works of art. Now the truth is, that the demolition of the monasteries and cathedrals was not the work of Knox, nor any other of the reformed leaders. It was everywhere the act of an incensed people, who had long been oppressed by the lordly prelates who inhabited these palaces, and officiated in these churches. Many of the religious houses, over the ruins of which certain writers whine in such melancholy strains, were notorious dens of licentiousness, and the people who dwelt in their neighborhood had long writhed under a species of tyranny, of all others the hardest to be endured, and for which terrible vengeance is always taken in the day of retribution.

The first of these acts of demolition was done at Perth. John Knox had preached a sermon against the mass in the cathedral of that city, then the head quarters of the Protestant nobles, or "lords of the congregation," as they were called. After service was over, and the congregation dismissed, a priest uncovered a rich altarpiece, and in the presence of some idlers, who still lingered in the

church, prepared to say mass. A boy, who stood near the altar, made some offensive remark, which caused the priest to give him a severe blow. The little heretic immediately retaliated by throwing a stone, which missed his reverence, and hitting an unlucky saint, who happened to be in the way, broke him to pieces. At this the bystanders rushed upon the rest of the ornaments and images, and dealt with them in the same way. A mob soon collected from all parts of the town, and finding nothing left for them to do, hurried off to the monasteries, which they forced, plundered, and demolished.

The leaders and preachers exerted themselves to the utmost to arrest the torrent; but the long pent-up indignation of the people was not to be restrained.

Another feeling than that to which I have alluded, impelled the poorer classes to sack the religious houses. A notion was widely prevalent among them that the revenues of the monks, and especially the receipts of the begging friars, were, of right, the property of the poor, whom God has appointed heirs of human charity; and they looked upon the fraternities of monks, who neither toiled nor spun, but monopolized the alms of the rich, as thieves who plundered the patrimony of the afflicted and the needy. An insight into the pantry and wardrobe of one of the monasteries of Perth, was well calculated to increase this feeling. The sheets, beds, &c., were found to be as luxurious as could be seen in any baronial castle in the kingdom, and although there were but eight monks attached to the convent, and it was then the middle of May, they found eight puncheons of salt beef in the cellar, besides quantities of other provisions, and wine, ale, and beer, in abundance. All this was distributed among the poor by a summary act of replevin. The example was followed all over the kingdom, and Knox, though at first he denounced these proceedings, was soon convinced that they were necessary and proper.

The people were in the midst of a civil war, the termination of which no man could foresee, and unquestionably it was proper to destroy the fortresses and provisions of the enemy. The wonder is, that the monks themselves suffered no violence from those who well knew that no mercy would be shown to them, if any reverse should place them in the hands of the Romish ecclesiastics. It is highly creditable to the people of Scotland, that they proceeded no further in their vengeance than to destroy the buildings which had so long harbored their oppressors. For this, independently of any vindictive feeling, there was justification enough in the remark of Knox, "If you would get rid of the rooks, you must pull down their nests."



One of the first acts of the parliament that dethroned the regent was to adopt a religious creed, which might be the basis of a national establishment. John Knox drew up the Confession of Faith, which was accepted. It is a noble instrument, simple, dignified, and forcible, and withal so carefully worded that, if ever the time shall come, and how soon it may come is known only to God, when it shall be necessary for the Calvinist and Arminian churches to draw closer together, and stand shoulder to shoulder in defense of their common rights, this creed of John Knox, with but little modification, would be an all-sufficient basis of confederation.

Having repudiated popery, the government next proceeded to organize a church establishment. For this purpose, Knox, with five other ministers, was requested to prepare a plan. These learned and pious men determined to disregard all existing forms of church government, and, taking the Bible for their guide, to construct the best system they could. The result was the establishment of the Presbyterian organization, much as it now exists, although the peculiar circumstances of the time rendered certain arrangements expedient which are now dispensed with.

This plan of church government, as submitted by Knox, is well worthy of our consideration from two circumstances. The first is, that it required the establishment of a public school in the bounds of each parish, thus originating the great measure of common-school education.

If John Knox was the savage he has been represented; if he was a gloomy fanatic; a despiser of authority, and a hater of women, this one gift which he bequeathed the world is enough to cover all his sins against popery and politeness, and elevate his memory to the highest place in our grateful recollections.

The other circumstance connected with this church organization to which we wish particularly to call attention, is, that it is founded upon the republican doctrine of equality, and seems to be the origin of that representative plan of elective government which has since been so generally applied to the civil economy of this country.

Knox's political creed was curiously republican for the age in which he lived. While he uniformly inculcated a conscientious obedience to the lawful command of rulers, as long as they did not trample upon obvious rights, nor cease to execute justice, he nevertheless maintained that no family, or class of men, has an inherent and personal right to govern a people without their consent, and that a nation has a right to require that certain laws, in accordance



with the divine laws, shall be established for the guidance of both the governors and the governed. He regarded all government as a mutual compact, either tacit or expressed, and when a sovereign violates such compact, and becomes a tyrant, he thought that the people had a right to dethrone him, and elect another.

Such are the opinions now known as liberal, and of these the despised and vilified John Knox was the apostle. He found them in the Bible ; with the Bible they have come down to us ; and as long as that divine volume shall be to us a holy and an open book, these opinions, and the free institutions based upon them, will be triumphantly maintained. But if that book be repudiated ; or if it be shut up from the people ; or if the common schools, which were instituted for the safe transmission of truth from generation to generation, be abandoned or abused, we may depend upon it that the spirit of freedom will depart, and the forms of it will soon follow.

Time will not permit us to dwell much longer upon the political and religious events in which Knox was concerned during the remainder of his eventful and useful life ; but there is a part of history which we must glance at, as it has been the chosen subject of bitter invective and unmitigated censure. We allude to his behavior to Mary, queen of Scots.

A great deal of ingenuity and eloquence has been exhausted in the defense and eulogy of Mary, and the vilification of Knox. She was a woman and a queen ; beautiful, accomplished ; unfortunate, and a Romanist ; and upon all these items the world has been surfeited with her praises. But all her winning qualities were external. Never was the striking illustration of the whited sepulchre more appropriate than as descriptive of her. Bigoted, crafty, unprincipled to an extent almost incredible ; cruel, and perfidious ; this remarkable woman covered over all these hideous features of character with an engaging countenance, a bewitching smile, a tender and affectionate manner, and all the arts of deception that could be learned in a French convent, and practiced at a French court.

In all ages women of this character have proved the greatest curses of the world. From Helen and Cleopatra, and the daughter of Herodias, down to Mary of Lorraine, and *her* daughter, the queen of Scotland, beautiful and profligate women have been the most dangerous of all evil doers.

When Mary arrived in Scotland, in pursuance of the invitation of the Protestant nobility, she found the reformed religion an inherent part of the constitution ; and from that unhappy day which saw her land amid the shouts and congratulations of the too cre-

dulous multitude, until public indignation drove her, a branded murderess from the throne she had stained with a husband's blood, she never ceased to plot and work for the overthrow of the established religion, and the restoration of that terrible system of persecution which the nation had cast off by a convulsive effort of suffering strength.

On the very first Sunday after her arrival she caused the mass to be openly celebrated, in direct violation of law. A storm of indignation was immediately raised, but by flattery and smiles, promises and tears, she so wrought upon the rude nobles, who gathered around her, that the cloud passed harmlessly away, and the men, who had driven out the priests and the mass at the point of the sword, suffered both to return for the boon of a smile, or a sweet low confidential whisper, or an admirably wept tear!

As noble after noble arrived at court, each passed through a regular course of fierce indignation, calm toleration, and ardent devotion to the lovely woman, who dextrously wound round their rude hands the silken cords that held them more securely than fetters of iron. Lord Ochiltree was among the last of the lords of the congregation to arrive, and when he learned that the mass had been re-established already, he was exceedingly enraged: an old man, who stood by him, quietly remarked, "My lord, I see that the fire edge is not off you yet; but when the holy water of the court is sprinkled upon you, you will become as temperate as the rest; for I have been here now five days, and I have heard many say, when they first came, 'Let us hang the priest,' but after they have been once or twice to the abbey, their fervency was gone. I think there must be some enchantment about the court." The old man's prediction was verified, and Ochiltree was, ere long, as quiet as the rest.

There was one man, however, who was made of sterner stuff, and it was well for Scotland and for the world that God had reserved such a man to uphold the truth in the day of general defection. John Knox was the only serious obstacle in the way of the plan which the French court had matured for the subjugation of Scotland to the condition of a province of France, and a dependency of Rome. But he was an obstacle that could no more be moved by threats or flattery than could the Grampian hills.

On the very first Sunday after the mass had been celebrated, under the protection of Lord James Murray, and other Protestant leaders, Knox preached a sermon against idolatry, in which he said, "I fear a single mass more than an army of ten thousand men: for in God there is strength to resist and confound multitudes;

but if we join hands with idolatry, God's presence and defense will leave us, and what shall become of us then?"

The queen being informed of the tenor of the sermon, sent for the preacher, and upbraided him for his conduct; accusing him of various offenses against her authority, and especially of having written that unpardonable pamphlet, "The First Blast of the Trumpet."

Knox denied, respectfully, but firmly, that he had done any thing to invalidate her authority, and assured her that he was as loyal a subject as she had in the realm.

"Your book," said the queen, "denies my authority to govern." Knox answered, "Please your majesty, learned men in all ages have differed from common opinion on many matters of importance, and yet have submitted quietly to evils they could not mend; so, madam, if others find no inconvenience in the government of a woman, I shall live as well content under your majesty's rule as Paul did under the Roman emperor."

The queen rejoined, "You have taught the people another religion than their princes allowed, and how can this doctrine be of God, since he commands men to obey their rulers?"

"Madam," replied the intrepid man, who might well have felt indignant at the avowal of such detestable doctrines by the sovereign of the country, "true religion had not its origin in princes, but in the eternal God, and often princes are, of all others, most ignorant of God's religion. If the seed of Abraham had been of Pharaoh's religion, what piety would have been left in the world? and if the apostles had obeyed the religion of the Roman emperors, where would now be the doctrines of Christ? Daniel and his fellows were subjects of Nebuchadnezzar and Darius, yet they obeyed the religious commands neither of the one nor the other; for the three Hebrews said, 'We make it known unto thee, O king! that we will *not* worship thy gods;' and Daniel prayed in defiance of the royal command."

"Yet," replied the queen, "these resisted not with the sword." "God," replied the reformer, "had not given them the means."

At this unexpected reply the queen lost her affected composure. A scowl came upon her usually pleasant brow, and she gazed upon Knox for more than a quarter of an hour without uttering a word. At length, recovering herself, she resumed her interrogatories, and finally, in reply to some remark of the reformer's, she fiercely exclaimed, "Yours is not the church that I will sustain: I will defend the Church of Rome, which I think to be the true church of God."



This bold announcement of the royal purpose to overthrow the established constitution, and bring back the fire and the stake, the superstition and the wickedness, which the people of Scotland had struggled so desperately to banish, was enough to arouse the indignation of a less ardent spirit than that which burned in the feeble body of John Knox. "Madam," he replied, "I offer myself to prove that the church of the Jews, who crucified Christ, was not so far degenerate from the ordinances of Moses as the Church of Rome is from the religion preached by the apostles."

"My conscience," replied the queen, "is different."

"Conscience," rejoined Knox, "requires knowledge, and of true knowledge I fear you have little."

"I have heard and read," replied the queen.

"So, madam, did the Jews that crucified Christ read both the law and the prophets after their manner."

We give but the outlines of this remarkable conversation, in which two acute and antagonist minds were measuring each other. From this time Knox thoroughly understood the purposes and the character of Mary. Being asked, after he left her presence, what he thought of her, he answered, "If there be not in her a proud mind, a crafty wit, and an obdurate heart against God and his truth, my judgment faileth me."

The progress of the popish plot was rapid. By little and little Mary won way for the return of the banished religion. She flattered the vain, encouraged the ambitious, who hoped to share her throne, threatened the timid, and cajoled the simple, until the success of similar movements in France enabled her to take higher ground in opposition to the Protestant religion, and she consummated her treason against the nation by signing the league with other popish princes, in which each monarch was bound to extirpate the reformed religion in his dominions.

News having arrived that some massacre of Protestants had been perpetrated in France, this Mary, this lovely, interesting, amiable woman, gave a ball in honor of the deed!

In those days there were no newspapers to denounce such deeds, and carry the news of them to every fireside. The pulpit, therefore, was the only means of communication upon matters of religious interest, and on the next Sunday Knox preached against balls in general, and the queen's ball in particular, and took occasion to denounce the queen's uncles, who had perpetrated the villany in question, in much such terms as they deserved.

For this offense he was again summoned to the queen's presence and charged with the misdemeanor. In reply, he recapitulated all



that he had said, verbatim, for the benefit of her majesty and her counsellors. After he ended, the queen turned her back on him, and Knox left the apartment, as he says, with "a reasonable merry countenance." Some of the queen's attendants, being offended at his smiling appearance, made some remarks as he passed through the ante-chamber, among which, Knox overheard the words, "He is not afraid," upon which he turned, and said, "Why should the pleasant face of a lady affray me? I have looked in the faces of many angry men, and have not been afraid beyond measure."

Notwithstanding Knox's faithful warnings, things went on from bad to worse. The probability of the queen's marriage to a Romish prince was publicly debated, and the cause of Protestantism was rapidly becoming desperate. In the midst of this general defection, John Knox again availed himself of the pulpit to warn the people of the calamities with which they were threatened, and particularly of the fatal consequences of such a matrimonial connection as Mary contemplated.

Again he was summoned to appear before the queen, who burst into a paroxysm of rage as soon as she saw him—scolding, weeping, and vowing vengeance against the man whom she had neither been able to disarm by flattery, which she had privately attempted, nor overawe by threats. Upon this occasion, all the formidable artillery of female wrath was combined with the fierceness of royal indignation to beat down the obstinate reformer; but Knox was proof against all these weapons, which so rarely fail to effect their purpose. He mildly insisted that the contemplated marriage would be ruinous to the interests of the nation, and exhorted the queen to dismiss all such intentions. At length, however, being moved by her tears, which, albeit, had more of rage than tenderness about them, he attempted a few words of apology, which, like the apologies of most straight-forward and simple-minded men, was rather awkward. He said he was really sorry to afflict her majesty; indeed, he did not like to witness the distress of any living being, and could hardly bear to whip his boys when they deserved it.

The queen now sought an opportunity to be fully revenged upon the intractable man who had resisted all her blandishments and threatenings, and she saw, with exultation, the day approach, when, stripped of his friends and his influence, by her arts, and the overshadowing authority of the crown, she might make him feel the weight of her long-hoarded indignation. At length the day arrived. By one means or other, the powerful friends of the reformer were

brought over to the royal interest, and Knox, with a few faithful ministers, was left almost alone to stem the current of popular feeling and royal influence. But so far as his conduct was concerned, it mattered little to John Knox whether all the world was banded against him, while assured that God was with him. Even the defection of these early friends, by whose side he had fought the battles of liberty, and the ungenerous reproaches of men whom he had long loved, could not break down the spirit of that war-worn veteran.

As the noble oak, stripped of its foliage by the frost of winter, tosses its arms as freely to the tempest, and offers its breast as boldly to the storm, as when it waved its leafy branches to the summer breeze, or dipped them in the warm light of the summer sun; so stood this doomed and forsaken man, steadfast and immovable.

Some Protestants having been cited to trial for riot, it was judged proper to send a notice to the principal Protestant nobles to attend the trial. Knox wrote a circular to this effect, and a copy falling into the queen's hands, it was tortured into an act of high treason, and Knox was summoned before the privy council for trial.

Previously to the day appointed, great efforts were made to intimidate him, and to induce him to acknowledge his fault, and throw himself upon the queen's mercy. His most intimate and powerful friends, even Maxwell and Murray, urged him to this course, declaring that they had had great difficulty in mitigating the queen's resentment, and nothing could save him but timely submission. Knox firmly refused to do any such thing. He said he was conscious of no crime, and, therefore, should confess none: and knowing that God would not forsake him, he cared but little what course any men might take.

On the day of trial the public anxiety was greatly excited, and all the avenues to the palace were thronged with people, waiting to hear the result. When the counsellors had taken their seats, Knox was made to stand at the bottom of the table, and then the queen, arrayed in great state, walked into the apartment, and seated herself at the head of the board. She had been assured that conviction was certain, and already she was anticipating the sweetness of long-coveted revenge. As soon as she saw the prisoner she burst into a loud fit of scornful laughter, and exclaimed, "That man has made me weep, and shed no tears himself. I will now see if I cannot make him weep."

In answer to interrogatories, Knox avowed himself the author

of the circular, but denied that it was treasonable. The queen's secretaries contended that it was so, and urged him to confess his fault, and his regret at having done a deed so wicked. As, however, they could point out no passage in the circular that could be tortured into treason except one, in which Romanists were accused of cruelty, Knox went into a defense of the assertion, and proved the cruelty of the Church of Rome so fearlessly and so effectively, that, notwithstanding the queen came to the rescue of her discomfited secretaries, and took the examination upon herself, the whole council, except the queen's immediate dependents, acquitted him of the foul charge—even the man who had accused him voting in his favor. Thus the Lord, in whom he trusted, granted him a triumphant deliverance, and covered his enemies with confusion.

Time will not permit us to follow any further the steps by which these two distinguished personages were conducted, the one to infamy, imprisonment, and the scaffold; the other to a peaceful and honorable death. Let it suffice to say, that the murder of Darnley, and the queen's precipitate and disgusting union with Bothwell, destroyed all her schemes when ripe for execution. The admiration and romantic affection which had made the most powerful nobles in the country her devoted slaves, was, by these monstrous acts, converted into fullness of loathing and abhorrence, and she was shut up from the sight of men, as an object too disgusting for the public gaze.

In the sixty-seventh year of his age John Knox rested from his labors, and fell asleep in the arms of Jesus. His end was serene and glorious. He had fought the good fight; he had kept the faith; and his soul was full of glorious anticipation of that crown which the righteous Judge would give him in that day. A few days previous to his death he sent for the pastor and elders of the church, in which he had so long labored, and gave them his parting benediction. On that solemn occasion he said to them, "The day now approaches, for which I have vehemently thirsted, when I shall be released from my labors, and be with Christ, and now God is my witness, whom I have served, that I have taught nothing but the true and solid doctrine of his gospel; and have had it for my only object to instruct the ignorant, to confirm the faithful, to comfort the weak, and resist the proud."

After repeated declarations of the fullness of his hope, and the joy of his triumph, John Knox was gathered to his fathers; and over his grave the regent Merton pronounced that noble eulogy, "There lies he who never feared the face of man."

It is one of the most remarkable evidences of the excellence of



Knox's character, that the gravest charge which even hatred can bring against him is, that of rudeness to a loathsome woman, whom some have chosen for their idol, seemingly under the influence of that singularly depraved taste which leads the heathen to select the most monstrous and hideous things to be their gods.

Some people have very odd notions of cruelty. Peter Pindar represents a French dandy as rebuking a wretch who was writhing on the wheel, because he made an exceedingly unpleasant and impolite noise; and really there are some "petit maitres" in our day who seem to be equally fastidious about breaches of etiquette. There are men who can read of the intolerable sufferings of a nation, under the wicked rule of a sovereign, and even of the murder of hundreds of obscure men, for the crime of worshipping God, without the slightest emotion of horror, and yet these exquisitely sensitive things are thrown into a paroxysm of sympathy when a free and fearless man has the harshness and hardihood to bring tears into the eyes of a beautiful queen, by telling her the plain truth—without a single redeeming grain of sugar to make it palatable.

There was once a rough man preaching in the wilderness of Judea, who called the dignified Pharisees "a generation of vipers." Doubtless they thought him very rude. Moreover, this same rough man forced his way through crowds of cringing things that disgraced the name of Jew, into the presence of Herod and his profligate mistress, and sharply denounced their conduct as wicked and scandalous. It is likely that the beautiful Herodias wept on that occasion, and that these same cringing and creeping things united their little voices to villify the barbarian who could thus disregard the passionate distress of royal beauty! But John was not a reed to be shaken by every breeze. He did his duty without fear or favor: he loved men too much to suffer sin upon them without rebuke.

Such a man was John Knox. We should not go into the moral wilderness, where the pioneers of truth are hewing their way through time-hardened obstacles, in search of men of soft manners, and silken garments, and courteous tongues. Such love to dwell in kings' palaces. We may find them in plenty, hanging about the skirts of power; watching each coming change, and trimming their little barks to every breeze of favor. But we must go to the waste places of history to find God's great men; those whom he honors; those who only deserve the name of *great*; men so nobly intelligent, and so beautifully good, that the mind can scarcely form an image of superior excellence without soaring above

humanity ; men whose residence on earth may reconcile the most fastidious spirit to humanity, and the prospect of whose companionship in heaven may innocently mingle with our brightest anticipations of felicity.

"Names are things." It is unfortunate that they are so, for names are often inaccurately applied. Terms loosely transferred from the physical to the moral, have become permanently fixed by use, and often keep up erroneous analogies in the public mind. Thus the term "great," which in the material world is applied to things of superior size or vast extent, has been very improperly used as descriptive of moral excellence. Mere amplitude of intelligence, or of intellectual knowledge, cannot make a man *great*. In the natural world greatness is an element of sublimity ; but in morals, sublimity is an element of greatness. Was Bacon great, who used his extraordinary powers to wheedle a woman ; to secure a place ; and to murder his friend ? Was Carnot great, who prostituted an intellect, almost angelic, to sustain and perpetuate the government of the guillotine ? No ! no ! There was nothing high—nothing superior to earth—nothing sublime in the character of these men : *they* were not great.

The essentials of greatness are purity of heart ; a resemblance to the nature of Him who fills heaven and earth with the glory of his goodness ; and united to this that wonderful "virtue" of which the apostle speaks ; a courage which God only can bestow ; and which, when given, makes the meanest man a hero.

God has many jewels. Some reflect his glory more brightly, others more beautifully ; but purity and hardness are the essential qualities of them all. While impervious to all grosser things, their inmost depths are open to the rays of that luminary, for whom only they burn and sparkle ; and with the serenest of them all, God can write his glorious name upon the highest and hardest tablets of this world's history.

If the possession of these jewel qualities constitutes moral greatness, then Knox was truly great. He was a man of clean hands, and pure heart, and fearless spirit. May God raise up many such who shall shine for ever, the crown jewels of Immanuel's kingdom.

*Baltimore, March, 1842.*

ART. II.—*The Coming of Christ.*

THE celebrated prophecy of the destruction of Jerusalem, contained in the twenty-fifth chapter of Matthew, has furnished matter of triumph, alternately, to the Christian, to the skeptic, and to the Universalist.

The Christian has drawn from the particularity of its prophetic details, and the completeness of their fulfillment, a great argument for the prescience of its Author and the truth of his religion.

The infidel, however, arrests the Christian in the full tide of triumphant argument, by reminding him that the day of judgment is represented as "immediately after" the destruction of Jerusalem, and that both are, in fact, very much identified as one event. And this close and inseparable connection, he affirms, falsified as it has been by the lapse of subsequent ages, furnishes so glaring an instance of prophetic untruth upon the lips of Jesus himself, as to transform this argument for the truth of Christianity into a complete demonstration of its falsehood.

Thus the skeptical historian, Gibbon, assures us that in the apostolic age "it was universally believed that the end of the world and the kingdom of heaven was at hand. The near approach of this wonderful event was predicted by the apostles; the tradition of it was preserved by their earliest disciples; and those who understood in their literal sense the discourses of Christ himself, were obliged to expect the second and glorious coming of the Son of man in the clouds, before that generation was totally extinguished, which had beheld his humble condition upon earth." And this master of the "solemn sneer" adds, in one of his insidious notes, "This expectation was countenanced by the twenty-fourth chapter of Matthew and by the first Epistle of Paul to the Thessalonians. Erasmus removes the difficulty by the help of allegory and metaphor; and the learned Grotius ventures to insinuate that for wise purposes the *pious deception* was permitted to take place." And further to illustrate how substantial an item this is, in the floating infidelity of the day, we may refer to the conferences upon religion held with Lord Byron by Dr. Kennedy, in which the latter undertook to argue the noble poet into the Christian faith. "Is there not," said his lordship, "a prophecy in the New Testament, which it is alledged has not been fulfilled," namely, that "it was declared that the end of the world should come before that generation passed away?" Dr. Kennedy, like Erasmus, endeavored to remove the difficulty by the help of allegory and metaphor; and how satisfactory



his reply was likely to be to a shrewd, worldly man, may be inferred from Mr. Galt's closing remark, "It is manifest, without saying much for Lord Byron's ingenuity, that he was fully a match for the doctor."

Dr. Kennedy was, however, sustained by such critics as Dr. Bloomfield, Townsend, Macknight, and Dr. Clarke, and, indeed, we may say, by the main body of modern commentators, in thus applying to the destruction of Jerusalem those verses which describe the coming of the Son of man, in those glowing terms which are so obviously suitable to the judgment day alone. They have felt themselves forced to this expedient by the fact, that the latter of these two events appears to be "immediately after" the former; and by the declaration, that all these things should be fulfilled before that generation had passed away. And thus the Christian removes, or rather evades the difficulty, not much, perhaps, to his own satisfaction, and very greatly to the satisfaction, or rather the triumph, of his opponent.

The orthodox interpreter is scarce extricated from this opponent when the Universalist is upon him. This new champion hears with great gratification this clear concession, that terms which so explicitly describe a day of judgment are, after all, mere *allegory*. And then he claims, with great logical justice, that if the glowing description of the coming of the Son of man in verses 29-31, are merely an allegorical description of the destruction of Jerusalem, then, certainly, the "parable of the sheep and goats," chap. xxv, 31-46, occurring, as it does, in the same discourse, and being a mere expansion of the same thing, is allegorical too. And, then, if about the most vivid description of the day of judgment in the New Testament is mere figure, *a fortiori*, any other passage you may please to quote is still more certainly so.

All this difficulty arises from a single, though a prominent passage. But there is a whole class of texts in which appears the same obvious reference to the judgment, in which the skeptic finds the same affirmation that the judgment was to occur in the apostolic age; in which the orthodox endeavors to work the same transfer to the destruction of Jerusalem, much against the natural force of the word; and in which the Universalist obtains the same complete triumph from orthodox concession. Whoever is conversant with that part of religious controversy, can but see that this interpretation of those texts has been, in fact, the cockatrice's egg from which modern Universalism has been hatched. Such being the state of the controversy, we are deeply convinced that a thorough reconsideration of the whole subject may do import-

ant service to the cause of truth and to the interests of the church.

Let us first take our Lord's discourse as exhibited in the parallel passages of the three evangelists, Matthew xxiv, Mark xiii, and Luke xxi. What we would accomplish is, to prove, in the first place, against the skeptic, that the two events, the destruction of Jerusalem, and the end of the world, are not confounded, but, in fact, are distinguished and contrasted; and that our Saviour's words do not even seem to represent the judgment day as about to occur in the apostolic age: and in the second place, to prove against the Universalist that the passages descriptive of the coming of Christ are literal and not figurative, and referable directly and solely to the judgment day. And this without any use of allegory, metaphor, or double sense, but by a simple and legitimate resort to a gospel harmony.

The same course is obviously applicable to this and other *discourses* of our Lord, as is applied by harmonists to *events* recorded partially by different evangelists. For instance, in the calling of James and John to the discipleship, Mark relates that he found them "mending their nets." What a *vraisemblance* does it communicate to this circumstance, and what a confirmation to the whole account, when we find, by comparing Luke, that the miraculous draught of fishes had occurred just before, to break their nets! Thus a complete picture of the whole transaction is formed by the junction of the different parts, and what was before an inert clause, an apparently impertinent triviality, an unexplained allusion, and, sometimes, an apparent absurdity, is at once transformed into a confirmation of Bible truth. So when three evangelists give each an abridged sketch of the present discourse, if, without any marring or transposition, the sentences of one naturally fall into the hiatus of another, what is more just than that such an insertion should be made in order to explain the subsequent parts? What each reports must have formed a part of the discourse, and the only question is, how should the parts be made to succeed each other, so as in sound judgment to present a consistent and coherent whole.

Let, then, our readers take in hand a Gospel Harmony, (Robinson's Newcome, for instance,) or some other means of bringing together the sketches of the three different reporters, who have, we may presume, given this, as they have other discourses, with more regard to substantial truth than identity of words.

Upon our Lord's assuring the disciples that not one stone of the temple should be left upon another, they, in surprise, inquire, "Tell us, when shall these things be? And what shall be the sign of thy

coming, and of the end of the world?" This was an inquiry in regard to two very different events; and our Lord's discourse, therefore, consists of *two great divisions*. Division first terminates at the close of Matthew xxiv, 35, Mark xiii, 31, and Luke xxi, 33. All this first division treats (with the exception of a single parenthetic passage) upon the *destruction of Jerusalem*. Division second, commencing with Matthew xxiv, 36, and extending to the end of the twenty-fifth chapter, treats wholly upon *the day of judgment*. We shall first examine the first division.

As the disciples seemed by their confused manner of inquiry, as differently stated by the different evangelists, to confound together the two events, viz., the sacking of the city and the *end* of the world, our Lord employs this first division in correcting their mistake, and in giving them prudential directions for their own safety, embracing four successive paragraphs: 1. He directly tells them that the *sack* is not the *end*; 2. He draws a picture of the sack and indefinitely long desolation; which he contrasts with, 3, a parenthetic sketch of the *end*; and, 4, he gives direction how the sack might be escaped. We may analyze these paragraphs at length, combining the passages of the different evangelists.

First. *He warns them that the sack of the city is not the end of the world.*

Take heed that ye be not deceived; false Christs shall appear, pretending that (*καιρος ηγγικε*) the time hath approached of my second advent, Luke xxi, 8—terrible commotions may appear to you like a falling world, Matt. xxiv, 6. All these things must be, but *the end is not yet*. Matt. xxiv, 4-7; Mark xiii, 5-7; Luke xxi, 8, 9.

Many standard commentators refer *the end* here specified to the catastrophe of Jerusalem, and make this clause to mean—all these troubles must take place—but more still remain—their termination is not yet. But

1. It is far more natural to identify this "*end*" in our Lord's answer with the "*end*" just mentioned in his disciples' question. They ask, When shall be the end of the world? He replies, that false Christs will announce (what is not to take place until the final dissolution, namely) his advent, and national convulsions would seem like a falling world, but this is not what they inquired, namely, "*the end*."

2. This phrase, "the end," occurs not only in their question, but it occurs twice again in the discourse which forms the reply. "He that shall endure unto the end, the same shall be saved," Matt. xxiv, 13. "This gospel shall be preached in all the world, and then shall the



end come," ver. 14. Arbitrarily to refer this phrase, four times used in the course of their question and his answer, in one verse to one thing, and in another verse to another thing, is no very scientific, and, perhaps, no very rational mode of interpretation. The very fact that "the end" of the world, as distinguished from the destruction of Jerusalem, forms the burden of both the question and reply, points to that as the true and uniform sense of the phrase. We may, therefore, now take it for granted, as we shall soon furnish reasons for believing that here, as elsewhere in the New Testament, "the end" designates that issue to which all our probation points—the final day—the judgment.

3. The fact that the end should not yet be, is mentioned as a motive for composure and comfort. See that ye be not troubled, *μη θροεισθε*, for the end is not yet. Be not dismayed, for you must face still more terrible disasters, they do not terminate yet—would be very cold comfort indeed. But, be not dismayed, the world will not fall—would to men, who, like the disciples, anticipated that event at the fall of the temple, a very tranquilizing speech.

4. This is evidently a cautionary and preliminary paragraph. Though false Messiahs announce that final event—Christ's advent presence—be not deceived: though the falling temple seem to presage the world's dissolution—be not dismayed. All these events do not demonstrate that one great event—these must be, but the END is not yet.

5. That the terms in this paragraph are general and preliminary is evident, for our Lord distinctly indicates that in the very next sentence—which commences the next paragraph—the details of the whole series commence: "The beginning of troubles"—the commencement of the series—would be contending kingdoms and nations, pestilences, famines, earthquakes, &c.

Second. *He pictures the signs—the sack—the dispersion—the mitigation lest the race perish—and the permanent desolation.* Matt. xxiv, 7-28; Mark xiii, 8-23; Luke xxi, 10-24.

The end, he informs them, is not yet; *for* the following events should occur previously:—1. National calamities, kingdom against kingdom, pestilences, famines, signs from heaven should be the beginning of troubles.—To the close of Matt. xxiv, 8; Mark xiii, 9; Luke xxi, 11. 2. Apostolic sufferings of persecution.—They should be violently assailed, but not a hair of their head should perish. Luke xxi, 18.—"In your patience possess ye your souls," Luke xxi, 19. The purpose and consequent result of this marvelous preservation follow, Matt. xxiv, 14, and Mark xiii, 10, namely, that the gospel might be perpetuated and be published

among all nations before the *end of the world* shall come. "And this gospel of the kingdom shall be preached in all the world for a witness unto all nations; and *then shall the end come.*" The closing phrase, "and then shall the end come," shows that the reference extends to the final millennial spread of the gospel antecedent to the judgment day. The apostles were to survive at the destruction of Jerusalem, in order that the gospel might be preserved for this ultimate millennial diffusion. 3. The CATASTROPHE.—Jerusalem should be surrounded with armies and desolated. Luke xxi, 20. The Roman legions should possess the holy of holies. 4. Flight and misery.—To the close of Matt. xxiv, 21; Mark xiii, 19; Luke xxi, 23. 5. Those days should be shortened, lest the race should perish.—To the close of Matt. xxiv, 22, and Mark xiii, 20, omitted by Luke. 6. False Christs.—The Christians must not be deceived by them into the imagination of his (second) coming, for that would be sudden and blazing as the lightning. "For as the lightning cometh out of the east, and shineth even to the west, so also shall the coming of the Son of man be," Matt. xxiv, 27. An event like this, they need by no means confound with Jerusalem falling like a prey under the Roman eagles: "For wheresoever the carcass is, there will the eagles be gathered together," Matt. xxiv, 28. 7. General massacre and dispersion throughout the world.—"And they shall fall by the edge of the sword, and shall be led away captive into all nations," Luke xxi, 24. 8. The desolation of Jerusalem for an indefinite period, perhaps of ages.—"And Jerusalem shall be trodden down of the Gentiles until the times of the Gentiles shall be fulfilled," Luke xxi, 24. This expression of our Saviour is precisely parallel to the prophecy of the apostle, Romans xi, 25, "Blindness in part hath happened unto Israel, until the fullness of the Gentiles be come in." The apostle speaks of the rejection and judicial blinding of the nation; our Saviour speaks of the desolation of their city; the former would continue blind until the πληρωμα, the *full amount* predicted by God's foreknowledge, and required by his providence *of the Gentiles, should, by conversion, come into his church*; the latter should remain under Gentile subjection until that destined period. Our Saviour implies, and the apostle expressly predicts, their subsequent restoration.

Thus then, we have, delineated by an omniscient mind and rolled out before us, the grand prophetic chart of the fall and desolations of Israel through the lapse of ages, even to the period of the restoration. It is made out by simply treating our Saviour's words as, in all fairness they should be treated, namely, by taking all he

said together, and letting the different parts of the same discourse exercise their proper influence in explaining each other.

And here is perhaps the place to show, in confutation of the skeptical view, most conclusively, that the divine speaker did not represent or imagine that the dissolution of the world would be coincident in point of time with the destruction of Jerusalem.

1. If we have rightly interpreted the first paragraph of the discourse, its whole purpose is, to distinguish the end of the world from the convulsions of Jerusalem's downfall. If any one will carefully weigh the generality of the terms in which those convulsions are alluded to, such as, that they should "hear wars" *ακουειν πολεμους* (they would not, of course, take part in them, though their ear should be stunned with their clangor) "and rumors of wars," "and commotions," "and false Christs," their comprehension is sufficient to denote as far as it was as yet necessary, the whole troubles of the times. These general terms are, of course, more specifically developed and expanded in the subsequent paragraphs; but the rough outlines are struck out in the first. The falso Christs, in particular, which are alluded to in the first paragraph, are delineated minutely in the latter part of the second paragraph, as taking place in prophecy as well as in history, even after the downfall. And then how sweeping is the last phrase, (compare Matthew and Luke,) "*ALL these things must come to pass, but the END is not yet.*" It is needless to add, that if this be a correct interpretation, it is the whole purpose of our Lord to *deny* the very identity of those two events which the skeptical interpretation understands him to *affirm*.

2. We must maintain, equally against the orthodox commentary and the skeptical insinuation, that the prediction of the preaching of the gospel *unto all nations, and then shall the end come*, is a prophetic glance at the ultimate millennial spread of Christianity. We will not stop here to inquire how illegitimately Protestant commentators, in order to sustain the application of this prediction to the apostolic days, have resorted to the use of those legends which send the apostles upon missions into Thrace, Scythia, and even India, but which they are ready, in a controversy with papists, themselves to condemn as probably little better than religious romance. But the very form of the passage itself is very indicative of our view. To say that the whole world shall be evangelized, and then the whole world shall be dissolved, is a very well-balanced antithesis; but to say the whole world shall be evangelized, and then a city shall be subjected, is rather a lame and impotent conclusion. It is giving that strange and undue importance to the



sack of the Jewish city, which we shall have further occasion to show has disfigured modern theology, and given birth to Universalist heresy. Our interpretation of this passage brings it into harmony and mutual confirmation with all those passages that describe the latter day glory. And it serves to confirm the other proofs which we bring that our Lord contradicts the idea that the downfall of Jerusalem and the end of the world were to be cotemporaneous events.

3. More decisive, however, is the proof which we may draw from the passage (Matt. xxiv, 22; Mark xiii, 20) that the days of destruction should be shortened lest the race should perish. Why terminate the days of trouble in order to continue that race, if, at that very termination, the world was to be dissolved, and the whole current of the human race was to cease. Not only were the apostles not to perish, but the Jewish race was to survive; nay, a special shortening was to be provided that that race might be perpetuated. Most assuredly, then, the whole human race was to be continued. This seems incontestible.

4. Not only was the city to be destroyed, but (Luke xxi, 24) the Jews were to be led into captivity among all nations, and Jerusalem was to be trodden down by the Gentiles until certain times were completed. Now, it would take time, after the sack, for a whole people to be led off among all nations, and there be settled in captivity. The natural idea it presents requires a protracted period. Then the treading down of the city is expressed in terms of indefinite and permanent continuity. To the apostles the designation of the time might not have been very precise, but the continuity of this state of things has shown that these ominous intimations had a meaning. The whole air of the passage shows, in fine, that our Lord meant to represent a captivity of the race among all nations, and a subjection of the city of a mysterious and protracted length; and certainly when combined with the fulfillment, it must not only prove that our Lord did not expect the immediate dissolution, but must show an agreement between prediction and event very perplexing to skepticism and very confirmatory to Christianity.

5. The voice of ancient Christian history testifies that no Christian perished in the destruction of Jerusalem. Instructed and guided by the details of this very discourse, the disciples were inspired with the assurance, and informed of the means of escape and safety. So well did they understand its consolations and directions that every individual, watching the signs of desolation, fled to the city of Pella as a safe retreat from every danger. Demonstrably, then, the immediate auditors of our Lord understood,

and rightly understood, his words to declare that *universal destruction was not at hand*. They fled because they were taught to flee. They escaped to a place of safety, because they were taught that they could attain safety. They survived the destruction of Jerusalem, because they were taught, not that all flesh should then perish, but that the ruin might all be avoided and they remain unharmed. Whatever, then, may be the cavils of skeptics, or the misconstructions of errorists, this discourse taught its immediate audience that the dissolution of the world was not at hand.

THIRD. *A parenthetic sketch of the END.*—Taking it as proved, then, that in the first paragraph of his discourse, our Lord distinguished the downfall and subjection of Jerusalem from the dissolution of the world, and that, in his second paragraph, he depicted the former of these two events, it is natural that, by way of further distinction and contrast, he should draw a brief distinctive sketch of the latter. As this is not, however, yet his main subject, he would only fling it in subsidiarily, and then resume his former thread of discourse in the next paragraph. More clearly to mark the parenthetic character of this brief passage we shall present the phrases by which it is introduced in the evangelists in three parallel columns, but give more fully the passage as it is most fully given by St. Matthew only:—

MATTHEW XXIV, 29.

Εὐθὺς δὲ. BUT immediately after the tribulation of those days the sun shall be darkened, and the

MARK XIII, 24.

Ἀλλὰ. BUT in those days, after that tribulation, the sun shall be darkened, &c.

LUKE XXI, 25.

AND there shall be signs in the sun and in the moon, &c.

moon shall not give her light, and the stars shall fall from heaven, and the powers of the heavens shall be shaken: and then shall appear the sign of the Son of man in heaven: and then shall all the tribes of the earth mourn, and they shall see the Son of man coming in the clouds of heaven with power and great glory. And he shall send his angels with a great sound of a trumpet, and they shall gather together his elect from the four winds, from one end of heaven to the other.

We have already avowed our belief equally of the futility and the danger of solving this passage by means of "metaphor and allegory." We will now state one specific objection. If, as is usually explained, the sun, moon, and stars signify the luminaries of the Jewish state—the magistracy—this passage is both misplaced and untrue: for the Jewish government was demolished, and anarchy

established long before the city was finally sacked; but this passage is placed long after the sack, and, in Luke, even after the captivity and desolation—it is, therefore, upon this hypothesis, misplaced. But both Matthew and Luke *expressly state* that the downfall of these luminaries was “*after the tribulation*,” if then, as is historically certain, their downfall was before, it would be untrue.

But the most objectionable mode of allegorizing is, the expedient of a double sense. If commentators could make out a literal or a figurative sense, clear of difficulty, they would adopt it. But as they cannot do this, they destroy the difficulty by doubling it. Because they cannot make it either, they make it both; and thus make our Lord utter about two subjects at the same time, what seems to them to be applicable to neither.

In order to justify the allegory, parallel passages of highly poetical character have been produced from the Old Testament prophets. But one decisive rule of interpretation destroys their parallelism with this passage. No passage can be allowed to be all at once loftily allegorical in the midst of a prosaic context. Now this whole discourse is genuine prose. It is one thing to describe, as our Lord does, agitated scenes in plain terms, and another thing to describe, as our Lord does not, plain things in figurative terms. The Saviour is describing exciting objects and events; but he calls the object by its simple name, and states the event as it visibly occurs. If a figure is used, it is of an illustrative nature, and but an instant's duration.

Taking the passage, then, to be strictly literal, the only question now to be discussed is this,—Is there a true and clear transition from a picture of Jewish desolation to a picture of the coming of the Son of man to judgment? We will only adduce the following several arguments:—

1. *From the completeness of the previous picture.* We have shown, merely by combining the different sketches, without any violation of their actual order, that our Lord traces the whole progress from the first signs of ruin to the crisis, through the massacres, even down (Luke xxi, 24) to the dispersion and implied restoration. The picture is there complete, the subject done; what more natural, then, than to take up another? He had answered now the question of his disciples with regard to the temple's destruction; what more natural than to allude to the answer of their other question touching the end of the world?

2. *From a special notice of the time* (in Luke xxi, 24) *which was to intervene between these events.* It is this verse alone which traces the prophetic history of Israel through her later massacres,



captivities, and down-trodden oppression. "*And they shall fall by the edge of the sword, and shall be led away captive into all nations; and Jerusalem shall be trodden down of the Gentiles until the times of the Gentiles be fulfilled.*" What a stream of predictive light does this fling through centuries of Jewish history! The prophetic character of the verse itself, added to the inspiration of the evangelist, doubly proves the accuracy of his hearing of his Lord's words. Now when we consider that these words were most assuredly uttered by our Lord; that they are omitted by the other evangelists; that they naturally form the closing part of the picture of Jewish troubles; that they are placed by Luke before the words of this paragraph, as if to mark the break in the discourse, it seems quite certain that after this verse a chasm takes place between an old and a new topic.

And, what is decisive upon this point, this verse separates the two events, the sack of the city and the judgment day, in point of time, immeasurably apart. The chasm between them is indefinitely wide; and standing like separated continents, between them the waves of uncounted centuries are rolling. This verse presents to our view the whole successive ages of Israel's "tribulation," and Mark tells us that it is indefinitely somewhere in the times succeeding this tribulation, that the Son of man is to appear—in *those days* (which are) *after this tribulation, the sun shall be darkened, &c.*

3. *From the particles of transition and the introductory phrases.* Although the above verse in Luke fully prepares us for the transition by closing the previous picture, and bringing us down to the latter days, he has not marked the transition from the *desolation* to the *judgment* so decisively as the other evangelists. As his is the briefest and most sketchy report of the discourse, he places merely the continuative particle *καί*, which "is put very frequently, in the New Testament particularly, in narrative style, where classic writers either put nothing, or use some other particle, as *δε*, *αλλά*, *τοτε*, and the like." (See Robinson's New Testament Lexicon.) There is, therefore, no contradiction in sense between Luke and the other evangelists who use those other particles. Matthew uses *δε*, which unfortunately is wholly omitted from our *English version*, and Mark uses *αλλά*, particles which, of course, are the proper indications of antithesis and contrast.

4. *From the probable emphasis of the introductory clause.* If, as is frequently the case, interpreters find the sense of a phrase decisively influenced by the emphasis, even in written style, this must be specially the case in a spoken discourse. If we may

suppose our Lord to have placed the emphasis upon the phrase, *those days*, in Matt. xxiv, 29, and Mark xiii, 24, the transition and the contrast would both be marked between the two pictures in the two paragraphs. The meaning, then, would be,—such and such is the picture of the temporal calamities of the Jews, particularly during our own time; but, on the other hand, in *THOSE* days to which you allude, in which the *end* comes, events of a much more stupendous and supernatural character shall take place. And this remark will serve to reconcile the introductory phrases of Matthew and Mark.

MATTHEW.—But immediately after the tribulation of *THOSE* DAYS the sun shall be darkened, &c.

MARK.—But in *THOSE* DAYS after that tribulation the sun shall be darkened, &c.

If, as some may do, we make the *those days* of Matthew mean the days of Jewish commotions, and the *those days* of Mark refer to the latter days—the ante-judgment days—there will be a slight but very important discrepancy. Matthew will then say, that the judgment will immediately follow and join upon the termination of the desolation, occupying the place of the restoration; whereas Mark only says, indefinitely, that the judgment will take place in *those* latter days.

But by supposing our Lord to have uttered the emphasis in Matthew upon the phrase, *those days*, we may easily understand them to denote the ante-judgment days, and thus agree with Mark. The antithesis would be—such is a picture of the woes of these previous days; but immediately after the tribulation of *THOSE* ante-judgment DAYS the sun shall be darkened, and nature's dissolution shall occur. And this will harmonize with the passages which teach, as we shall show, that there will be a tribulation—an apostasy—in the last days.

5. *From the contrast in the nature of the two paragraphs.* Every reader, we think, perceives that he has made a stupendous transition from a series of natural events to the supernatural—from the terrestrial to the celestial—from the earthly order of things to the breaking up of the whole system. When, therefore, we take all these considerations into one view, which show an antithesis between the two great events described in these two paragraphs, namely, that one picture is completely done before the other is introduced; that the twenty-fourth verse of Luke xxi separates the two events immensely apart in time; that the clearest adversative particles and transition clauses and distancing marks of time are used, and finally that the texture and structure and specific terms

of this paragraph all demonstrate a new body of events as the subject, what can be more plain than that the two events are as different as possible in nature, and as wide as ages apart? What is more clear, than that one event, namely, the destruction of Jerusalem, is named in order to show that it was at hand, and that the coming of the Son of man is named in order to show that it was not at hand?

6. Were it a clear point, that in every case where the *παρουσία* (*coming*, taken substantively) of the Son of man is mentioned in the New Testament, it designates his judgment advent, then would it be placed beyond all contradiction, that the *παρουσία coming*, mentioned both in the disciples' question and in our Lord's reply, designates distinctively the judgment day. We hope soon to make this evident by proof, but if we may now take it for granted, it is decisive upon this point.

For it is by this very word that the transition is prepared, and this paragraph is introduced. In Matthew, the two previous verses introduce two contrasted illustrations of the two events, namely, the *παρουσία* advent, and the *πτῶμα* downfall. One should be like lightning flashing from heaven, the other like a carcass beneath the eagles. How natural, then, is the transition! He has described the falling carcass at full length; he has, in two concise similes, marked the contrast between it and the advent; and then, we have a brief glimpse of the advent itself, which, however, is immediately interrupted until the closing warnings and proper directions are given, in order to complete his whole discourse upon the first event. "For as the lightning—so shall the *παρουσία* advent of the Son of man be—and then shall appear the sign of the Son of man coming in the clouds of heaven," Matt. xxiv, 27-30.

7. The historic argument applies here also with great force. With the immediate hearers and readers of this discourse, there was no indistinct blending of the two great events. If it be true that the word *παρουσία* always designates the next visible advent of the Son of man, it must be equally true that they did not expect that great and final event, the *παρουσία* of this paragraph, to be coincident with the national downfall. Nor could they have imagined that the final *παρουσία* of this passage would, before that generation should pass, close the current of human events. The desolation of the previous paragraphs, and the judgment advent of the present paragraph, must have stood before their minds in clear and bold contrast. All this is certain, because it was by the clear delineations of this discourse that they knew the signs of ruin, the moment of escape, and the security of their refuge and preservation until the indignation should have passed away.



This passage, then, we consider as introduced *parenthetically*, in order, without changing the main subject, to suggest the contrast between the two great events. We may suppose that a summary of this entire division of the discourse may well be given in these words :—

“Be not deceived ; the destruction of the city is about to happen, not the end of the world. And in order to distinguish the two events, I will warn you that the former will be preceded by the most ominous signs. Famines, pestilences, earthquakes, wars, persecutions, which will not destroy you, since the gospel must be preserved in you for ultimate promulgation—the siege—the destruction—the indefinitely long desolation—these shall constitute that train of calamities against which I warn you, (while, on the contrary, that sudden event, against which no warning can be given, and of which no time can be assigned, will consist of nature’s dissolution and the visible presence of the final Judge,) in order that, watching the omens of this train of events, you may prepare and avoid them ; for, be assured, that this generation shall not pass until all these things shall be fulfilled.”

We may now take up the last paragraph of this first division.

FOURTH. *Earliest omens of the downfall.*—Our Lord, having concluded his description of the destruction, brings our minds back to the commencement of the calamities, in order to give directions for watching and escaping the opening omens. 1. At the very beginning, they were to lift up their heads and look for their redemption. Luke xxi, 28. 2. He illustrates the signs of approaching ruin by the signs of approaching summer, put forth by the budding fig-tree ; and, in the approaching catastrophe, they were to recognize the kingdom of heaven—the exhibited sovereignty of the Messiah—and confidently might they watch the events of this catastrophe, “for verily I say unto you, this generation shall not pass until all these things be fulfilled,” Matt. xxiv, 34.

There need be no difficulty with this last expression. The scope of this whole paragraph (and the main scope of the whole discourse thus far) embraces the calamities of Jerusalem alone, and, therefore, they alone are comprehended in the phrase, “all these things.” This expression has just the same comprehension as the similar phrase in the first paragraph, “all these things must come to pass—but the *end* is not yet.”\*

\* It seems to us that some very unwarrantable and licentious modes of wrenching this sentence from its natural signification have been adopted by some orthodox commentators. Dr. Clarke, with unconcealed distrust, refers the phrase, *η γενεα αυτη*, *this generation*, to the Jews ; others, with equal

Thus far extends the first division of our Lord's discourse, embracing the answer to the first part of the question proposed by the apostles. That it afforded to the minds of his audience, consisting, it would seem, of four disciples, a distinctive view of the event which it describes, a knowledge of the mode of escape, and the hope of a survivorship of an indefinite length after that event, is clear, both from the internal and the historical evidence. How clear a view the intimations of our Lord may have furnished them of the length of the period to intervene between the destruction and the judgment, is much less certain. To these intimations, *time*, the only infallible expositor of prophecy, has given an incontestable commentary.

Our Lord closes this first division of his discourse, and makes his transition to the next in a style of the utmost dignity. He is now about to pass from the destruction of a city to the dissolution of a world; and he introduces that last solemn event in the same breath with an asseveration of his divine veracity—*Heaven and earth shall pass away*—but my words shall not pass away.\*

justice, and more than equal positiveness, refer it to the Christians; and we see no reason why it may not with equal propriety be referred to the Romans, whose race or descendants are still existing; or to the whole human species. An interpretation which makes a text mean vaguely any thing, makes it mean nothing, and is therefore good for nothing.

When the expressions, *generation of the righteous*, or of the wicked, are used, these adjective phrases, of course, fix a distinctive meaning to the word, and we easily understand it. But when we hear any one mention specifically *THIS generation*, without any other qualifying term than the previous adjective, it seems perfectly plain that he designates the present existing generation of men in contradistinction from the generations that have preceded and will succeed it. The natural antithesis to *this generation* is the last generation, or the next generation.

\* The following harmony presents a synopsis of the three evangelists thus far:—

First Paragraph.			Second Paragraph.			Second Paragraph.		
MATT.	MARK.	LUKE.	MATT.	MARK.	LUKE.	MATT.	MARK.	LUKE.
4-6	5-7	8, 9	13		18, 19	22-28	20-23	
Second Paragraph.			14	10		—	—	24
7, 8	8	10	15	14	20	Third Paragraph.		
9	9	11	16		21	29	24, 25	25, 26
	10, 11	12, 13	17	15		30	26	
10	12	14	18	16	22	31	27	
9	13	15, 16	19	17	23	Fourth Paragraph.		
11			20	18				28
12		17	21	19		31-35	28-31	29-33

SECOND DIVISION.—We may easily imagine that as he passes from the less to the greater topic, the features of the divine orator should gather a new solemnity; and that, as he pronounces the thrilling words, "HEAVEN AND EARTH SHALL PASS AWAY," his frame dilates with the momentous thought, and, pointing to the heavens whence his sign will yet appear, he utters, with a thrilling emphasis, the first words of his next discourse, "But of THAT DAY knoweth no man; no, not the angels which are in heaven—nor the Son—but the Father only." And then follows the most solemn discourse perhaps ever uttered in human ears, descriptive and admonitory of that day for which all other days were made.

He had already, by anticipation, allusively pictured the Son of man coming and sending forth his angels to gather his elect. Every simile is used to illustrate most strikingly the suddenness with which the Son of man shall appear, and the selecting angel shall separate the righteous from the wicked. Like the flood pouring upon a world in the midst of wedding revelries; like the storm of fire bursting upon licentious Sodom; like a thief stealing upon the slumbering householder; like the bridegroom's midnight cry pealing upon the ten sleeping virgins, was to blaze forth the coming of the Son of man. And when his commissioned angels came to select his chosen from the wicked, it should be as two women grinding at the mill,—the one taken and the other left. The various illustrative parables of the abusive servant, the ten virgins, and the journeying lord, close with the scene at which both righteous and wicked meet again, though in separate bands, to receive the final judgment sentence.

This discourse upon the judgment day is for all the world in all generations. It is matter of record, preserved for the warning of every candidate for judgment until that day arrive. Those four disciples listened—not alone for themselves, but—for the universe. They stood representatives of the great whole; and in that character our Lord addressed them—"What I say unto you, I say unto ALL—WATCH." The church of Christ must never slumber, but expectantly *wait* until he come. The great ceaseless law is this: *that day shall take the world by a fearful surprise, and the*

This entirely corresponds with Newcome's Harmony, with the very important exception, that we place Luke xxi, 24 at the close of the second paragraph, whereas he places it opposite to Matt. xxiv, 21, and Mark xiii, 19, with which verses it has no resemblance. We place it between Matt. xxiv, 28, 29. There is a large hiatus in Luke; Newcome puts Luke xxi, 24 before the hiatus, and we put it after. The very nature of the verse shows that it finishes off the whole picture of Jewish calamities.



*only way for every human being to escape its woes is to be prepared for its arrival.* And this mode of viewing the subject removes at once all the difficulty arising from the apparently immediate approach which our Lord seems to ascribe to that event.

Upon a view of the whole discourse, two things, we trust, have been made evident. First, that our Lord did hold the judgment day to be really and literally at a great distance; and, second, that he has made it the duty of every individual ever to *feel* it near. This mode of treating this momentous subject undoubtedly characterized the entire style of the New Testament writers. And as very possibly this discourse formed the model from which they adopted their style, so our remarks upon it may form the basis upon which to found a solution of that whole class of passages in which the skeptic has attempted to find a falsified prophecy of an immediate judgment. Specimens of this class are the following:—"The end of all things is at hand; be ye sober, therefore, and watch unto prayer," 1 Pet. iv, 7. "Behold the Judge standeth before the door," Jas. v, 9. "Wherefore be patient, brethren, unto the coming of the Lord," ver. 7. "And you that are troubled, *rest with us*, when the Lord Jesus shall be revealed from heaven with his mighty angels, in flaming fire taking vengeance on them that know not God," &c., 2 Thess. i, 7, 8.

We cannot agree that either of these texts refers to the destruction of Jerusalem. The very excellent commentator, Dr. Macknight, reckons four several comings of Christ, and his views upon the subject are adopted and republished by Dr. Clarke.\* These four comings are, 1. To destroy Jerusalem; 2. To destroy the man of sin; 3. At the death of the Christian; and, 4. At the final judgment. We must be permitted to believe that, properly, there is but one substantive "*coming*," namely, the second advent, and we fully believe that the reference of such texts as 1 Pet. iv, 7,

\* Let us not be suspected of any want of respect for this eminent man. To have made acquisitions, and have achieved labors like his, was truly wonderful; to have been perfectly accurate in them all, would have been miraculous. But we regret to say that many of Dr. Clarke's comments have brought him under a most unmerciful load of popularity with a certain sect of pseudo-theologians. Had Dr. Clarke been well acquainted with that new and original invention in theology, modern Universalism, his attention would doubtless have been called to such a reconsideration of the texts in question as would have secured him from being their text-book whenever they wish triumphantly to confirm their misinterpretations with an orthodox concession. See his commentary on Matt. iii, 7-10; xii, 32; xxv, 31; Acts i, 25; James v, 3; 1 Pet. iv, 18; 2 Pet. iii, 3, and other similar texts.

and James v, 7, 9, and many others of the same nature, is *erroneous, unsatisfactory, and deleterious*.

It seems to us *erroneous*, for it is depriving words of just that meaning which every one cannot but consciously feel they do in themselves possess, and substituting a meaning which they do not possess. It is *unsatisfactory*, for the purpose of this substitution is to solve the difficulties of the rationalizing and skeptical—just the last men in the world to allow an unnatural and arbitrary meaning to be palmed upon a sentence, in refutation of their objections. It is *deleterious*, for when the orthodox and evangelical commentator indulges in arbitrary interpretations, and allows any words to mean any thing, he has no hold upon looser and liberalizing interpreters, and he may be well assured that they will use quite all the liberty his example sanctions. And experience has in this instance most painfully verified this assurance. What could modern Universalism do without its favorite solution of all the threatenings of divine punishment, *the destruction of Jerusalem*? This serves them in the place of an atonement; it bears away all the sins of the world, and takes all the curse. It serves as a common receptacle, in which, by a wholesale process, all the intimations of judgment and hell are promiscuously precipitated. Whether Paul at Thessalonica, or Peter at Babylon, threaten divine retribution upon the wicked, it is all at the city of Jerusalem. And to such a licentious extreme have they carried this that they have made the destruction of Jerusalem the main topic of the New Testament. It has been closely computed by an ingenious writer, Rev. Parsons Cooke, that, according to Universalist interpretation, of the amount of Christ's discourses in the gospel of Matthew, more were employed upon the destruction of Jerusalem, than on all other subjects put together, by the amount of one chapter! And the same author very justly remarks, "If I ever succeeded in digesting this monstrous absurdity, I would be honest enough to call things by right names, and label the New Testament, JERUSALEM'S DESTRUCTION FORETOLD." But these errorists find an ample justification for their wild outrages upon all interpretation, as they affirm, in the examples of their orthodox opponents, who concede to them that the only way to explain these passages, consistently with their expressions of immediate time, is to refer them all to that great cotemporary event.

We do not hesitate, nevertheless, to refer all those passages which Dr. Macknight quotes to sustain his fourfold coming of Christ solely to the judgment advent. And with regard to those expressions, which indicate the apparent proximity of that event,

we affirm three things, namely: 1. That it is certain that the apostles expected that event would be postponed far beyond their own day; 2. That for all those expressions of proximity there is an obvious and natural solution; and, 3. That this solution is expressly stated, and fully and repeatedly maintained by the apostles themselves.

In the first place, in the discourse of our Lord, we have exhibited ample internal evidences that he did not place the destruction and judgment of the world at the destruction of Jerusalem. We have ample historical proof that the apostles and early Christians understood him to place them immensely apart. And if this alone did not settle the question with regard to the views of the apostles, Dr. Macknight's argumentation on that subject is perfectly conclusive. St. Paul placed the judgment day at an indefinite distance, for he expressly stated that it would not occur until after the rise and fall of the man of sin and the restoration of the Jewish nation. Rom. xi. St. James (Acts xv, 17) indefinitely postpones it until the accomplishment of the same great event. St. Peter expressly affirms that in the last days men would argue from the permanent course of nature, that the promise of his coming was falsified. And St. John, in Revelation, gives a prophetic chart of ages yet to intervene before the final event. The only question then is, how to find the solution of those verbal indications of its close proximity.

A close collation of those various passages will perhaps bring out the following general result. While, as a matter of abstract doctrine, the New Testament writers affirm that the judgment advent is literally and physically at a great distance, yet, as a matter of feeling, they endeavor ever to maintain it before the mind as practically and *conceptually* near. All that is necessary to make this a certainty is to find not only that the apostle believed in the great distance of the judgment day, but that for their apparent implications of its proximity, there is a clear solution well founded in the nature of the human mind, and that this is the very solution which the apostles themselves carefully and repeatedly give.

1. This language, by which the dissolution of the world and judgment day, although acknowledged to be *physically* distant, is presented as *conceptually* near, is in perfect accordance with the spirit of early Christian faith and feeling. A whole system of conceptions, unknown, or but dimly and distantly described by the heathen and even Jewish mind, surrounded, with a close contact, the soul of the Christian. As heathen, or Jews, they had known no Saviour; but an apostle could now tell even those who had never seen the



Saviour, that Jesus Christ is "set forth *visibly*, crucified among you." Philosophic theism had placed God at an infinite remove from all human concerns; but now, "ye are *brought nigh* by the blood of Christ." The supposed eternity of matter had infinitely postponed the end of the world; but the word now was, "The end of all things is at hand; be sober, therefore, and watch unto prayer." The insensibility of men's consciences had theoretically abolished the throne of divine retribution; but now one "is *ready* to judge the quick and the dead," 1 Pet. iv, 5. And this was not a proximity of position, but a nearness of relation. Nor was it verbally and literally accurate; but to the conception momentarily true. Just as in speaking of the Deity, the abstract doctrine was, that God is a spirit without parts or members, while to the conceptions a more vivid sense of his existence was communicated by strong terms of anthropomorphism; so in regard to the judgment, while the sound doctrine was, that it was physically at an indefinite distance, the Christian could best impress the closeness of its relation to him upon himself, by holding it, both in *conception and language*, as ever approaching and ever present.

2. Nor was this feeling likely to cease so long as the church was conscious of having to do with the mind and language of a divine Being, before whose glance all distance is near and all time a moment—a Being who quickeneth the dead, and calleth things that are yet to be as though they were. All measurement of space and time is comparative. Compared with one's morning walk, Europe is distant; compared with the distance to the moon, it is near; compared with the distance to the sun, it is here. And thus the mind of the prophet, supernaturally elevated to a comprehensive view of immense ages at once, brought the judgment immediately near to the contemplations of the church. And this solution of this mode of expression is given with a philosophical precision by St. Peter, 2 Pet. iii. Scoffers, he tells us, in the last time would come, who would affirm a contradiction between the protracted continuance of the order of nature and the prophetic promise of His advent. That advent, according to prophecy, they would say was at hand; but an interval of one, two, or three thousand years is removing it to an unknown distance. But the apostle immediately elevates the minds of his readers into a more suitable comprehension of the language of Him, to whom he asserts that one day is as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day. In the divine dialect of such a Being an event might be pronounced as close at hand—at the door—and all the while these terms for a few days might designate a few thousand years.

3. And such a Being might be rationally supposed, when he spoke through his organs, the prophets, not to address men of the present time alone, but entire generations at once. And this solution is furnished by the whole tenor of the language of prophecy. The divine oracle was given not for the prophet nor for his contemporary auditors—for to him and to them it might be unintelligible—but for those who should behold or succeed its accomplishment. Thus the Jews, who possessed the sacrificial types, little understood their import, which the real sacrifice of the antitype has made so full of meaning to the entire Christian church. When Daniel had received his wonderful prophecies, he tells us, “And I heard, but understood not; then said I, O my Lord, what shall be the end of these things? And he said, Go thy way, Daniel, for the words are closed up and sealed till the time of the end.” It was not to his eleven apostles alone, but through them to all the generations of his genuine ministry, that the Saviour promised, “Lo, I am with you to the end of the world.” He also identified the four disciples to whom he addressed his discourse on the judgment with all to whom that judgment shall ever be a matter of interest, “What I say unto you, I say unto all, Watch.” And St. Peter explicitly assures us, “That to them (the ancient prophets) it was revealed, that not unto themselves, but to us they did minister the things which are reported to you unto whom the gospel is preached.” It is, therefore, to his universal church, filling not only all nations, but all ages of the world, that he to whose infinite movements a thousand years are as one day, declares, “Behold, I come quickly, and my reward is with me.” It is over the great congregation, whose ranks extend through the range of centuries, that his advent is ever impending. The interval must not be measured by the span of individual life, but by the great life of the church. Her destinies are fast unfolding, and even before they seem completed, his advent may cut them short.

It is in this spirit that the New Testament prophets, in depicting the resurrection scenes, identify both themselves and the whole church with the generation upon whom they shall come. St. Peter, in the very chapter in which he explains the nature of the divine designations of time, gives a vivid description of the final dissolution, and a solemn warning of preparation to meet it. 2 Pet. iii. Similarly St. Paul identifies himself and the general church with those who shall be alive at the resurrection. “We shall not *all* sleep, but we shall be changed.” The words “*we*,” “*all*,” evidently include the whole Christian church, part of whom should sleep, but not *all*. “The trumpet shall sound, and the dead shall

be raised, and we shall be changed," 1 Cor. xv, 51, 52. "We which are alive and remain unto the coming of Christ shall not *prevent* (*go before* into heaven) them which are asleep." "The dead in Christ shall rise first, and then *we* which are alive and remain shall be caught up." But as if to deny all specification of time in all this, he immediately adds, "But of the times and the seasons, brethren, ye have no need that I write unto you. For yourselves know perfectly that the day of the Lord so cometh as a thief in the night," 1 Thess. v, 1, 2. And when the Thessalonians, nevertheless, misunderstood this language, he expressly corrects their error, and however he may have painted its stupendous scenes as conceptually near, he assures them that events of unknown extension precede that final day. "Now we beseech you, brethren, (such is Macknight's translation,) concerning the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, and our gathering together around him, that ye be not soon shaken from your purpose, nor troubled, neither by spirit, nor by word, nor by letter, as from us, intimating that the day of Christ is at hand," 2 Thess. ii, 1, 2. So clearly do the New Testament writers guard their expressions of the "ideal presence" of the advent from being confounded with a real approach.

4. But there was a high practical purpose in thus cherishing, both in language and in conception, a close contiguity between the present hour and that final scene—between the responsible act and its divine judgment. That is likely to be the holiest church, and the holiest individual, who forgets the interval of time and lives in the very judgment presence. It is good to stand, not only near the atoning cross, but also near the adjudging throne.

And this was all the more natural from the fact, that with each individual and each one generation, the termination of life immutably fixes their state for the judgment. And this furnishes a solution of those passages which Dr. Macknight quotes to identify "a coming" of Christ with the Christian's death. As death puts them in their judgment state—as their cases were then irrevocably made up and their destinies unchangeably fixed—it was the most natural combination in the world ideally to identify death and judgment. When the eye contemplates two objects in the same optical line, the intervening distance is lost, and the conception identifies them as the same point. When the astronomer perceives two stars in the same optical line, he leaves out of mind the interval between them, and pronounces them "in conjunction." So when the eye of Christian faith, looking forward, beholds death and the judgment in the same optical line, it drops out the intervening distance, and



both are identified as one. By omitting the element of time—the only effect of which is to dim the true impression and produce a false security—that dread event is brought in all its just reality upon the mind. In comparison with the great future, eternity indeed—that line endlessly produced in the same direction—this intervening period becomes infinitely small—is nothing. And hence whether they came into the judgment presence through the portals of *death*, or through the *resurrection change*, in either case, there was a profound reason, as well as a high moral purpose, in viewing its awful adjudication as an event of unknown nearness and incalculable suddenness. These reasons seem to us to furnish a reconciliation between those passages in which the judgment day is *vividly depicted* as near at hand, and those in which it is *logically defined* to be at an indefinite distance, not only well founded in nature, but actually and explicitly stated by the writers themselves. Permitting them, therefore, to be their own expositors, we have no hesitation to apply to the judgment day all those passages which others have, on account of their apparent reference to immediate time, forced out of their natural meaning, and arbitrarily applied to a nearer event.

1. To the judgment day we unhesitatingly refer all those passages which designate a point of time when the result of our probation will be decided. Generation of vipers, who hath warned you to flee from the wrath to come—μελλουσης οργης—wrath about to come—impending wrath. Matt. iii, 7. “Exhorting one another daily, and so much the more, as ye see the day approaching,” Heb. x, 25. “For yet a little while, and he that is coming will come, and will not tarry,” ver. 37. So also the passages which speak of the *end* to which our probation points. “Who shall also confirm you unto the *end*, that ye may be blameless in the day of our Lord Jesus Christ,” 1 Cor. i, 8. “If we hold fast unto the *end*,” Heb. iii, 6, 14. And similarly in our Lord’s discourse, Matt. xxiv. “He that shall endure unto the *end*, the same shall be saved,” ver. 13. “All these things must come to pass, but the *end* is not yet,” ver. 6. “What shall be the sign of thy coming and of the *end* of the world?” ver. 3. “The gospel shall be preached unto all nations, and then shall the *end* come,” ver. 14.

2. All those passages which mention substantively a “*coming*,” παρουσία, of Christ. We do not dispute that the verb “come,” (ερχομαι,) and its present participle, are frequently used in another sense. They, in fact, are used to designate every powerful moral movement in which Christ “*comes*” forth to revive his church, and

establish, or extend, or chasten his kingdom on earth. In this sense Christ is constantly "*coming*" in the power of his kingdom, ever since his ascension. This is according to his promise to his disciples: "There be those standing here which shall not taste of death until they have seen the kingdom of God come with power," Mark ix, 1; "Until they see the Son of man coming in his kingdom," Matt. xvi, 29. Compare Matt. vi, 10; 1 Cor. iv, 20; Rev. ii, 5. Very different from the sense of *ερχομαι* is that of *παρουσια*, which, when applied to Christ, always designates a *visible and personal presence*. It is always rendered substantively "*coming*," but might properly be always rendered his JUDGMENT ADVENT. For as the lightning cometh out of the east, and shineth even unto the west, so shall the (*παρουσια*) JUDGMENT ADVENT of the Son of man be. Matt. xxiv, 27. What shall be the sign of thy *judgment advent*, and of the end of the world. Ver. 3. Christ the first-fruits, afterward they that are his at his *advent*; then cometh the *end*. 1 Cor. xv, 23. Before God, even our Father, at the *judgment advent* of our Lord Jesus Christ with all his saints. 1 Thess. iii, 13. We which are alive and remain at the *advent*. See also 2 Thess. ii, 1; Jas. v, 7, 8; 2 Pet. i, 16; iii, 4, 12; 1 John ii, 28; 2 Thess. ii, 8. All these passages fix their own application, with the exception, perhaps, of the last, which is the only one which Dr. Macknight quotes to sustain his second definition of Christ's *coming*, namely, a coming to destroy "the man of sin." "And then shall that wicked be revealed whom the Lord shall consume with the spirit of his mouth, and shall consume with the brightness of his coming," or *judgment presence*. We understand this verse to affirm that the man of sin is to be destroyed by moral influences. As, on the one hand, he is destroyed by the *gospel*, which is the spirit or breath of the Lord's mouth; so also by the blazing terrors of the *law*, which emanate from the *judgment throne*. But as it is the real *mouth* of Christ from which the gospel first originates, so the blaze of his law takes its ultimate origin from his real *judgment presence*. Hence the *παρουσια* of this text must mean his literal judgment. And we may further remark with regard to this whole prophecy of the man of sin, that although the apostle very properly introduces his rise and fall as proof that the judgment day was not at hand, it does not follow, nor does he say, that the judgment will *immediately* succeed his fall.

3. The same reference we make of one class of all those texts which designate a *final period*; such as the phrases, *last days*, and *last day*, *last times*, and *last time*. Such terms, of course, being in their nature relative, can have no independent meaning; and

their reference must always be decided by the connection in which they stand. The *last days* must always refer to some *first days*, with which they form an antithesis. Ascertain the *first*, and you fix the *last*. A close analysis will perhaps discover three different classes of these texts, and three different meanings of these phrases. 1. The Christian dispensation in contrast with the Jewish dispensation, which was *the former days*; 2. The *last days* of the apostolic age; 3. The *last days* of the world.

1. It was perfectly natural for the Old Testament prophets and the Jewish writers to designate the age of the Messiah the *latter* or *last days*. "The Jewish doctors," says Whitby, "lay this down as a rule, that wherever we find the phrase '*in the latter days*,' we are to understand it of *the age* or *the times* of the Messiah." So St. Paul, "God who spake in *times past* unto the fathers by the prophets, has in these *last days* spoken unto us by his Son," Heb. i, 1. See also Acts ii, 17; 1 Pet. i, 20.

2. The *last days* of the apostolic age. A comparison of different passages will, perhaps, clearly indicate that these phrases are used in this sense by St. Paul alone, and by St. John in allusion, perhaps, to him. St. Paul uses them to designate the time of that apostasy which was to arrive before the termination of the lives of those whom he addressed, namely, Timothy, the Ephesians, and the Thessalonians. This apostasy, which was to spring up within the church, we suppose, in spite of the vehement assertions of Tittmann to the contrary, to be the dogmas of Gnosticism, as they developed themselves in the early church, became imbodyed in the antichrist of St. John, and ultimately came to a head in the papacy.

The only passages in which he uses the phrases in question are the two following:—"Now the Spirit speaketh expressly, that in the *latter times* some shall depart from the faith," &c., 1 Tim. iv, 1. He then gives a description of those errors which have been reasonably considered as belonging to Gnosticism, and thence adopted into papacy; and warned Timothy to guard the church against them. "This know, also, that in the last days perilous times shall come," &c., 2 Tim. iii, 1. This passage is a re-inforcement of the former. These passages, compared with 2 Thess. ii, will show that this apostle had a peculiarly clear foreboding that there should arise within the church, even before those whom he addressed should pass from the world, the commencing developments of a mighty antichristian principle. "For I know this, that after my departing shall grievous wolves enter in among you. Also even of your own selves shall men arise," &c., Acts xx, 29, 30.



With St. Paul's 'ο αντικειμενος, man of sin, in its Gnostic stage of development, we do not hesitate to identify St. John's 'ο αντιχριστος antichrist; and with the εσχαταις ἡμεραις last days of the former, the εσχατη ὥρα last time of the latter. "Little children, it is *the last time*, and as ye have heard that antichrist cometh, even now are there many antichrists; whereby we know that it is *the last time*," 1 John ii, 18. If we may suppose that the church whom St. John addressed, had, as the passage indeed itself clearly indicates, become impressed with the prediction of St. Paul, and perhaps others, that they were on the eve of the development of the antichristian elements, we may suppose St. John to identify the time of his epistle, as the predicted *latter days* and *last days* of St. Paul. We may then suppose St. John in effect to say, *Little children, it is the last hour* of Christian prophecy; for as ye have heard that it is in the last hour that antichrist is to come; so now, since many elemental antichrists are appearing, it is evidently St. Paul's predicted "*last time*."

3. The last days of the world. There is no admissible doubt that 2 Peter iii, 3-14, applies the phrase "*last days*," to the closing period of the world. "In the last days scoffers shall come," ver. 3. This passage is evidently quoted by St. Jude in the same sense. "Beloved, remember ye the words which were spoken before by the apostles of our Lord Jesus Christ, how that they told you there should be mockers in the *last time*, who should walk after their own ungodly lusts," Jude 17, 18. "Salvation ready to be revealed in the *last time*," 1 Pet. i, 5; the judgment advent, as appears from ver. 7. "Ye have heaped together treasures for the *last days*," Jas. v, 3; that is, the final retribution. In the singular number, the *last day* signified the resurrection and judgment.

Our exposition is now, perhaps, sufficient to present a harmonious view of the representations of our Lord and his disciples upon this momentous, but somewhat intricate and misunderstood subject. The principles which we have stated are obvious, and their application so natural that they guard the word of God, we would hope effectually, at once from skeptical cavil and heretical perversion. If any others have felt any similar difficulties, have gone to the wisdom of commentators with as little relief, and shall find in these views as satisfactory an elucidation as ourselves, we shall be doubly satisfied. If we shall have stirred up some more competent mind to a still clearer solution, greater still will be our reward.

Wesleyan University, Jan., 1842.

ART. III.—*An Epitome of the History of Philosophy, being the Work adopted by the University of France for Instruction in the Colleges and High Schools. Translated from the French, with Additions, and a Continuation of the History from the Time of Reid to the Present Day.* By C. S. HENRY, D. D., Professor of Philosophy and History in the University of the City of New-York. 2 vols., 18mo., pp. 587. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1842.

It is undeniable that the taste for philosophical studies has been greatly increasing among us for some years past. The indications of this fact are numerous, and continually multiplying. The range of inquiry, too, is wider, its spirit more profound, more independent, more critical. Time was, indeed, when the very term philosophy was a word of ill odor—synonymous, in good men's minds, with materialism, fatalism, atheism, and associated with all the abominations of the French revolution. But it has at length come to be recognized that philosophy should no more be condemned for these things, than chemistry for the quackeries of the alchemists; that the only way to put down false philosophy is to put forward sound philosophy; that it is absurd to seek to avoid the mischievous errors which have resulted from perverse speculation by attempting the impossible task of destroying the spirit of speculation altogether: for, by the necessity of his rational nature, man will never cease to speculate—to ask after the grounds of his convictions. It is begun to be seen how still more absurd is the course so long pursued by theological authority in the high places of public instruction, in marking off a certain domain of licensed philosophy, hedging it round with the Westminster Catechism to prevent all outbreaks of vagrant speculation, and yet, at the same time, installing, as master within that domain, the very father of French materialism and atheism, with Edwards on the Will as the special drawbridge to span the chasm between fatalism and accountability, to solve the contradiction between the allowed system and the dictates of conscience.

All this is good progress; for philosophy of some kind we must have, and it is high time that its true position and just claims were understood. It is a science of *facts*; facts that can neither be made, unmade, nor altered this way or that way, by any arbitrary assertion, denial, or mutilation; facts, therefore, which, as in every other science of facts, claim to be impartially observed apart from any foreign interest, to be accurately described and fairly reasoned from.

It is, moreover, the universal science—*scientia universalis*; because its fundamental principles are recognized by every human being, and because its facts are the universal principles of knowledge and truth for man. Every other human science derives from this science its foundations—its grounding principles. The facts of philosophy—the fundamental laws of human thought and belief—furnish the principles which are implied and proceeded upon in the construction of every special science. Not only so, but the whole life and activity of humanity, with all its infinitely diversified phenomena, is but the perpetual evolution of those fundamental laws of the human mind which it is the province of philosophy to recognize and describe, put in clear light, and arrange in their complete whole.

Now it may be thought that, as philosophy is a science of observation, the leading principles of which are to be found in every one's own mind, the study of its *history* can be only a matter of curious interest, of little importance in enabling one to come to satisfactory conclusions; and even that the ten thousand different opinions comprised in this history must rather serve to perplex than to aid the inquirer. Such a notion would, however, be as superficial and unsound in regard to the history of philosophy as in regard to the history of any other science. Impartial history is always a light, always a guide; and in nothing more so than in the history of human opinions concerning the great questions of philosophy. There are only a certain number of great problems which the human mind can propose to itself for solution; and there are only a certain number of possible solutions which those problems can receive. The history of philosophy shows this: all philosophical speculations for three thousand years are only attempts to solve a few problems, the same in every age; and all the systems that have existed in every philosophical period are only the recurrence of the same determinate number of solutions, differing in phrase and form, and in the different relative prominence given to them in their respective systematic connections, but ever at bottom substantially the same.

Surveying thus comprehensively, under the guidance of the impartial historian, the progress of human opinions, observing in every period, notwithstanding all differences of form, the same great questions coming up, and the same circle of answers continually recurring, the inquirer is put in the most advantageous position possible for forming his own conclusions. He sees why and how it is that so many and such contradictory answers have been given to the same few great questions. He sees the true



nature and real relations of the innumerable systems, and how they all fall within a very few general systems. He sees that the number of contradictory and incompatible systems is far less than at first appeared, and the decision upon their claims becomes comparatively easy. He learns the invaluable lesson of discerning between the substance and the form of things, of distinguishing the great question from the false or insufficient answer it may have received. He perceives that the same ideas, the same truths which he is accustomed to express in the forms of his own age, are to be found in almost every age in different forms of expression; and thus he is cured for ever of one of the most fool-born traits of the ignorant and shallow—that of despising the unfamiliar as necessarily the untrue or ridiculous.

We hold, therefore, that if the study of philosophy be made a part of every course of education, (as it certainly should be, and as the practice of all higher institutions admits,) the study of its history should ever be united with it. Hitherto, however, we have had not only no comprehensive work to put into the hands of the student, but absolutely none at all. The old work of Stanley is entirely out of question—a huge folio, yet covering less than half the ground. The more recent abridgment of Brucker, by Enfield, is equally useless for purposes of instruction—being too bulky, and, at the same time, extremely defective. A very poor translation of Tenneman's History of Philosophy has been published in England: but even if the translation were a good one, the original work is chiefly valuable to the advanced scholar for its *literature*, (as the Germans call it,) or references to the sources of history; while for the purposes of elementary instruction it would be of little use, from its want of positive details, and from the influence of the peculiar system under which it was written.

In the Epitome of the History of Philosophy presented to us by Dr. Henry, we have a good book where, properly speaking, we had nothing before. It supplies a real and great want, which has hitherto been altogether unsupplied; and it supplies it well. It is an excellent contribution to a most important department in the course of public instruction. Besides being adapted to academical use, and the only work in the language that is at all adapted to this use, it has also the merit of being, at the same time, a better, more complete, and trustworthy book of reference for the general scholar, than any other which can be named.

It is comprehensive—embracing a complete survey of philosophy from the earliest times to the present day. It divides the history of philosophy into five periods: the oriental philosophy, the Greek,

the first centuries of the Christian era, the middle ages, modern philosophy.

It is judicious. It is not—like too many, we may say most histories of philosophy—a series of disquisitions upon the systems that have prevailed, leaving the knowledge of the systems themselves to be supplied by the reader's previous study, or else vaguely inferred from the disquisitions; but it is full of positive expositions; it tells us precisely what the systems were. On the other hand, it is not a mere indiscriminating assemblage of all facts, all opinions, the significant and insignificant alike, partial and isolated conceptions, as well as true philosophical systems. It follows the course and history of philosophical theories in the proper sense of the term—conceptions which present a class of systematic ideas on the general questions, the determination of which decides the place and character of particular views. While, therefore, it presents to the student a great mass of positive notions, yet they all serve to show the general progress of philosophy in its different periods, and the logical connection of the various systems.

The plan is well adapted to an elementary work. The exposition of every system is preceded by such brief biographical and historical notices as are indispensable; then follows the summary of the system; then critical observations upon the system analyzed.

In analyzing every system, more care is had to bring out its fundamental characteristics and its chief systematic results, than to follow it into all the variety of its minute developments. The expositions are in general characterized by remarkable clearness; and, taken in connection with the observations, enable the student to get a more accurate and distinct view of the great systems of every epoch and their logical relations, than any work to which he can be referred.

Finally, the spirit of the work is admirable. It well exemplifies the remark of one of the most celebrated living philosophers: "That the true muse of the historian of philosophy is not hatred, but love." What we mean is, that there are in this work no traces of prejudice, party spirit, bitterness; no displays of the *odium theologicum*, nor "odium" of any kind. It is written with the greatest calmness, candor, and impartiality. Not that the writers of this work manifest any real or affected indifference, whether skeptical or contemptuous, for the truths at issue between the various conflicting systems which they analyze. They make no studied pretension of having no opinions of their own, nor caring to have: on the contrary, their personal opinions are by no means hard to be perceived.

Such are the general characteristics of this book. To the original work, as published by the directors of the college of Juilly, Dr. Henry has contributed important additions, forming nearly one-third of these volumes. The original work ended with the eighteenth century—with Reid, in England; Kant, in Germany; and Condillac, Helvetius, &c., in France. Professor Henry has brought down the history from that period to the present time in all those countries—presenting in a brief compass the results of an examination vastly extensive and laborious. He has, besides, made some important insertions into the body of the original work, particularly the period of English philosophy between Locke and Reid. These additions are made on the same plan as the original, and they render the work more comprehensive. We think he deserves the warmest thanks of all students of philosophy, and of public instructors, for the care he has bestowed in preparing this work, and especially his sketch of the history of philosophy in the nineteenth century—a task which but few persons in the country could well have undertaken, and perhaps none have better accomplished. It is a good work—a work of far higher intrinsic character and rank than it puts itself forward to be. It is not a book for the mere tyro: it is one that should be among the books of every intelligent reading man, as well as one that should be introduced into all our institutions for higher education. As a book for colleges and schools it demands, indeed, that faithful and earnest *teaching* on the part of the instructor should be combined with the study of it on the part of the scholar. This is the case with all elementary books that are of any worth; and where these two conditions are combined, the use of this work will, we are confident, be a rich source of instruction and mental discipline.

We add, in conclusion, one thing more, which, in our opinion, constitutes an eminent merit of this work. It puts, in a strong light, the important truth that there can be no real contradiction between philosophy and revelation. No one can attentively read it without arriving at the salutary conviction that all philosophical theories which contradict the fundamental truths of revealed religion, may be clearly shown to be either false or purely hypothetical; while philosophy itself furnishes the means of negatively vindicating every great truth of religion—that is, of nullifying every objection made on speculative grounds. The careful student of this work will not fail to be strongly impressed with this; and will thus learn a lesson of great and inestimable value, both in itself and as establishing the true position and just claims of philosophy.

*New-York, April, 1842.*



ART. IV.—1. *Herder's Præludien zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit.* 1770, 1774.

2. *Herder's Ideen zur Geschichte der Menschheit.* 1784.

3. *Hegel's Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte.* 8vo. Berlin. 1837.

4. *Schlegel's Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte.\** Vienna. 1828.

I. *A philosophy of history is no chimera.*

THE course of universal history is regarded by many, perhaps by most men, as a mere circling of unprogressive changes, or an accumulation of fragments, and its most perfect written form as a piece of cunning mosaic; or, at best, they represent it as a vast process of crystalization, advancing only by external accretion, and destitute, as a whole, of any vital organism or rational significance, or moral end. The common prejudice, which we must meet and combat at the threshold, is, that a philosophy of universal history is a chimera. This prejudice results from the point of view in which the subject is regarded. To him who takes a trivial view of a subject, that subject cannot be expected to assume a philosophical aspect. "But whoever looks rationally upon the world, to him the world looks rational," says Hegel; and it is no greater paradox that the history of the world, through all the manifold variety of its phenomena, should preserve the unity of its animating and informing principle than that we ourselves, through all the changes which we experience in the substance, texture, and form of our bodies, and in the habits and capacities of our minds, should preserve our personal identity from childhood to old age.

In the first place, either a philosophy of history is possible, that is, it is rational to seek for its principle of unity, or else the past, beyond its immediate and palpable connections with the present, is as dead—as truly nothing to us as the images and scenes of the ideal world. *Why, then, should the study of history be preferred to that of fiction?*

Because it is more *attractive*? But who is insensible to the charms of fancy's fairy world? Does not the mind instinctively rejoice in the consciousness of creative power, and in retracing its exercise by kindred minds? Independence, not indeed of the laws

\* Herder's *Introductory Essays to the Philosophy of Universal History.* Ideas toward the History of Mankind.

Hegel's *Lectures on the Philosophy of History.*

Schlegel's *Lectures on the Philosophy of History.*

of the nature within and around it, but of the bare facts of external life, is its chosen element. Hence the mythologies of antiquity, the fables of the golden and heroic ages, and the world-creations of the epic and tragic muse. Hence the legends and romances, the tales and novels of later times. And who is ignorant of their attractions? When a person will use the strongest expression for his enjoyment in reading a book, he does not say, "It is as interesting as Herodotus or Hume," but, "It is as interesting as a novel."

Does the advantage, assumed for history, consist in the *absolute inherent superiority of truth to falsehood*? We speak of truth and falsehood with great looseness of meaning. There is truth in the fictions which emanate from genius, as well as in the facts of proper history—and that, too, truth of the highest kind—truth to the laws of nature and reason; while the truth that is wanting is only that of external actuality. But if fiction led us to study and taught us to appreciate the former kind of truth, and history failed to elevate us above the latter, history, instead of being superior to fiction, would fall below it in utility as well as dignity.

There is more of truth than hyperbole in Prospero's moral,—

"We are such stuff  
As dreams are made of."

And while external things have their unreal side, the creations of poesy have also their substantive nature. They are phantasies, fictions, if you will, but they are none the less realities, for,

"As imagination bodies forth  
The forms of things unknown, the poet's pen  
Turns them to shapes."

And those "shapes" are not arbitrary and accidental; otherwise there would be no distinction between genius and the want of it; one man could construct an epos or a drama as well as another.

The Julius Cesar of Shakspeare is no less a reality than the Julius Cesar of actual history, when the latter is isolated from all preceding and subsequent history. Homer's Achilles and Milton's Satan, King Lear and the famous knight of La Mancha, may have had no personal representatives in the actual world; but are they, in themselves, any the less great and significant realities for the human mind?

Compare the characters of Prometheus, the Cid or Hamlet, the tales of Old Mortality or of the later Oliver Twist, with the real histories of Herod or Caligula or Sardanapalus; and if these stories and histories are considered in their *insulated* significance,

who that is qualified to judge but would prefer the fictitious narrative, notwithstanding the inherent superiority of truth to falsehood?

But it may still be supposed that the practical instruction which may be derived from an *analogical use of history* gives it its great advantage over fiction. "History," it is said, "is philosophy teaching by examples. What has been may be again." True; and what has not been may yet come to pass also; for certainly the saying of the wise man, that "there is nothing new under the sun," applies not so much to an individual or specific as to a general view of things, not so much to separate facts as to the laws and principles on which they depend. In any other sense we may more truly say, "There is nothing old under the sun." No two leaves in the forest, and no two events in history, are exactly, and, in all respects, alike. Provided a work of imagination be true to nature, it may furnish, as well as actual history, a *norma* and a guide in practical life. Take the allegory of Menenius Agrippa, and was it any the less persuasive to the Roman plebeians because all who heard it knew it was a fable? Take our Saviour's parable of the good Samaritan, and as far as its interest, instructiveness, or effectiveness is concerned, of what manner of importance is it whether it were ever actually realized or not? In all the relations it involves, it is true to nature, and is, therefore, susceptible of all the application, by way of analogy, of which any history whatever is susceptible.

Perhaps it may here be objected that, if history and fiction be thus confounded, we shall in the end have no rule to determine what is natural.—But the test of truth to nature is not to be found exclusively or even chiefly in the narratives of real history; it is to be derived primarily from the laws of our personal consciousness and actual experience; without which, as a basis, neither history nor fiction could teach us any thing. Esop's fables are true to nature; by what tests do we discover it?

If, then, we read history as a collection of separate stories, as a mere narration of facts and events; if our interest in it is proportionate to the rapid succession and startling character of the incidents it contains; if conquests and battle-fields, and bloody revolutions; if diplomatic negotiations, political crises, and court intrigues constitute both the form and the substance of what we look for in it; in a word, if we neglect the causal connection and interdependence of the facts; or if, while we trace this connection partially, and within a certain limited sphere, we nevertheless do this in entire unconsciousness, or with a direct disbelief and denial that there is a unity in universal history to which the



portion we are considering pertains, as an element or stage of progression—then, indeed, would it be difficult to show wherein the study of actual history is more profitable than that of poetry or genial fiction. If a limb be lopped from the tree, it retains its life and natural character no longer. It is thenceforth subject only to mechanical laws and artificial applications.

Has history, then, no advantage? We would not be thought for a moment to hold such an opinion. We are far from professing to maintain or believe that, in dignity or usefulness, fiction is equal to actual history. History, rightly considered, is far grander than any drama or epopée the mind of man is capable of creating; and its study, rightly pursued, is one of the most humanizing and elevating of all employments. But “rightly considered,” and “rightly pursued,” are important qualifications. How, then, should history be viewed? We answer in one word, *Philosophically*.

The mere common study of the details of history is not without its use, for it furnishes the facts in which the philosophy of history is imbodyed; and these facts constitute one of the best studies for early youth, because they are then devoured with the same avidity as if they were fairy creatures, and are impressed indelibly on the memory.

There is a certain sort of philosophic view of history about which men talk very currently, and which they praise very highly, but which occupies a quite subordinate place in the scope of our present meaning. It is the pragmatic view. It consists in a sort of attorney's ratiocination and weighing of evidence; and, unless the historian is perfectly impartial, it often degenerates into special pleading. It is scrupulous in deducing the genealogy of the meanest trifle. It is never content until it has formed or presumed some immediate inferior cause—some rational, or perhaps selfish motive for every event or action. But it never carries the mind beyond the details and their immediate mechanical connections; it never rises so far above the surface as to command the whole field at one view. Such is the character, for the most part, of the histories of Hume and Gibbon, who are often styled philosophical historians. But nothing deserves the name of philosophy which has not placed before itself the idea of unity as its goal.

That philosophy to which we refer proposes to elevate history far above an equality with the noblest creations of mere human wit. It looks upon it as one great whole, whose parts are in organic, or at least indissoluble relations to each other, and which unfolds itself according to some leading idea that is its soul and centre.

We are aware there are those who are disposed to ridicule such a notion as this, who deny that the history of the world contains any such principle of unity, or if it do, that the mind of man is able, with any attainable data, to ascertain and unfold it. But is there, indeed, no higher philosophy of history than that minute and meagre one which traces the series of cause and effect from point to point, and makes no further generalization? Or must we wait till we have anxiously scrutinized every particular before we can be sure of having ascertained the general idea? Must we thread out the course of events in the *mêlée* of a battle-field, or plod through the details of a commissary's department to apprehend the scope and spirit of a national conflict? But if there be any philosophy of history for one age or nation, then there undeniably may be a philosophy of the history of all ages and nations. If any ruling spirit be discoverable in the history of a given period, then may a ruling spirit be discovered in the history of the world. Nearly two centuries since, Bossuet—and surely no man will accuse Bossuet of any unusual tendency to extravagant speculation—in his admirable discourse on Universal History, expressly aimed at the apprehension of this spirit, and made a gigantic effort toward it; but his ideas had not become sufficiently fused together to form one consistent whole. The political and religious history of the world he treated too much as constituting two parallel and independent series, while the progress of philosophy and of the useful and elegant arts was almost entirely neglected. While he expressly recognized an overruling Providence, and one grand design in universal history, he traced out the course of events in their mechanical succession, rather than with reference to any organic laws—he did not develop, he arranged. He spread before us, after all, a dead and formal chart, rather than an exposition of the living, breathing reality.

True it is, that when we survey the grand panorama of the world's history in all its variety and confusion—when we consider this medley of changes; empires rising and falling; civilization now advancing, now retrograding, now taking up its favorite abode in one region, now in another; forms of religion, once omnipotent, decaying, and abolished; systems of philosophy, once prevalent, growing obsolete; flourishing literatures passing into oblivion; whole races of men exterminated from the lands where once they lived and wrought, leaving behind some mighty pyramid or broken column, some sculptured idol or unintelligible hieroglyphic, mutely to proclaim their power and skill; and, on the other hand, races, comparatively barbarous, swarming from their forest hives, and

growing up to manhood and civilization in those same regions which their own hands had strewed with desolation, enthusiastically resuscitating those very letters which they themselves had buried under ruins and rubbish—distracted by such a view as this we are ready to exclaim in despair,—Man may determine the laws of motion which govern the wandering stars, the waves of the sea, or the winds of heaven; but the laws of his own historical development he may strive in vain to reach. Bewildered in the boundless confusion, he may be thankful for even a well-executed chart.

“We sail and traffic on the sparkling cerulean deep while under us lie the treasures and the bones of those who fared joyously on the same voyage before us. We should shrink from surveying the uncovered bottom, strewed with skeletons, monsters, cannon, moldering trinkets and parchment, and water-worn statues of gods. States advance slowly in strength, their full bloom is transient, loathsome their slow decay. How long must the barbarians gnaw away at the Roman empire, until one bird of prey had devoured the other, a scene as revolting to the eye as if the great bog-serpent should swallow stranglingly down the living crocodile! How long did Islamism gluttonize on ethereal Greece! And let no heart hope for aid or deliverance in the pursuit of any noble end. Undoubtedly an arm may be stretched down from the clouds, but as often to tear up by the roots an oak on the mountain top, as to hold it erect against the storm. Then think of what once was, and never will be again—an Alexandrian library, ships and cities full of the beautiful forms of art for ever sunk beneath the wave—and the irreparable thoughts of immortal Greeks! Sarcastically almost, fate has bound the freedom of a state to the spider-thread of accident—England’s to a tailor’s shears;\* Genoa’s to a skiff. There, however, it held, here it broke away.”

Such is the language of despondency and skepticism. But the successful efforts of the human mind to ascertain principles, and introduce order into other departments of inquiry, should teach us not to despair, or doubt, or treat scornfully sincere and earnest attempts elsewhere. Those who think that the great fundamental law of history is to be discovered, if discovered at all, by a logical inference from mere passive induction, may well despair, for nothing lies before them but chaos and darkness visible. But that law is not thus to be inferred. It is not to be a sort of quintessence obtained by the sublimation of *all* the facts piled indiscriminately together in one vast crucible. It is, indeed, to be *suggested* by the phenomena, but only to the creative mind, to the mind familiar with

\* “Robert Cotton is said to have found the Magna Charta at a tailor’s, who was just on the point of cutting it to quite another measure. Fiesco’s end is well known.”—*Jean Paul Richter*.



the world of ideas, apt in the construction of theories, and possessed beforehand of some rule by which to distinguish the essential from the unimportant. Theory without induction is empty, but induction without theory is blind. Those, therefore, who are possessed with the prevailing prejudice that there is no way of inferring or learning any thing but from a plodding induction, may give up this search as bootless. But let us consider, for a moment, by what method the mind of man has succeeded in obtaining satisfactory results in other departments.

We see among the stars the far greater part passing from our eastern to our western horizon, night after night, and year after year, in the same relative positions ; but a certain number we perceive wandering about among the rest, whose laws of motion, however, were long since determined by induction. Hence arose the Ptolemaic system

“ Which girt the sphere  
With centric and eccentric scribbled o’er,  
Cycle and epicycle, orb in orb.”

Such was the complicated system “ contrived to save appearances,” as Milton says ; and induction unaided could never have risen higher. Chaldean shepherds and European astronomers might have gazed at the heavens for ever ; they might have made themselves so familiar with the laws of the planets’ apparent motions, as to be able to predict for myriads of years their exact relative position at any given point of time ; yet they would never, guided by this observation alone, have penetrated to the great central law of Copernicus. But that law, once conceived, dissolves as with a magic wand their cumbrous and intricate machinery, and renders the whole system so simple that a child may comprehend it. Now the point we here insist upon is this, that the discovery of this great central law was no mere inference from induction ; it came from another and a higher sphere ; it originated in a mind which was not a mere workshop, but which could create as well as elaborate, and which, uniting these two operations, was capable of producing a theory which so simply and satisfactorily explains all the phenomena that we are prone to think it might be learned directly from them.

“ The wind bloweth where it listeth.” It is the very symbol of capricious changefulness and uncertainty. Yet even the wind obeys laws which are, to some extent, discoverable. But he who, from its most general law of a tidal progress from east to west, resulting from the combined influence of the rarefying heat of the sun, and the diurnal revolution of the earth, should think to infer the course

of the wind at a given time on every point of the earth's surface, would greatly err; and he who, from observing the irregular and frequent changes in the course of the wind at any given place, should deny the existence of any such general law, would equally err. Nor is it by any means absurd to imagine that some inventive intellect, aided by careful observation, should ascertain the nature of certain modifying influences, certain minor and specific laws, whose discovery may be as applicable to the uses of life as the knowledge of the trade-winds.

None will deny that there is a general law of the ocean's tides; but that it is modified and entirely subverted in certain places and under certain circumstances, is equally undeniable; and he would be thought little less than insane who from this general law should think to deduce the height, form, and frequency of the series of waves in a given cove, or along a certain line of breakers.

Let these illustrations suffice. A philosophy of history is possible. And it is not to be denied, because it cannot be evolved by a mere generalization of the facts, nor even because it may sometimes seem inconsistent with, or diametrically opposed to, any portion of the details. The central idea of such a philosophy must not be conceived by solitary experience, but begotten upon it by a higher power. Apparent, partial inconsistencies, when we cease to apply this idea, are what analogy authorizes us to expect. It must, first of all, correspond with the higher laws of the universe which reason recognizes; and, secondly, be consistent with the *general tenor* of the most important historical phenomena, and serve as the key to their explanation.

What, then, is the great central principle of that indefinite series of changes and revolutions which at once arrests and distracts our attention? Whence come all these, and whither do they tend? Do they not all originate in a fountain of infinite wisdom? and do they not all concentrate to the accomplishment of some grand design? We observe the particulars; we trace their connection among themselves. This is one thing, and this is well. But what is the end and object of all these particulars? That is the great question. Instead of being satisfied with the beauty and gorgeous variety of the scene, like children gazing at the images of the magic lantern, we should inquire into the significance of what we see; through shadows and images, we should penetrate to realities; through facts and particulars, we should look for principles and laws. Analysis of the mere facts of history is but the dissection of a dead body. The vital principle is the true object of our investigation. History in the gross is unrefined ore; mere facts are the

dross; principles are the gold. Let no man, then, condemn the refining process because it is a *refining*, for only by means of it is the pure metal to be obtained. "We should look on history as rational," says Hegel, "not simply because its events, instead of being driven to and fro by mere chance, are held together by the indissoluble chain of cause and effect; rather we should look on it as *rational*, because it is the manifestation and work of conscious reason, which has proposed to itself a great end or idea, and is engaged in the process of its realization." We have first, then, to determine what this idea is; and, secondly, to show that it is in the process of being realized.

## II. Herder's scheme.\*

Herder's leading idea in the work which we have placed first at the head of this article, was, *an organic development of the race analogous to that of the individual*. And though Herder afterward disclaimed this theory, yet as it naturally suggests itself on a

\* John Godfrey Von Herder was born in 1744 at Mohrungen, in Eastern Prussia. His father permitted him to read only the Bible and the Hymn-book, but an insatiable thirst for learning led him to pursue his studies in secret. The clergyman of the place employed the boy as a copyist, and soon discovered his talents, and allowed him to participate in the lessons which he gave his own children, in Latin and Greek. He studied theology at Königsberg, where he became acquainted with Kant, who permitted him to hear all his lectures gratis. But he afterward wrote a severe criticism on Kant, entitled the *Metacritic*. He declined a professorship at Göttingen, and went to Weimar, where he led an active and highly useful life, and was on terms of intimacy with Göthe, over whom he exercised no inconsiderable influence. He died in 1803. In 1819 the grand-duke of Weimar ordered a tablet to be put on his grave, with the words, *Licht, Liebe, Leben, (Light, Love, Life.)—Vide Encyclopedia Americana.*

His "Spirit of Hebrew Poetry" is well known among us in an English dress. His works in the various departments of literature and philosophy have been published in Germany in forty-five octavo volumes. But his greatest work is that here under review. It was the favorite study of his life, and in it all the light of his great mind is concentrated.

Herder was distinguished for his philanthropy; he possessed the acutest sensibilities, and a most luxuriant imagination: and few authors have had a better influence on the public taste in Germany. As to his theological character, although he considered himself, and is considered by his countrymen, as standing in opposition to ultra-rationalism; there is much in his writings, and in his philosophy of history among the rest, (and, alas! how few German authors are free from the imputation,) which must grate harshly on the feelings of all who hold the Scriptures, of both the Old and the New Testament, to be, in the special and proper sense of the words, a revelation from God. In common with most German writers of all classes, he is apt to look upon the Bible from a position assumed to be higher than that which the sacred writers themselves occupied—to criticise, therefore, rather than to explain. Yet he



cursorry survey of the history of the world, as it has been the favorite theory of many philosophers, and as it is one of the most prevalent, even in the learned world, at the present day, it must not be passed over without a few remarks.

According to this theory, the world first awoke to consciousness in the East, in the persons of the earliest generations of mankind, and there passed through its infancy under the immediate tutelage of the Creator and the subsequent sway of the patriarchs. Thence, as the world has advanced in age, and as the patriarchal sway in the East degenerated into despotism, the spirit of history has moved westward; first charging, as with electrical influence, the shores of Phenicia and Egypt, and then attracted to the islands and coasts of Greece and Italy, where it developed itself into the two poles of Grecian and Roman civilization. This period represents the sensitive and vivacious youth of the human race and the beginnings of soberer manhood. Afterward that progressive spirit was apparently annihilated, but really diffused and rendered latent by the thick exhalations and overwhelming floods that accompanied the corruption and downfall of the western empire; and finally, as the rust and rubbish were gradually removed, as the heavens again grew serene, and the atmosphere was purified from its corrupt damps and vapors, the same electro-spiritual principle began to manifest itself along the southern peninsulas of Europe, and afterward to develop a still greater intensity toward its western and northern shores. Having charged these, and culminating in the British isles, it has sent its sparks over the broad Atlantic, and lighted on the shores of America. This period is the mature manhood of the race.

There is something fascinating about such a theory, it must be admitted, and much may be said in its favor; but though it may be serviceable as furnishing an obvious and convenient bond of union for a looser view of the subject, it must be allowed to be quite insufficient as regards the exhibition of the true formal idea of universal history. Striking, pleasing, instructive, it may be; but it is too superficial. It does not penetrate to the real ground, the actual causes and connection of things, but seizes upon and gene-

seems to have been a man of deep and sound religious feeling. Few men, after all, have appreciated and loved the Scriptures better than he—particularly, however, the poetical parts of the Old Testament, and the evangelical histories of the New. He never meant to attack religion, but rather to defend it; and, doubtless, he felt and thought that he was so doing, even while suffering his mind to be led astray by the secret influence of a false philosophy and illuminism, which, in its full development and naked form, he rejected with disgust.

ralizes the mere external characters. It is like a system of mineralogy framed without the aid of chemistry. Besides, it is overhasty in reaching its conclusion, as all theories on subjects of this kind are apt to be. Assuredly if a Roman in the Augustan age had broached such a theory, he would have placed the maturity of the world's history in his own time and nation; and so might even a Greek at the time of Demosthenes and Alexander. Tertullian, in the second century of our era, having divided the history of the race into similar periods, actually placed its maturity in his own times. A modern European, and a German, of course places it in Europe at the present time.

But when and where are the old age and final decease of the world to come? Perhaps it will be suggested in reply, that a comparison must not be required to walk on all four. Nevertheless, if the world goes on, the fourth age must infallibly come, or the third must be unnaturally lengthened. In fact, America, if any thing is to be made of her by the supporters of this scheme, must represent the old age and decrepitude of the human race; unless, perhaps, they will call it the period of second childhood; or, reviving the fable of the eastern sorceress, they will suppose this continent the cauldron of rejuvenescence, whence, after due boiling and seething, the regenerated race shall recommence its westward pilgrimage. But must we give up our title to a share in the vigorous and genial age of our species? Is there really such a broad difference between the civilization and spirit of the race on the opposite shores of the Atlantic? Are we not still Anglo-Saxons? And are we not as fresh and youthful as our brethren? And, finally, is not this analogy to advancing age applicable rather to the rise, progress, and decay of separate nations, than to any similar phenomena of the race passing on through different longitudes?

That the culminating point of civilization has, in the course of history, been moving westward—and that the character of this civilization has changed as it has changed its seat—are facts, interesting and important facts; but that this diversity of character, as it has unfolded itself chronologically, should be compared to the diversity in the several stages of human life, savors rather of *poetry*, than of strict *philosophy*.

Ever since the earliest generations of mankind, as this culminating point has moved westward, men have looked back from its elevation upon an older world behind them. They have ever felt *themselves* in the vigor of youth and manhood. Thus *they* have felt successively, so *we* feel, and so, if we follow the teaching of experience, we must suppose that men will continue to feel

in subsequent ages, as this favored point continues its westward circuit.

But we must dismiss this theory as pertaining to the poetry rather than the philosophy of history. Herder's introductory work, which he entitled, "*Preludes to a Philosophy of History*," contained, besides a rapid outline, or rather a poetical epitome, in which this theory was the leading idea, an essay on the "*Origin of Language*," which received the prize from the Berlin Academy of Sciences; and the whole was published at least ten years before the "*Ideen*" appeared. Meanwhile, as with longer reflection, his views became more enlarged and definite, they seem to have grown more profound; at least he seems to have become more conscious of the difficulties of the problem he had undertaken to solve. In his preface to the "*Ideen*" he disclaims any serious intention of building an entire philosophy of history on the above-mentioned analogy.

"With the few allegorical words, childhood, youth, maturity, old age of our race; whose successive periods were applied, and were applicable to but few nations of the earth; it had never occurred to me to designate a highway on which even the history of civilization, not to speak of the philosophy of universal history, might be measured out with a sure foot. We must begin at a much deeper point, and the circle of ideas must be drawn with a much wider sweep, if the work is in any degree to be worthy of its title."

"Already in my early years, when the fields of science lay before me, adorned in all the beauties of the morning, from which the noon-day sun of life detracts so much, the thought often occurred to me—as every thing in the world has its philosophy and science, whether that which concerns us most nearly of all, the history of humanity, viewed as a great whole, should not have its philosophy and science as well as the rest. Every thing reminded me of this, metaphysics and morals, natural philosophy and natural history; last, and most of all, religion. The God who hath ordered all things in nature by measure, number, and weight, and established accordingly the essence of things, their form and connection, their course and preservation; so that from the great temple of the universe to the grain of sand, from the force which holds the earth and sun to the thread of a spider's web, one and the same wisdom, power, and goodness, presides over all. He who, in the human body, and in the powers of the human soul, hath arranged all with such a marvelous and divine depth of intelligence, that if we attempt to follow the all-wise far in our thoughts, we lose ourselves in an abyss; how, said I to myself, should this God have foregone his wisdom and goodness in the formation and destiny of our race as a whole, and here alone have no plan?"

This plan may indeed exist, and we not be able to discover it; but if we are to have a philosophy of history, we must know or assume it, at least to a certain extent. What, then, is this plan?



According to Herder's maturer view, it would seem to resolve itself briefly into this—that *God created man with certain powers and impulses, and placed him in this world to act out his nature.* "Man's organization is fitted for a capacity of reason, for refined sensibility, for art and language, for noble impulses, and, consequently, for freedom; man is formed for humanity, religion, and the hope of immortality." That there are, likewise, in human nature, capacities for evil, is, of course, admitted. Thus framed and equipped, man is placed under an infinite variety of circumstances, and "his fate is given into his own hands." Hence Herder speaks continually of physical powers, of implanted tendencies, of an *anima mundi*, of *destiny*. The whole course of history becomes really, and notwithstanding all of Herder's special disclaimers, an unconscious process of blind fatality. "In all the periods of history every thing happens which can happen"—this is one of his fundamental laws. Of course there is properly no room for divine guidance after the original adjustment of the machine. Accordingly Rome, for example, *must* have risen and proceeded in every step of its whole history, just when and where, and as it did. "Under the circumstances it was impossible but that it should have been built on the banks of the Tiber, should have warred by land and sea with all the nations in those quarters of the globe, subjugated and trodden them in pieces, and finally found *in itself* the limits of its renown and the origin of its decay; just as it actually did. Every phenomenon of history is a physical product. All or nothing is accident; all or nothing is the result of immediate, positive will," [Wilkûhr, arbitrium.] By all this our author must mean to exclude all immediate divine guidance, adaptation, and agency; for, directly afterward, he expressly rejects as absurd and horrible the idea that, in any sense, the Roman empire was made, what it was, in order to prepare the way for the introduction of Christianity; as if, in that case, Providence or Christianity would be accountable for all the crimes connected with Roman history. "Indeed," he adds, "the philosophy of final causes has brought no advantage to natural history; but its lovers, instead of investigation, have contented themselves with plausible illusions. How much more would this be the result in the history of mankind, with its ten thousand ends involved and complicated into one another!" Nevertheless, is there not, even according to Herder, one grand focal end toward which all history is tending? If not, then there are no partial ends in the supreme Intelligence; every thing, as far as any design of Providence is concerned, exists for nothing beyond itself. If the Roman empire was not, in any sense, designed as a

preparation for the introduction of Christianity, then the Jewish state had no such design—then Christianity was not *designedly* introduced after the Jewish state and the Roman empire, in the accomplishment of their own destiny, had actually made preparation for it. At least Herder must admit this, for, according to him, “all or nothing is design.” And further, if, as he says, God originally made man to be just what he has been, is, and will be, then, according to his reasoning here, why are not all the crimes of men to be laid to the charge of their Creator? Still more, if there is no principle to serve as a clew in history but the natural powers of man, and the physical laws of their development, then Christianity must be a mere product of nature—must, from physical necessity, have appeared just when and where it did, and have been merely one step in the natural unfolding of humanity; or—Christianity is no element of history. Here we join issue with Herder: “All is design, or nothing is design; all is fate, or nothing is fate.” Either, then, Christianity is not of immediate divine origin, but a mere natural and necessary phenomenon, or God is still immanent in all his works, is still impelling, guiding, and governing the vast movements of the world’s history.

“There’s a divinity that shapes our ends,  
Rough hew them as we will.”

Indeed, Herder himself, with strange inconsistency, sometimes asserts as much. He expressly allows and maintains a *providence* in history; he only asks that it should be *rightly understood*; of which the only consistent meaning would seem to be, that, while a providence is to be allowed in general, it is to be denied all particular application—which were a providence worthy of the gods of Epicurus.

If the admission and investigation of final causes in history is to be treated as profitless reverie, or as fitted for religious edification rather than for philosophical instruction; then, by parity of reasoning, how stands the case with the study of natural causes? Hume proved long ago that we don’t immediately learn from experience the one kind of causes any more than the other. The facts are given. Why not state them and rest satisfied? Why go further, and investigate causes and principles? Is it in order to explain, arrange, and systematize the facts? The investigation of final causes performs the same office. Whatever reasons can be given for the investigation of natural causes will, in a philosophy of history, apply *a fortiori* to that of final causes. It is only by reference to the latter that we can approach to unity of view. But how can

we discover final causes? The facts are before us; by the aid of reason we ascertain their natural causes and connections; in like manner, by the aid of reason and revelation, we ascertain their object and end. This last process does not exclude the other. By no means; rather it *subsumes* and includes the other—it *cannot exist without the facts* and their natural connections—not, indeed, in their universality, but to a sufficient extent to betray their general tendency, or, in mathematical phrase, the law of their curvature.

It is a striking illustration of the confused or wavering character of Herder's views—at least according to our imperfect apprehension of them—that he closes the first part of the “Ideen,” which contains a natural history of the earth, its productions, and inhabitants, with the remarkable statement that “the present state of man is probably the bond of union between two worlds.” He says,—

“I cannot imagine that, as we are a middle species between two classes, and are in some degree partakers of both, the future state should be so far from the present, and so entirely cut off from all communication with it as the animal in man would gladly believe. On the contrary, many steps and results in the history of our race become to me utterly unintelligible without a higher influence. That, for instance, man has entered upon the path of civilization, and found out language and primitive science without higher guidance, seems to me inexplicable, and more and more inexplicable the longer a rude animal condition is assumed to have continued. A divine economy has certainly presided over the race from its origin downward, and gently led it along its path. But the more man's natural powers have come into exercise, the less he has needed this higher aid, and the less susceptible of it he has become; although even in later times the greatest effects on the earth have arisen from inexplicable circumstances, or been accompanied by them.”

How, then, can we expect to obtain a philosophical view of the leading events of history without referring all to a divine economy, and humbly seeking for the grand design to be accomplished by the whole?

In his second part Herder establishes *the unity and Asiatic origin of the human race*. In his essay on the “Origin of Language,” he had already proved the divine original and the *primitive unity of language*, and a subsequent confusion of tongues by some violent disruption. These results are the more worthy of notice, since Herder prosecuted his investigations independently of the authority of the Mosaic history, and openly professed himself ready to believe, in case the evidence should look that way, in *autochthones*, and the original plurality of the race: and the general cha-



racter of his researches shows him to have been sincere in this profession.

The third part of the "Ideen" contains a philosophical compend of universal history, viewed geographically and chronologically; from all which he derives the following laws, which may convey a tolerable idea of the various elements embraced in his theory:—

"1. *Humanity* is the final end of man's nature, and with this end in view, God has given the fate of our race into our own hands.

"2. All the destructive powers in nature must, in the course of time, not only yield to the conservative powers, but also, in the end, contribute of themselves to the general development.

"3. The human race is destined to pass through various stages of culture in various vicissitudes; but its permanent welfare is essentially and solely founded on reason and equity.

"4. According to their inherent laws, reason and equity must, with the course of time, gain a wider and wider influence among men, and promote a permanent humanity.

"5. A wise goodness rules in the fate of man; hence, there is no higher dignity, no more enduring and purer happiness than to act in furtherance of its counsels."

Thus Herder, after all, was compelled, by his philosophical instinct, to seek for some principle of unity. He found it, as he supposed, in the idea of *perfectibility*. He called it "humanity," that is, the realization of the ideal of human nature. Here is an end proposed, and the true end, if you will; but where is the law of progression, unless we admit an efficient providence, or resort to fate or the superficial analogy to the life and development of the individual? The most common notion in regard to the progress of the species is that of a gradual approximation toward perfection in general. This may be denominated the *popular* philosophy of history; and every true philosophical theory must include and satisfy it; but, at the same time, should furnish for it a more definite and appropriate expression. Of itself, it is too loose, too abstract and general to furnish any key to the great problem. It proposes a perfectibility without end or aim, or law of progression. The idea of human perfectibility lies, indeed, enfolded in the idea of immortality; but that the scene of this perfection is to be *here*, either in respect to the individual or the race, is neither implied nor so much as rendered probable by that idea.

"Human perfectibility" is a phrase which has been so constantly repeated, and so grossly abused by the French school of atheistic philosophers, that its very sound has grown disagreeable. With Turgot, Price, and Priestley it was a favorite idea. But to pass by the blasphemous ravings and reveries of Volney, perhaps no man

has ever carried out this idea more philosophically, thoroughly, and consistently—in the sense of the illuminist school—than Condorcet, in his “Sketch of a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind.” According to him, the origin of Christianity was but a fortuitous event, growing out of the confusion and fanaticism of the times ; and “its triumph was the signal for the entire downfall of the sciences and philosophy.” He held Moses, Jesus, and Mohammed to be the “three grand impostors” that have deceived the world, and that “their religions, originating in one and the same source, are only the corruption of a purer worship paid by the primitive tribes to the universal soul of the world.” (*Query—Does this indicate, most, perfectibility or corruptibility?*) He flatly declares all religion to be a sheer impediment to the progress of humanity ; and yet, such is his hardihood that he even undertakes to “show how the religion of Mohammed, the most simple in its dogmas, the least absurd in its practices, the most tolerant in its principles, (!) seems to condemn to eternal slavery and incurable stupidity all that vast portion of the earth over which it has extended its empire ; while *in modern Christendom we see the genius of science and liberty blaze forth* under the most absurd superstitions, and in the midst of the most barbarous intolerance.” Thus he strikes the sun from the centre of his system, and it is curious to see what pandemoniac visions then rise upon his imagination. He has no doubt that the political example of republican France (with which he has the effrontery to couple the United States of America) will soon, and without fail, be imitated in all the civilized world. (Little did he dream of Napoleon and the holy alliance.) In his prophetic vision he hails the time when “brigand merchants” and “superstitious monks and missionaries” will cease to tease and torment the less enlightened tribes of Asia and Africa ; and “will be succeeded by a race of missionary philosophers, employed in disseminating among them truths conducive to their happiness, and in enlightening them in regard to their interests and rights.” (!) “The period, then, will arrive when the sun will no longer shine upon any but free men on the face of the earth—men who recognize no other master but their reason ; when tyrants and slaves, priests and their stupid or hypocritical instruments, will exist only in the history of the past and in the plays of the theatre.” One step further : “Among the advances of the human mind, most important for the general happiness, we must reckon the entire destruction of the prejudices which have established between the two sexes an inequality of rights, injurious even to the favored party.” Nor is this all ; there is to be an

indefinite progress in the sciences and useful arts ; and in medicine among the rest ; so that the time will come when the nature of all diseases will be understood, and they will be for ever abolished ; “the time will come when death will be only the effect either of extraordinary accidents, or of the less and less rapid exhaustion of the vital powers ; and, in short, the duration of the mean interval between birth and this exhaustion has no assignable limit.” (And yet this same class of philosophers mock at the long lives of the patriarchs as impossible and absurd.) All the physical faculties are not only to be perfected in individuals, but that constantly increasing degree of perfection is to be transmitted by *hereditary descent*. “In short,” he concludes, “may we not extend these same hopes to the intellectual and moral faculties ? And our parents, who transmit to us the advantages or defects of their conformation, from whom we have both the distinctive traits of the countenance and the dispositions to certain physical affections ; can they not transmit to us also that part of the physical organization on which intelligence, force of thought, energy of soul, or moral sensibility depends ? And is it not probable that education, in perfecting these qualities, has an influence on this same organization, modifies and perfects it ? Analogy, the analysis of the development of the human faculties, and even some facts, seem to prove the reality of these conjectures, which would roll back still further the limits of our hopes.” There’s perfectibility in its most illuminated form ! With what face could such a philosopher scoff at the credulity of the Christian believer ? We have made these citations, partly, as they exhibit a curious illustration of the manner in which a philosopher may theorize when his mind is no longer warped or clouded by any religious superstition ; and partly as they show that the idea of human perfectibility is too indefinite a matter to determine with any precision the character of a philosophy of history, to which it may serve as a basis. Let us see, then, if we cannot find a more definite theory, which, at the same time, thrusts its roots more profoundly among real principles and vital causes.

### III. *Hegel’s scheme.\**

According to the doctrine of several distinguished modern writers, and of all politicians, *the progress of human freedom is*

\* George William Frederic Hegel was born at Stutgard in 1770. In 1816 he was invited to Heidelberg as professor of philosophy ; and in 1818 he succeeded Fichte in the philosophical chair at Berlin, where he died in 1836. He is considered one of the greatest of the modern German metaphysicians, and his philosophy has made an epoch second only to Kant’s.



*the central idea of the world's history.* Hegel has constructed a philosophy of history *in extenso* on this apparently narrow basis.

"The Science of Logic" forms the basis and the centre of his system—a system which may be described as reducing not only all our ideas, but the essence of all reality itself, if not to empty logical formulas, yet to a mere process of pure thought. Nevertheless, it pretends to eschew all abstractions, and to be the most *concrete* system that could possibly be imagined.

Hegel has sought to reconcile the contradictions of metaphysics by asserting the logical identity (which with him is no less than the real identity) of opposites, as the basis of all truth. Thus, by laying down as a foundation the most monstrous of contradictions—as, for example, that God is at once absolute being and absolute nothing—he naturally finds room enough to accommodate, if not to reconcile, all possible contradictions. With a method so omnipotent, of course he shrinks not from the most difficult problems. It is no longer necessary to pursue the old thorny inquiry, whether *the one or the other* be true; he cuts the matter short by roundly asserting that *both are alike true*. He denies (our right of asserting) the *existence* of any thing which we may not fully know and comprehend. We have no right, for example, to assert *that* God is, unless we comprehend *what* God is, and only so far as we comprehend this; otherwise we "know not what we say, nor whereof we affirm." But even if Hegel himself had a clear apprehension of the meaning and bearing of his own assertions, (which may well be doubted,) certain it is that his disciples are as much at variance among themselves about the purport of his dicta as philosophers were before about the truth itself. They are divided into the right and the left Hegelians, according as they more incline to one or the other of the opposites which should have been harmonized—by mutual elimination. The latter party, sometimes called Hegelings, openly profess all the blasphemies and abominations of pantheism and atheism. Strauss, the author of a *Leben Jesu*, (Life of Jesus,) replete with bare-faced infidelity, and cool mockery (under the veil of philosophical criticism) of the most sacred mysteries and truths of our holy religion—Strauss, a professor of theology, may be regarded as quite too favorable a specimen of this party. The other side claim for the Hegelian philosophy a thorough universality, a logical consistency and strictness, and a high spiritual character, which pre-eminently fit it for a basis to a pure Christian philosophy.

Be this as it may, the pantheistic and rationalistic tendency of Hegel's system cannot be mistaken. And when we say that he calls a miracle a childish absurdity, and denies to the Deity any proper personal *consciousness* distinct from our own, we have said enough to stamp his theological character for this longitude.

His "Philosophy of History" has appeared among his complete works, which have been in a course of publication since his death, and have reached seventeen volumes, 8vo. It is a production which has some capital defects, undoubtedly, growing out of its author's philosophical system. But it must be admitted to be a masterly performance in its kind, displaying an astonishing grasp and precision of thought, and highly instructive for any one who may choose to see how the history of the world looks as surveyed from the point which he assumed as the centre of observation—that is to say, not the religious, but the purely intellectual point of view.

According to a favorite view of his metaphysical system, he holds that the reason (which is the prime and constant motor, the informing spirit of the world) has been *gradually* evolving itself and emerging into *consciousness*. The history of the world is, then, the progress in the *consciousness* of freedom—not in its actual manifestation or external enjoyment—a progress which is not accidental, but a necessary law of human nature.

Like the biographical theorists, Hegel makes a threefold division of history—1. The orientals, who only knew that *one is free*; 2. The Greeks and Romans, who knew that *some are free*; and, 3. The modern occidentals, who know that *man as man is free*.

Politically realized, this would seem to correspond to the monarchical, aristocratical, and democratical systems of government—though it is curious to observe that Hegel, lecturing in Berlin, states the historical order to be despotism, democracy and aristocracy, and monarchy! But he by no means restricted his doctrine to its *political* significance; although he expressly recognized this bearing of his theory, and it will naturally be treated as his leading idea.

Hegel is evidently in favor of a strong government, and very far from considering such a government inconsistent with freedom, as he understands the term. With respect to the origin of society and government he remarks,—

“An original state of nature, in which man is represented in the possession of his natural rights, in the unrestrained exercise and enjoyment of his freedom, is to be assumed as a matter of theory; but it must not be supposed to have had any historical realization. Freedom, although the *ideal* of what is original and natural, is not itself an original and natural state, but must first be earned and won through the instrumentality of a constant discipline of the understanding and the will. Hence the state of nature is rather the state of injustice and violence, of the uncontrolled natural impulse to inhuman deeds and feelings. By means of society and the state, *restraint* is indeed introduced, but it is a restraint of those coarse feelings and rude impulses—of caprice and passion. This restraint constitutes a part of the instrumentality by means of which the consciousness and the will of freedom, that is, of true and rational freedom, are first of all brought out. According to the idea of freedom, right and morality belong to it; and these are in themselves universal objects and ends, which can be discovered only by the activity of *thought* as it is contradistinguished from *sense*. It is the everlasting misunderstanding of freedom, to consider it only in a formal, subjective sense, abstracted from its essential objects and ends; and thus the restraint of the appetites, desires, passions, and caprices of the individual is held to be a restraint of his freedom: whereas such restraint is absolutely the condition from which emanci-

pation proceeds ; and society and the state are the spheres in which freedom is actually realized."

But, after all, it most plainly follows, that, as self-government is the true condition of individual freedom, and civil government of social and political freedom, and as the more self-government is exercised the less civil government will have to do, therefore that political system is the highest in the scale of progression which secures the good order of the state, chiefly by promoting the self-government, that is, the intelligence and morals of individuals. And when men are individually intelligent and moral, and thus accustomed to govern themselves well, they are better fitted than any other party can be, to assume the administration of their own state affairs. Therefore, as in the progress of the world's history, the *consciousness* of freedom spreads itself from *one* to *several*, to *all* ; so also political systems, passing from monarchy through aristocracy, must terminate in democracy. So that, on this scheme, as well as the earlier theory of Herder, we find the highest point of the scale placed precisely in our own times, and more especially in our own country. This circumstance may be regarded as betraying the partial, and, consequently, transient character of the theory. It is not *superficial*, like the other ; it penetrates to a real, organic principle ; but it cannot have seized the central principle. It is one important aspect in which the progress of mankind may be viewed, but yet a subordinate one. If we allow it, more than it can fairly claim, that it should represent *potentially*, like Herder's later views, the full development and perfection of the whole nature of man ; then, indeed, the true goal would be presented, and so far we should have nothing to blame in either ; but what we especially find fault with in both, is, that they either assign none, or an insufficient principle of the proposed development.

Hegel's work is essentially unchristian. He passes in review all the great epochs and leading historical nations ; but confines his attention almost exclusively to the progress of the arts and sciences, and to the development of *political* and speculative philosophy. As a well-digested treatise in respect to these points, it is altogether unrivaled ; but Christianity has a place in it only as one of the agents in completing the modern consciousness of freedom—in the emancipation and illumination of the human mind. Christianity, as one element of modern culture, is placed in organic connection with Roman civilization, and not with Judaism. Indeed, he devotes to despised Judea but two pages of his whole work. And here, though he allows that the idea of the unity and spirituality of the Deity is a sublime characteristic of the Jewish religion, yet he



cannot refrain from a piece of mockery altogether beneath the dignity of a philosopher. He complains that the idea of the *state* is incongruous with the principle, and foreign from the legislation of Moses; and adds,—

“In the conception of the Jews, [that is, of the Jewish Scriptures,] Jehovah is the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, who called them out of Egypt, and gave them the land of Canaan, [that is, he is a *personal* and a partial or petty God.] The history has some grand traits; the exhibition of the patriarchs is attractive; although odious features are introduced into the accounts as a whole, from the fact that this people in their rigorous and burdensome worship felt themselves elevated above all other nations, and were appointed to exterminate the inhabitants of Canaan. The history is polluted with miracles, too; for so long as the concrete consciousness is not free, the concrete apprehension is not free either; nature ceases to be deified, but is not yet understood. Moses brought nine plagues upon the Egyptians, but this the Egyptians were able to do also—the bringing forth of lice only was peculiar to Moses.”\*

#### IV. *Schlegel's scheme.*†

Of the professed philosophies of history, perhaps Schlegel's is better known among us than any other. It proposes, as its formula, “the restoration in man of the lost image of God,” or, “the return of the race to that original state of perfection from which it had fallen.”

\* Who would not imagine that these last words were from the pen of Voltaire, as they certainly are from his spirit? They are not quoted, however, as an index of the pervading spirit of Hegel's book, but to be condemned as unworthy a place in any philosophical work. They were probably prompted by a hatred of the modern German Jews; a feeling which must not be forgotten in explaining the very general rejection of the Jewish Scriptures on the part of German theologians.

† Frederick Schlegel was born at Hanover in 1772. He commenced his literary career in 1794 by an essay on the different schools of Greek poetry. His first important work, entitled “The Greeks and Romans,” was published in 1797; and his History of Greek Poetry in 1800. He then turned his attention to the study of Sanscrit and Persian literature, meanwhile writing articles on the early Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, and Provençal poetry, and lecturing in French on metaphysics to a Parisian audience. On painting, sculpture, and architecture, he wrote in the spirit of a Winkelmann. In 1805 he left the Protestant for the Roman Catholic communion, and this change of sentiment tinctures most of his later productions. In 1808 he published the result of his researches in Eastern literature, in a celebrated work entitled, “The Language and Wisdom of the Indians,” which forms no unimportant step in the progress of modern ethnographical science. In 1810 he delivered at Vienna a course of Lectures on Modern History. This work, in two volumes, though reckoned by some of Schlegel's admirers his master piece, shows but too clearly the

This theory conceives of the race as, after the first great lapse, degenerating age after age until about the Christian era : since that time the process is supposed to be one of recovery and return, of revival and convalescence. There is no difficulty in assigning a sufficient reason for placing the turning point where it does, and having placed it there, the law of progression is sufficiently indicated in the Christian system which was then established. The previous history may then be regarded as illustrative of the insufficiency of all other means of recovery besides the evangelical, whether they were the light of nature and reason, and the appropriate objects to reflect upon, as among the Greeks and Romans ; or whether they were, besides, traditional notices of a primeval state of purity and of the revelation then first made to the race, as among the orientals ; or whether, finally, they were a subsequent revelation of the character and law of God, the external glory of which showed it manifestly to be by divine authority, as among the Jews. When all these means had been tried, and the race, instead of improving, had fallen lower and lower, then the great effectual remedy is introduced ; and the progress of history afterward is to display and illustrate its efficacy.

The relation in which this system stands to those of Herder and Hegel cannot be better stated than in the words of the author. He says,—

“ According to the different notions entertained of man’s nature there are but two opposite views of history—two mighty and conflicting parties in the department of historical science. It is quite unnecessary to observe that we include not in either class such writers as, confining themselves to a bare detail of facts, indulge not in any general historical

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contracting spirit of his new religionistic prejudices. In 1812 he delivered his *Lectures on the History of Literature*, which is every way an admirable production, an English translation of which has appeared in this country.

Schlegel was an active political writer, and in respect to the institutions both of church and state was a thorough conservative. In his metaphysics he had his own theory, which, as an idiosyncrasy, will not long survive him. His speculations in this department were published under the title of a *Philosophy of Life*. In 1828 he delivered at Vienna his course of *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*. Toward the close of the same year he gave in Dresden nine lectures on the Philosophy of Language ; and in January, 1829, he died—a man of great literary activity, immense learning, and rigid virtue. Though many of his works abound in beautiful and exciting thoughts—in enlarged and philosophical views, we find it difficult fully to relish, or perhaps worthily to appreciate them, on account of the haze of German indistinctness which shrouds many parts of them. He is not remarkably lucid in his arrangement of a subject, and he always makes us remember that he is a German, and too often that he is a Roman Catholic.

views, or even such as, vacillating in their opinions, have no clear, definite, and consistent views on the subject. According to one party, man is merely an animal, ennobled and gradually disciplined into reason, and finally exalted into genius; and therefore the history of human civilization is but the history of a gradual, progressive, and endless improvement. This theory may, in a certain sense, be termed the liberalism of historical philosophy; and no one, perhaps, has developed it with such clearness and mathematical rigor as a very celebrated French writer entirely possessed with this idea, and who, indeed, became in his time a martyr to these principles.\*

"This principle of the endless perfectibility of man has something in it very accordant with reason; and if this perfectibility be considered as a mere possible disposition of the human mind, there is doubtless much truth in the theory; but it must be borne in mind that the *corruptibility* of man is quite as great as his perfectibility.

"But man is not merely a nobler animal, fashioned by degrees to reason or dignified into genius. His peculiar and distinctive excellence—his real essence—his true nature and destiny, consist in his likeness to God; and from this principle proceeds a view of history totally different from that we have just described; for, according to it, man's history must be the history of the restoration of the likeness to God, or of the progress toward that restoration.

"If, in opposition to the rationalist theory of man's endless perfectibility, we were to designate the opposite system of history, founded on man's inborn likeness to his Maker, as the *legitimacy* of historical philosophy; this title would not be incorrect, since all divine and human laws and rights, as they are found in history, depend in their first basis on the supposition of the high dignity and divine destination of man. Hence this view of history is the only one which restores to man the full rights and peculiar prerogatives of his being. Even to all other truths it restores their full force and rights, and it alone can do so without detriment to its own principle; for as this is the simple truth, it is therefore complete and comprehensive. It must even acknowledge that man, besides his higher dignity and divine destiny, is, and remains in his outward existence a physical creature—and though he be such, not in an exclusive, but only secondary and subordinate sense, still, in respect to his external being and external development, he may be subject to certain natural laws in history. In the same way it may admit that man, endowed with freedom, even when he rejects the religious principle, is still a being gifted with reason; a being that consequently on this foundation incessantly works, builds, and improves, in good as in evil, essentially, interminably—we might almost say fearfully progressive. This legitimate philosophy of history, which proceeds from the high, divine point of view, should be, as far as the limited capacity of man will permit, and, at the same time, without deviating into ultraism, a recognition, and a just appreciation of the truth, and thereby become a science of history—that is to say, of all which under Providence has occurred to the human race.

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\* The author probably alludes to Condorcet.



"Independently of that progressive power of reason inherent in all the forms and departments of human activity ; and independently of the operations of divine providence, which form that high mysterious chain of unity that links together the different periods of man's social progress ; independently, I say, of all these, there is a law of nature—a high and secret principle of nature presiding over the life and growth of human society—which, if kept in due subordination to the higher principle of providence, will not be found incompatible with it. The prevalence of this law of nature may be clearly traced in the history of mankind, and even in that of particular nations, when their social progress is not impeded or interrupted by violent or irregular causes. And in following the current events of history the historical observer can accurately distinguish the different periods of national development—the first period, of artless, yet marvelous, childhood—the next, of the first bloom and flush of youth—later, the maturer vigor and activity of manhood—and at last, the symptoms of approaching age, a state of general decay and second childishness. This energy of nature, which, together with the other higher and divine principle of human destiny, is inherent in mankind, displays itself even in the sphere of intellect, and particularly in the flourishing eras of art and science.

"But without the idea of a Godhead regulating the course of human affairs, of an all-ruling Providence, and the saving and redeeming power of God ; the history of the world would be a labyrinth without an outlet—a confused pile of ages buried on ages—a mighty tragedy without a right beginning or proper ending ; and this melancholy and tragical impression is produced on our minds, by several of the great ancient historians, particularly the profoundest of them all—Tacitus, who, toward the close of antiquity, glances so dark a retrospect into the past."

A system founded on such principles is certainly an eminently Christian system ; and if Schlegel had carried it out with somewhat more of clearness and comprehensiveness, and with somewhat less of ultraism and Romish Catholicity, he would have left little to desire.

#### V. *The Christian philosophy of history.*

But in truth we have no need of Schlegel, or of any great German philosophers, to help us to a right understanding of the great problem of human history. They have expended all the stores of their vast erudition, and tasked all the acuteness, comprehension, and originality of their highly-gifted and thoroughly-trained minds to elucidate the subject, and, after all, they either "darken counsel by words without knowledge," or they send us back us to the simple word of God. *The Bible contains the true philosophy of history* ; and we have but to avail ourselves of the clew which its principles furnish us to guide our steps safely through all the turnings of the vast labyrinth. But it is well to have marked how

reason stumbles in her presumptuous, solitary efforts, that we may henceforth cling with the more undoubting confidence to our heavenly Guide.

Edwards, in his "*History of Redemption*," has seized upon the Scriptural view, and made a rude and half-unconscious, yet vigorous and characteristic effort toward a development of it. We refer to this work not because Edwards is by any means singular in his theory, but, partly, because he is the only one we know of who has imbodied the Scriptural view of history in one work specially devoted to the subject; and, partly, that we might be reminded that we have on this side of the Atlantic, not only the Holy Scriptures, but a Scriptural and an American philosophy of history.

According to this theory, the first human pair having fallen, and the whole race lying henceforth naturally in a state of ruin; the great central idea of the world's history—the object which the supreme Being is effectuating by, and in the course of human affairs, is the redemption of mankind by Jesus Christ. The history of redemption is, therefore, the basis and nucleus of the history of the world; while the Christian revelation discloses the goal and the law of progression. The process of recovery is made to go on from the first, (herein diverging slightly from Schlegel's view,) the completion of the revelation in Christ being made to reflect its influence back, as it were, and, through faith in the divine promises, rendering temporarily effectual that whose primary significance and design were to foreshow and prepare the way for Him who should come. Thus the great central point is the cross of Christ—the great central fact, the manifestation of God in the flesh. Both Schlegel and Edwards, in accordance with the Scriptures, have seized upon the sublime conception that all the events and changes in the course of human affairs, have in the mind of Him "who sits upon the circle of the earth," and directs the whole, their chief importance and end, in some more or less direct relation to the great work of human redemption. What more noble idea of history can be imagined? What higher or more delightful pursuit can be conceived than to trace out, in the boundless variety of particulars, their relation to this central object?

Here, as elsewhere, the Christian view is the most philosophical. And it is evident that, if Christianity be true, the philosophy that persists to neglect it, must be a lame, imperfect, and, so far, a false philosophy. Philosophy cannot pass by Christianity in silent contempt, as it fain would often do, and pursue its inquiries as if, at least by hypothesis, no such thing as Christianity existed. Christianity does exist. It is there,—and no philosophy can alter the

fact. It is undeniably an element in the problem which philosophy has to solve; it claims to be the highest element. This claim must be fairly met; it must be either admitted or refuted. There is no middle ground. If any, therefore, object to this view as narrow and religionistic, the only possible position that is left them to stand upon is that of a flat denial of the truth and validity of the Christian revelation. If they will have a philosophy of history at all, they must include Christianity, for it is a *part* of history; and if they will have a *true* philosophy of history, they must assign Christianity its true place and import in the system of which it is a part. The decision absolutely cannot be evaded. If, then, meeting the question boldly, we assign to Christianity the highest place, as it claims, we cannot avoid taking the Scriptural view, as presented by Edwards and Schlegel, at least as furnishing the *central idea*, if not a complete view of the whole system. There are, doubtless, other views revolving as secondaries around this primary idea, which have an important reaction upon this idea, and are themselves subordinate centres, well worth visiting as temporary points of observation. Bearing this in mind we shall have no difficulty in appreciating the several theories which have been advanced, and assigning to each its peculiar sphere. They are all true in their appropriate places; for man may be viewed as a moral and spiritual, or as an intellectual and social, or as a sensitive being; and it is with a primary reference to one or the other of these views of man, that the several theories of his history have been constructed.

Herder's theory of advancing age, and of natural energies and laws, refers more to the physical and sensitive man, less to the intellectual, and least to the moral and spiritual.

Hegel's theory of the increasing consciousness of freedom refers more to the intellectual and social man, less to the moral and spiritual, and least to the physical and sensitive.

While the Scriptural theory of the regeneration of the race by the power of Christianity refers more to the moral and spiritual, less to the intellectual, and least again to the physical and sensitive man.

Thus they may all be reconciled, and all combined, not, indeed, on a footing of equality, but in their due subordination, the precedence being given to the last. Indeed, the last, in its complete form, resumes and includes the others, and, together with these, the indefinite no-theory of endless perfectibility, so far as it has any foundation in truth; for the work of human redemption aims at the highest development and improvement of man in all the essential



elements and appropriate relations of his nature. And it is only by virtue of the latent energy, and through a secret reference in the supreme Intelligence to the final triumph of the Christian church, that in all departments there is a tendency, and, on the whole, a progress, toward perfection.

That there is such a progress ought not to be doubted, for it is in accordance both with the instinct of the race, and with the anticipations of Christianity. We ought not to regard the history of mankind as a mere succession of revolutions in the same circle, without any absolute progression. This seems, indeed, to be the law of the material and irrational world. The heavenly bodies continue to move round in nearly unvaried orbits. The different species of plants and the lower animals grow up from the embryo, flourish and decay, generation after generation, and age after age, without any proper advance. The general face of nature remains as of old. But is it, can it be so with rational and immortal man? These very characteristics of his nature forbid the supposition. It is true that since our earth has existed, there is abundant evidence of a progress in the material and irrational kingdoms, but *that* only by the substitution of a higher order of animals, or a more perfect species of plants for lower and less perfect kinds which had become extinct. There is not a gradual elevation or passing of one circle into the other, but one comes instead of the other. And we might naturally anticipate that whatever merely moves round and round in the same track must one day be annihilated to make room for something better. We ought not, then, to conceive of the progress of a race, endued with the high attributes of reason, as a properly circular, but rather as a *spiral* motion, returning from time to time to a position analogous to a former one, but always on a higher level. Such must be the progress of mankind—not that we are to subscribe to Condorcet's illuminist dream of an absolutely-endless progression in physical, intellectual, and social perfectibility—at least not in this present state—for the nature and capacities of man are limited, and “a more sure word of prophecy” teaches us to look for a final consummation of all sublunary things.

But the progress of mankind, such as it is, is far from being a straight-forward progress. There have been fearfully great *reactions* in history, and there may yet be greater and more fearful. Among the Jews there were great reactions from the time of Moses to that of John the Baptist; yet, on the whole, who can doubt that there was real progress both in intellectual and moral culture? That astonishing tendency to idolatry which had for ages been the besetting sin of that stiff-necked people, and the *fons et origo* of

their frequent calamities and captivities, had at last been radically cured. This single fact is enough to show an incalculable advance in mental and moral elevation.

But when the Jews, through later corruption, and in consequence of their obstinate rejection of the Messiah, were finally overthrown and dispersed—when their venerable and magnificent city, which had been “the joy of the whole earth,” and that glorious and beautiful temple where their fathers had worshiped, were laid in smouldering ruins, and trodden down under the iron foot of Roman domination; even then Christianity rose majestic from the ashes, soaring on loftier pinions, and bearing in her bosom the elements of a greater melioration and advancement, than the world had ever before seen.

Afterward came the yet more hopeless reaction of the *dark ages*, or rather, which preceded those ages; for, from a higher point of view, so far from the latter epoch appearing as an impediment in the progress of the race, it was rather a *pause* for the purpose of removing obstructions already existing—a *retiring* for the purpose of gaining greater momentum. The universal and indescribable corruption which had combined itself with Roman civilization; so that it had become another name for the age immediately succeeding the Augustan—“*corrumpere et corrumpi sæculum vocatur*”—would seem to have been too strong to be overcome and absorbed by the infant energies of the new religion. Christianity, therefore, seems to have seized upon the existing civilization to serve as the means of commanding the attention, and establishing its dominion over the hearts of those rude but comparatively untainted barbarians who were settling in swarms upon the decaying empire. It took firm hold of enough of the cultivated Romans to serve as its instruments in converting and civilizing their conquerors. Christianity combined well with Roman civilization, but could not combine with Roman corruption. Among the barbarians it found much better materials to work upon—for a rough block is better than a rotten one: but to educe from such materials the noble shape and physiognomy of humanized, enlightened, and Christian men, was necessarily a long and painful process. This was the office and vocation of the middle ages.

As these ages open, what is the scene that presents itself? The mangled limbs and splintered fragments of a long since death-struck and decaying society, trampled upon and trodden into the earth by numberless invading hordes, uncouth and rude, and wild, yet sound at heart, and full of native sap and energy. In the midst of this confusion and wide-spread ruin we seem to see the meek

but celestial form of Christianity diligently and piously gathering up, with one hand, every remnant of civilization, and every pure ray of intellectual light from the polluted ruins; and, with the other, gently beckoning to the proud and savage spoilers, as in reckless impetuosity they are pursuing their work of desolation. At the waving of her hand, their violence is checked; their hearts are softened; they pause in their career; they slowly approach; they bow; they kneel; they receive from her hand, with her more glorious, peculiar, celestial gifts, those precious relics of a former civilization which she had collected and preserved in her bosom. They receive them, and from that moment the transforming process begins. Through the middle ages it is struggling feebly on—feebly, because its foes are many and mighty. But let us beware how we treat those ages or that struggle with contempt. Then the great battle was fought and the great victory won of which modern European civilization is the result, and of which we enjoy the fruits. Let us rather honor the noble champions and martyrs—the great and indefatigable minds who achieved for us that victory.

Who dares despise the thirteen Anglo-American colonies when they conspired against the encroaching oppression of the mother country? They were feeble; their means were scanty; they prosecuted the struggle often with puny efforts; their soil, in every direction, was invaded and dishonored by an insulting foe; there were many traitors among their own people. Yet their hearts quailed not; they faltered not till their great work was achieved. We are now, as a nation, immensely their superiors in power, wealth, and resources; yet we scorn not the men of those dark times of our revolutionary struggle, we honor them in our heart of hearts.

This brings to view another important characteristic of a philosophical view of history. It is sufficient for us that a man took a part, on the right side, it little matters from what immediate motives, or with what individual character, in the contest for our independence. This participation covers all his faults, even though he may have been himself quite unconscious of the nature and tendencies of that struggle—a mere instrument of the idea which was the living spirit of that great movement. Analogous to this is the view we are to take of the agents that appear in general history. The main business of a historical philosophy is not to judge individuals or the morality of their acts; it considers them as the offspring of the popular spirit, and in their relation to the general progress. Many a tory in the time of our revolution was doubtless deserving of more respect personally, not only for his private virtues,



but for his public integrity and political honesty, than many individuals in the patriot ranks. Yet, historically, he is clothed with everlasting contempt. So in the general development of the race, those who with honest and righteous intent have withstood the progress of the great idea of the times, have a higher moral worth than those who, by their crimes, have, under an overruling Providence, furthered it. Yet the philosophy of history must assign to the latter a more prominent position.

Since the time of Voltaire, it has become too much the fashion to treat contumeliously the priests and monks of the middle ages. They had their faults, undoubtedly, and there were individuals among them worthy of all reprobation; but it may fairly be questioned whether they deserve as a body—certainly they do not deserve universally—the sweeping denunciation of stupidity, bigotry, and barbarism, so unthinkingly launched against them by modern scorners. If some enchantress could conjure up the spirit and the venerable form of a Bede, or an Alcuin, or an Anselm, or a Scotus Erigena, how would our modern Sauls quail and sink into conscious littleness before so majestic a presence! But whatever may have been their moral worth as individuals, the priests and monks of the middle ages have been the benefactors, not only of their own times, but of all subsequent generations. Through their instrumentality we have received whatever wrecks of the science and civilization of a former period have come down to us. They ushered in the dawn of that modern civilization and science in whose meridian beams we are now basking. It is true they knew not always the import of the part they were acting—but that matters little to us; they have performed their part, and a part of the highest importance to the progress of humanity, inasmuch as it lay in one of the most momentous forming and transition periods in the whole course of history. Nor were they always *unconscious* agents. Some of the most self-denying—active—apostolic—successful missionaries in the earlier centuries were monks. Sometimes they stood alone against the swelling flood of violence and barbarism that was threatening to roll back over the face of the Christian world. Many of them were persuaded of the approach of a brighter day, and “confessed that they were strangers and pilgrims on earth; God having prepared some better thing for us, that they without us should not be made perfect.”

That Christianity was in a very unsettled, confused, and imperfect state in the earlier and the middle ages is unquestionable; for Christianity, though perfect in the abstract, exists only in the concrete—as combined with the characters of those who profess it.

*Primitive* Christianity had, indeed, the advantage of immediate proximity to the pure fountains of our holy religion—to apostolic illumination—to the fresh influence of miracles and martyrdom. But in later times the more direct manifestations of the divine agency in enlarging and defending the church ceased, and she was left more to her own resources, as it were, more to be shaped by the general character of her members, not indeed as regards the nature of personal piety, but as regards an ecclesiastical establishment, and the relation of the church to society and philosophy. What wonder, then, that under such circumstances, as the character and interests of the church were committed to the hands of men just rescued from the errors, the vices, and abominations of heathenism, and brought into her pale, in many cases—at least after the conversion of Constantine—not so much by conviction as by interest and policy; what wonder that errors and corruptions early began to disfigure her doctrines and practices? What wonder at the crowd of early heresies? What wonder at the crude, unscriptural, ethnico-philosophical notions of an Origen or a Tertullian—men nevertheless esteemed fathers in the church? What wonder even if the pure light of Christianity had been entirely extinguished amid so many noxious influences? What wonder at the rise of Mohammedanism, in which the great enemy of mankind combined, as in one focus, all the scattered rays of error, and the prophet of Mecca knew how to balance himself therein? What wonder at the gross and scandalous corruptions of the Romish Church in later times? And, finally, what wonder if in the sixteenth century the pure spirit of Christianity, after having groaned for ages under the increasing burden of these errors and corruptions, at last imperiously called for a reformation? The Reformation came as the sun struggling forth from the thick mists of the morning. But, alas! even in the consequences of the Reformation we see marks of the marring hand of man, as well as of the merciful hand of God. If popish corruptions have driven some men to infidelity, Protestant freedom has been abused by others to rationalism and wild independence. Still the Reformation is a glorious proof of the indestructible character of the pure principles of Christianity. And may we not fairly presume—all things considered, intensity and extension being combined—that there is as much of the true, original spirit, and pure light of Christianity in the world now as at any former period since our Saviour's ascension? May we not even say, *more*? And may we not *hope* that, even in the great mass of dregs that settled down, after the ferment of the Reforma-

tion, in the shape of the modern Tridentine,\* Romish Church, there is yet enough of the leaven of pure Christian truth and power eventually to leaven the whole lump?

On the whole, then, we may safely assert that, notwithstanding the reactions that are past, and partly by means of them, mankind, under the guidance of Christianity, have been moving onward and upward. "The wheel," says Menzel, "always revolves about its own axis, but still goes forward," and, he might have added, goes forward by *means* of those revolutions. There is a living spirit in the wheel which ever guides and impels it. Ancient absurdities return again, but always lose something—reason and right always gain something in this revolving progression.

But it may be asked, how all this can be called a philosophy of universal history, when, at best, it actually traces out and explains the progress of only a fraction of the human race. We answer, it is so, because the redemption by Jesus Christ is the great end of the history of the whole world. The stone cut from the mountain's side is destined to fill the earth, however diminutive it may hitherto have appeared.

But the objector may still insist, "there is a history of Chinese civilization, of oriental, of Grecian and Roman, as well as of Christian civilization, and how can a true philosophy of history exclude them from its plan?" We answer, the first step is to find the central idea; and then we are to trace, as *far as we can*, the relations of the phenomena and their various subordinate centres to this idea. But this latter task we cannot expect thoroughly to accomplish. We cannot expect to explain every thing. There are, indeed, some things which hardly deserve the pains of explanation. This may be said, for instance, of the scattered and uncertain notices we have of unhistorical and barbarous times and nations. As the true philosophy of history is not to be deduced from an examination of the whole indiscriminate mass of facts, it is not necessary that *all* the details should be weighed precisely, or even taken into the account.

In this nation of seventeen millions, every person of mature age has, of course, a history of his own, but how few of all these individuals have, *de jure* or *de facto*, any place in the national history—not to say the philosophy of that history? What would be more absurd than to undertake to construct the history of a country by fusing together the biographies of all its inhabitants? As it is with the relation of individuals to a people, so with the relation of tribes

\* Most of the Romish corruptions were first enacted into dogmas by the Council of Trent.



to the race. There are few historical personages, and there are few historical nations.

For the rest, if we divide history, as usual, into the three great portions, the oriental, the Greek and Roman, and the modern occidental; and then inquire for their relation to Christianity; it will appear that the oriental civilization has been formed, and, obstinately looking back, has been *petrified*, as it were, from the scattered fragments and vestiges of the preparatory revelation of Christianity—the Greek and Roman civilization has been absorbed in Christianity—and the modern occidental civilization has grown out of it.

Whether we regard the past or present state of mankind, we may always consider the various developments in the race either in a friendly or antagonistic relation to the progress of Christianity, that is, of human redemption—and this is their fundamental and most interesting relation. Now, so far as they are antagonistic, it is manifest they are not to be explained by the grand, formal principle itself—they only offer impediments to be overcome by it; for the history of the world is not to be viewed as the simple progress of Christianity, but as a conflict between Christianity and its foes. These hostile influences may be regarded as external accidents—not belonging to the essence of history, except in their relation to the internal principle. It may, indeed, be interesting to discover and unfold the principle of their positive character, but this their negative character is the most important.

From this point of view, it is plain our theory commands the whole ground. And that there may be in all, even the remotest and most incongruous parts of history, some efficient relation to Christianity, is certainly no more incredible than that every footstep of ours has some real and calculable influence at the centre, and, consequently, on the position of the earth.

But while, in the mind of the Creator, and considered in relation to his plan, all history has its primary relation to the accomplishment of human redemption; when considered, on the other hand, as the *res gestae* of the race, it consists, according to its highest character, not in war and politics, and the growth and decay of states and empires, but in the progress of human thought as displayed in the arts and sciences, in general literature, but especially in philosophy. The highest sphere of thought is philosophy—thought reflected upon itself; and the highest sphere of philosophy is theology—thought reflected back to its source; and thus while religion must furnish the basis and nucleus of history in its diviner sense, next to religion the influence of thought in general is a most important element in the progress of the world.

It must be a point of primary importance in a philosophical view of history to distinguish permanent from temporary influences. As we look at the present, the most prominent events and personages are, of course, those who hold high and responsible offices in the social organization. We imagine that they will preserve the same relative position in all future time: but we deceive ourselves. Very few of those whose names are now so familiar in the mouths of the multitude will be known to have existed after the lapse of a few rapid lustra. Those now envied great men will then have fulfilled their brief destiny and sunk into oblivion; (unless, perhaps, they may serve, like the Roman consuls, for chronological landmarks;) while some humble, unobtrusive personage, may, at this very moment, be silently accomplishing a work which, spreading its efficacy wider and wider with the lapse of centuries, shall one day change the whole face of the world.

When Alexander was asked whether he would rather be Homer or Achilles, he replied by asking his interrogator whether he would rather be the victor or the herald in the Olympic games? From the warrior and the conqueror such an answer occasions no surprise. But what say we now of Homer and Achilles? The existence of the latter is to us a matter almost of indifference. Did Achilles really exist, we should have known nothing of him without a Homer: did he not exist, Homer would have created him. Homer without Achilles would have been, as he is, one of the noblest personages in the world's history. Achilles without Homer might as well have never been. Hector would have been dragged in the dust; Troy would have fallen; and the whole would long since have passed into oblivion. The ripple might indeed have been propagated indefinitely, but it would ere this have grown insensible. But Homer's name and influence can never die.

Of all the great men that plotted and warred, and ruled and revelled in Italy at the time of Dante—with their magnificent palaces, and sumptuous feasts, and splendid equipages, and crowds of trembling retainers—feared and envied by their contemporaries—the Bonifaces and Frederics—the Sforzas, the Malespini, the Ugolini, the Malatestas; what now remains? The names of some of them are known, like that of Achilles, chiefly from the pages of the immortal bard. Others have their record indeed in history, but they are lost in the undistinguished crowd of popes and emperors, and dukes and counts; while Dante still lives in all his native energy, not only infusing his noble spirit into the bosoms of his countrymen, but contributing directly or indirectly to form the intellectual character of the leading minds throughout Christendom.

The political history of England can scarcely furnish two other names to compare with those of Elizabeth and Cromwell. We omit to speak of Alfred, for his historical importance depends more on his character as a lover and patron of letters than on any political pre-eminence. But what is Elizabeth now, compared with one who while she lived was play-monger and play-actor for her court? The German now utters his name as familiarly, as fondly, as intelligently as his own countrymen. The Spaniard and the Italian, the Pole and the Russian, try to stammer out the harsh, unusual sound, with an indefinable awe and veneration—even the Frenchman recognizes it when he hears it. The name of Shakespeare is on every tongue; and day by day the sound waxes louder and louder, as if announcing the approach of some mighty conqueror: while the name of Elizabeth—the proud and magnificent Elizabeth—is pronounced with a feebler and still feebler voice, and chiefly by novices in thought, and by those who, for history, study the mere skeleton of the past.

Cromwell's secretary was once prosecuted under Charles II. as "one John Milton." What was he in comparison with the great worldly-wise men of his time? But what is he now, and what are they? Almost all of them, except Cromwell himself, sunk to oblivion or contempt; while Milton, if in the eye of the civilized world he has not already risen above the great Protector, must eventually assume that position. Cromwell with his works is dead and past; Milton in his works still lives and is present. Cromwell and Elizabeth belonged to the body of history; Shakespeare and Milton to the soul. The body is dead, and has its monument; the soul still lives in all its pristine vigor. The body has indeed left an impression of its acts behind it, but its *direct* effect is confined to the *external* form of society, and even there it acts with a constantly diminishing force. Elizabeth and Cromwell gave a turn to the political events of their own time, and these have affected those of subsequent times; but in this inextricable network of the details of history, it is impossible to determine the amount of their personal influence, such as it was. Their *example* may still be felt *directly*, but only through the agency of literature. It is more the historian's work than theirs. Why is Philip of Macedon so much more noble a personage than Philip the Pequod? Because he was surrounded by a literary spirit and found a classical historian.

Nor let the fathers of the civil and common law be forgotten; who, though mere private men, have *given laws*, and laws, too, more unalterable than those of the Medes and Persians, because



they are not founded upon the authority of a transient despotism, but are deduced from the universal reason, and find their echo in every breast. They have legislated for whole nations, and, in some degree, for the whole civilized world. Take Grotius's work on the rights of war and peace. What monarch or legislature in Christendom can boast of having exerted an influence on the general history and intercourse of nations such as that book has exerted? The Emperor Nicholas or the British parliament may make laws for a nation—Grotius made laws for the world. Others, it is true, —private men, and scholars like himself—have come after him, improved and completed his work; and they share, according to their measure, in his authority. Yet those who are less accustomed to meditate on *principles*, and more familiar with the details of every-day pursuits, often charge men of letters with ignorance of human nature and of practical affairs; and it is considered refutation enough of a man's opinions to say, "O! he is a mere theorist;" "a book-worm;" "a man of the closet!" As if a skillful accountant should charge the algebraist or astronomer with ignorance of arithmetical science because he could not add a given column of figures so promptly or so surely as himself! According to this, how many superiors in a knowledge of numbers might Newton or Laplace find in our shops and counting houses! This horse-in-a-mill sort of practical knowledge in some limited circle is very good in its place, and not at all to be despised, but let it not swell itself up to so great importance as to depreciate its betters.

The influence of philosophical speculations upon practical life, and upon the general course of history, has scarcely ever been stated in terms sufficiently strong. Alexander would surely have thought it strange, had he been told that, after some score of centuries, the school-master of his boyhood would fill a greater space in the view of the world than he himself. He could hardly have imagined that his splendid victories and conquests would ever be eclipsed by the closet-studies of a metaphysician. But the greatness of Alexander, be it more or less, remains immovably fixed to the epoch in which he lived; as, therefore, in the progress of ages, the distance from which it is contemplated increases, it must finally dwindle into insignificance. But the greatness of Aristotle moves on with the stream of time, increasing as it goes. Whenever and wherever we look upon it, it is directly before us, and even a partial and half-intelligent survey fills us with amazement at the vastness and sublimity of that profound and comprehensive genius. Of course we shall not be understood here as subscribing to all the doctrines of Aristotle, or as giving him the precedence of

all philosophers—as to his *merits*. We speak of matters of *fact* and *history*. We place him by the side, not of other *philosophers*, but of *Alexander*; and we say the influence of Aristotle on the world's history is above all comparison with that of Alexander. At one period his authority, overleaping the pale of European civilization, held undisputed sway over the mind of both Christian and Saracen. As human thought has begun to take a freer and wider range, it is true that the idolatry with which Aristotle was then worshiped has passed away; and with this there has naturally been a temporary reaction against him; but whether we will or not, modern European civilization is, in no small degree, what Aristotle has made it; and every Christian man who *thinks*, (in the higher sense of that word,) and who converses with thinking men, is, in spite of himself, more or less directly under the influence of Aristotle. The same is true, to a still greater degree, of Aristotle's master, who has even been styled a Christian philosopher.

Thought is immortal and omnipresent. The philosophy, the thought of an age, is the soul of that age. Learn the philosophy of a given period, and you have learned its highest characteristic, you have its simplest exponent. It can be shown that great revolutions in metaphysical dogmas, and in the spirit and method of philosophical speculation, have usually been accompanied or followed by great revolutions in the external fabric of society. The Sadducean sensualism preceded and prepared the downfall of the Jewish state. Epicureanism is but another name for that corruption which gangrened the Roman empire. Illuminism and atheism were the forerunners of the Parisian horrors that steeped in blood and blasphemy the close of the last century. But we need not multiply instances; they would lead us too far; and we hasten to conclude.

Religion itself, which must ever remain the central idea of all history—as it is of all true philosophy—develops its influence through the medium of Christian literature, based upon the records of “holy men of God who spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost.” All religions, that have had any historical character, have also had their sacred books. Christianity has its Bible; and therewith, as its mightiest external agent, it is destined to regenerate the world. This is that sword of the Spirit by which it must achieve its final victory, and establish its universal reign.

*Bowdoin College, Maine, March, 1842.*

ART. V.—1. *Theory of Temptation.* Methodist Quarterly Review for October, 1841, pp. 586-590.

2. *Ninth Article* of the Methodist Quarterly Review for January, 1842.

THE first of these articles presented a rapid analysis of Bishop Butler's celebrated "Analogy," concluding with a digression on the *nature of temptation*. At the instance of the learned reviewer, the writer of the ensuing remarks wrote, editorially, in the Herald and Journal, a brief criticism on the latter part of the article, dissenting respectfully, but distinctly, from its doctrines, especially so far as they were applicable to the subject of Christian perfection, and contending that the "excitement" of the "appetites" and "passions," which they asserted to be a necessary element of temptation, was not "always" essential to it—that the perfect Christian is exempt from it. The second article appeared in reply to these criticisms. In our humble judgment it both reaffirms and modifies into something else the doctrines of its predecessor.

We honestly consider the theory of temptation propounded in these articles to be a serious innovation on the received theology of our church respecting the doctrine of Christian perfection: this conviction, and not a love of metaphysical strife, disposes us to revert to the subject amidst an extraordinary pressure of other occupations. If our apprehension is wrong, we shall be more happy to find ourselves in fault than our brethren in heresy.

The following is the hypothesis presented in the first article:—

"Temptation is a sensible impulse or solicitation to do some evil act.—Each internal power in our constitution has its corresponding external object which God has appointed as its natural excitant, and which has power to excite it, *independent of the will*. These susceptibilities are the appetites and the passions. *Simply considered as powers existing*, they are neither vicious nor virtuous. Nor do their external excitants, so considered, partake of the nature of virtue or vice. When, under proper conditions, the external exciting object is presented, its corresponding appetite or passion is *necessarily excited* and *tends to gratification*. This involuntary and necessary excitement, which tends to gratification, is called *lust*; and properly constitutes temptation. The existence of it, and the consciousness of its tendency to seek gratification, *is not sin*, nor of the nature of sin.—There are two other sources of temptation which depend upon this *principal, original* source:—1. *Reflection* upon ideas and images which have been previously introduced into the mind, by which the imagination is excited; and by this means the appetites and passions are aroused: in this case the excitement is of the same nature as that produced by the presence of



the external object, and tends to seek gratification. 2. *Satanic suggestion*. Satan has the power to recall to our minds some, if not all of those ideas and images which we have received from external temptation, and thus to awaken our passions and excite our appetites, which state of excitement constitutes temptation. And it ought to be distinctly remembered that *he has no other means of tempting us.*"

From this theory the writer explains,—1. "How a Christian, after conversion, may be subject to the natural excitement of the passions and appetites, *as he was before conversion*. Young and inexperienced Christians should carefully understand this; for many have fallen into doubts, and cast away their confidence, upon finding, shortly after their conversion, that their passions and their appetites were as naturally susceptible of excitement as before." 2. How our first parents came to fall—they having our natural *appetites and passions*, and being subject to the influence of external objects; though they were naturally able to stand, while we can do so only by grace. 3. How Christ could be tempted, for he had a *perfect human nature*, "*including our natural appetites and passions,*" which were "*as naturally capable of excitement* by their appropriate objects, as in us."

We shall not pause to consider in what respect it can be said that the "natural" and "necessary" "excitement" of our "passions and appetites" can be called "temptation," or "a sensible impulse or solicitation to do some *evil act*."\* Graver, because more practical considerations, claim our attention. The capital feature of the theory obviously is, its discrimination between temptation and sin; showing how far the former may extend without involving the latter, and thus qualifying or "*limiting* the doctrine of *Christian perfection*." It was to this application of it that our attention was particularly called by a personal request of our esteemed friend, the writer, and that our former strictures related, almost exclusively. We shall confine ourselves to the same view at present. Let it be

\* In our strictures in the Herald, we endeavored to show the impropriety of denominating "a natural" and "necessary excitement of the passions and appetites," *temptation*. The author of the second article defends the writer of the theory by showing that, however this language may seem to convey "a universal proposition, it is evidently intended to be limited by the qualifying remarks which accompany it." These qualifying remarks define the "excitement" of which he speaks, as "temptation," to be "a sensible impulse or solicitation to do some *evil act*," as tending to "*unlawful indulgence*," as "*lust*," as being "*violent*," and accompanied sometimes by "*reflections and imaginings, horrible, offensive, impure*." Whatever, then, may be said of our author's words, we have, by these "qualifying remarks," his *ideas*. He defines fully the "excitement," which he calls "temptation," and with *this definition alone we have to do*.

distinctly understood, then, that we do not question whether the "necessary excitement of the passions and appetites," or rather *what our author calls such*, exists in ordinary temptations, but whether this excitement exists in the sanctified state?

Let us first ascertain whether the theory agrees with the Wesleyan doctrine of Christian perfection, and, if not, secondly, let us examine the theological and psychological arguments adduced in the second article to support it; for we would not receive the opinions of Wesley and his followers as paramount to sound reason, and if the writer of the theory has discovered a new truth, and its defender has demonstrated it, it is an imperative duty to abandon our old error, however precious its delusion.

Does, then, this "theory of temptation" agree with the Wesleyan doctrine of Christian perfection? We have nothing to do here with the defense of it by the author of the second article, if he has established it or modified it into something else that will claim attention hereafter. Our concern at present is only with the original article: its style throughout is perspicuous, even plain; it admits of no subtle constructions, either to ascertain or evade its sense. What, then, is its import, so far as it relates to Christian perfection?

It asserts that "excitement of the *appetites* and *passions*," "soliciting to evil acts," tending to "unlawful indulgence," &c., is essential to temptation, implying that "however horrible, offensive, violent, or impure" the images and reflections which accompany it may be, the sanctified man may be subject to it "without sin." It makes this assertion with the strongest emphasis, and with frequent italics. We give specimens:—

"This involuntary and necessary excitement, which tends to seek its gratification, is called *lust*; and properly constitutes temptation. The existence of this excitement, and the consciousness of its tendency to seek to be gratified, *is not sin*, nor of the nature of sin.—If any appetite or passion be addressed by its appropriate external excitant, it *must be excited*; but the excitement or lust in this sense is not sin, nor of the nature of sin.—Let it be particularly observed, that the excitement, and the tendency of the excitement to gratification, must *precede* sin.—However horrible, or offensive, or impure they [the 'reflections or imaginings' of the mind] may be, however violent the excitement, *yet there is no sin unless we consent.*"

These passages are peremptory. It proceeds to comfort the "young Christian" with these views: "For many have fallen into doubts, and finally cast away their confidence, upon finding, shortly after their conversion, that their passions and appetites were as naturally susceptible of excitement as before." Thus

what many of us have been accustomed to lament as the remains of the carnal mind, are taught to be innocent temptations.

This "excitement" is predicated of the "appetites and passions." Note this. The ordinary process of mental action, according to one of the reviewers, includes the following particulars respectively, 1. The intellect; 2. The emotions; 3. The desires; 4. The will. The third, or desires, comprise the instincts, the appetites, the propensities, and the affections.\* Our author asserts the *appetites* to be excited in temptation: if, then, the appetites are *desires*, it is equivalent to an affirmation that the desires (not merely the *emotions*) are subject to this "excitement." He asserts, further, that the "passions" are subjects of excitement in temptation. Passion is also higher than emotion. "It denotes a state of mind of which some simple emotion is always a part, but which differs from any simple, single emotion, in being combined with some form of that state of the mind called *DESIRE*."† Lord Kames defines it "an emotion accompanied with desire."‡ Let it be remarked, also, that "the affections are usually included among the passions, and the terms used synonymously."§ The passions include, among others, love, hatred, anger, pride, fear, jealousy.||

\* This is Professor Upham's arrangement, and it is quoted as authority by the writer of the second article, in his defense of the theory.

† Upham's *Ment. Phil.*, vol. ii, part iv, chap. 6.

‡ *Elements of Crit.*, i, 2.

§ *Ibid.*

|| It cannot be said here that the reviewer uses the words "appetites and passions" in a *peculiar* sense, differing from both their scientific and popular applications—that the latter contemplate man as he is, a fallen being, and therefore use the terms anger, pride, jealousy, &c., meaning a state of the passions superinduced, not primarily natural, while the theory contemplates him as unfallen; for, first, we ask, then, what applicability there would be in a theory of temptation, presented in a statement at once formal and universal, and yet not founded upon the actual nature of man, but suited only to a condition which, according to the general opinion of the Christian world, has existed but twice in the history of our race, viz., in the first pair, and in Christ? Second, the author, as already shown, has *defined* what he means by that "excitement" of the "appetites and passions," which he contends to be essential to "temptation," and this definition falls, in no wise, short of that violence which is implied in the scientific and popular names of the appetites and passions. Here in fact, as we shall see by and by, is the radical error of the theory: it confounds that state of the appetites and passions which arises from natural depravity, with what would have been their "natural and necessary" action, had man not fallen. Third, (and what is decisive of the question,) our author applies his theory to the *young Christian*. All agree that the carnal mind remains more or less strong in him; and that before sanctification his appetites and passions are, to some extent, subject to the same unholy excitement as before justification—the excitement implied by the popular and scientific



If, then, our author uses the terms "appetites and passions" scientifically, he asserts that the excitement, which he considers an essential element of temptation, extends beyond the *emotions* to the *desires*.

If he uses these terms in their popular application, they admit the same construction. The nice distinction between emotions and desires is seldom, if ever, made by the popular mind. "We can," says Upham, "learn their difference by our own internal examination and by consciousness alone; nor can any form of mere words illustrate to our comprehension either their nature or their *distinction*, independently of such internal experience, except, perhaps, in the single circumstance, that emotions are instantaneous, while, apparently, there is a greater permanence in desires." But we need not hesitate respecting the meaning of the reviewer: he evidently includes the *whole* class of *sensibilities*, (that is, emotions and desires,) the instincts, appetites, propensities, and affections. He defines temptation to be an excitement produced by "external excitants" on our "internal, excitable functions or powers;" he then includes *all* these "excitable functions in two classes: the appetites, which have their origin in the flesh; and the passions, which originate in the mind itself:" thus comprehending all our susceptibilities as the objects of attack in temptation.

Whether he uses popular or technical language, therefore, the inference is that our author asserts the excitement of temptation to extend, without sin, not only to the *emotions*, but to the *desires*, and not only to the emotions and desires in their simpler forms, but in even that higher, intenser combination, called *passion*. He uses the very word. If further proof is necessary, we have it decisively in his frequent assertion, that *there is no sin without the consent of the will*. Now, if the will can be reached only through the region of the emotions and desires, (as asserted in the second article,) then temptation, attacking the will, must do it through this region, and if there is no sin without the consent of the will, then the temptation or excitement, pervading the region of the emotions and desires, but not seducing the will, is not sinful. This is the doctrine of the theory.

We have been the more particular in this psychological statement, because we shall have need of referring to it frequently in the second part of our remarks; we bespeak a faithful recollection of it by the reader.

names of the appetites and passions. Thus, in whatever aspect we contemplate the theory, our remark holds true, that it admits of no construction by which its sense can be evaded.

Now, then, we ask, Is this "violent" "excitement of the appetites and passions"—accompanied by "imaginings, horrible, offensive, impure," and raging thus in the "appetites and passions," in the instincts, propensities, and affections, including not only the emotions but desires—compatible with that state of purity which we call Christian perfection? Can a sanctified man, according to our doctrines, feel these impure and violent passions, in common with the unholy, and is the difference between them simply this, that the former consents not, while the latter consents to the temptation? We have shown that, according to the theory under review, the whole region of the sensibilities (those of "the flesh" and those of "the mind") may be the scene of this excitement without sin. Do our standards so represent the perfect Christian? Let it be distinctly understood, we do not ask whether the natural and legitimate excitement of his appetites and passions may exist, but whether *what* our author *calls* this excitement, an excitement "horrible, impure, and violent," and in the character of "an impulse or solicitation to some evil act," can exist in a sanctified mind, according to the teachings of Methodism? We reply most peremptorily, No. We have not so learned Methodism. We believe that it is the doctrine of our church, first, that this excitement is not an essential element of temptation; it exists in the newly justified mind, because it is not cleansed from *all* sin, but not in the sanctified man: second, that where it does exist, it is of the nature of sin. As these propositions mutually involve each other, we need not discriminate them in our evidence. Let us consult our authorities.

Wesley says of the sanctified man,\* "There is not a motion of his heart [not his will] but is according to the will of God." But the learned reviewer asserts that "lust" or "excitement," "tending to seek gratification," [of course he means improper gratification, or there would be no temptation,] may and must exist, and is not sinful. Wesley further says of the sanctified, "They are in such a sense perfect as to be freed from evil desires and evil tempers." Speaking of worldly or sensual desires, he says, "You may bring these desires back; but you need not; you need feel them no more. O, stand fast in the liberty wherewith Christ hath made you free." To the question, "What is Christian perfection?" he answers, "The loving God with all the heart, mind, soul, and strength. This implies that no wrong temper, [not volition,] none contrary to love, remains in the soul; and that all the thoughts, words, and actions are governed by pure love." "It is the circumcision of the

\* Plain Account of Christian Perfection.

heart from all filthiness, all inward as well as outward pollution." Again, he says it excludes "every kind and *degree* of envy out of the heart, expels *all* anger, casteth out *all* jealousy, suspiciousness, and readiness to believe evil;" it is "love filling the heart, expelling pride, anger, desire, self-will, rejoicing evermore, praying without ceasing, and in every thing giving thanks." What could be more emphatic, and more in contrast with the very language of the theory, than the following: "A person may be sincere who has all his natural tempers, pride, anger, lust, self-will, but is not perfect till his heart is cleansed from these and all its corruptions." In enumerating the causes of the loss of entire sanctification, he mentions, among others, "Anger, however soon it is over, want of instantly forgiving one another." He defends St. Paul from the charge of "inward or outward sins," and says, "He could no more have the inward stirrings than the outward expressions of pride, anger, or lust;"\* and Fletcher declares sin to arise "from the momentary perversion of our tempers, as well as from habitual corruption;"† and our Book Concern publishes to the world that God "can no more approve an unholy desire or temper, than the act of adultery or murder."‡ In his Plain Account, &c., Wesley says of the perfect man,—

"He is pure in heart. Love has purified his soul from envy, malice, wrath, and every unkind temper. It has cleansed him from pride, 'whereof cometh only contention,' and he hath now put on bowels of mercies, kindness, humbleness of mind, meekness, long-suffering, and indeed all possible ground of contention on his part is cut off. For none can take from him what he desires, seeing he loves not the world, nor any of the things of the world, but all his desire is unto God, and to the remembrance of his name."

In distinguishing entire sanctification from justification, he asserts the former to be

"Total resignation to the will of God, without any mixture of self-will; gentleness, without *any touch* of anger, *even the moment* we are provoked; love to God, without the least love of the creature, but in and for God; love to man, excluding all envy, all jealousy, and rash judging; meekness, keeping the whole soul inviolably calm, and temperance in all things."

He makes the same distinction in his Sermon on Repentance in Believers.

"By this helplessness, I mean an absolute inability to deliver ourselves from that guiltiness or desert of punishment whereof we are

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\* Sermon on Christian Perfection.

† Last Check.

‡ Christian's Manual, chap. ii.



still conscious; yea, and an inability to remove, by all the grace we have, (to say nothing of our natural powers,) either the pride, self-will, love of the world, anger, and general proneness to depart from God, which we experimentally know to *remain* in the heart, even of them that are regenerate; or the evil which, in spite of all our endeavors, cleaves to all our words and actions. Add to this, an utter inability wholly to avoid uncharitable, and much more unprofitable, conversation; and an inability to avoid sins of omission, or to supply the numberless defects we are convinced of; especially the want of love, and other right tempers, both to God and man."

Here he speaks, among others, of "pride," "love of the world," "anger," "general proneness to depart from God," as remaining in those who are regenerate, but not sanctified. These are included in our author's "excitement of the appetites and passions" as "a sensible impulse or solicitation to do some evil act." Wesley speaks of these as involving, "guiltiness and desert of punishment," not merely when we "consent" to their existence, but "when by the Spirit we mortify the deeds of the body, even when we *resist* and *conquer* them;" for, says he, "Although we may, by the Spirit, mortify the deeds of the body, resist and conquer both outward and inward sin, although we may weaken our enemies day by day, yet we cannot *drive them* out; by all the grace given at justification we cannot extirpate them. Though we watch and pray ever so much, we cannot wholly cleanse our hearts and hands." Yet of this excitement of the passions, which Wesley asserts to be "guilty and deserving of punishment," even when "resisted and conquered," our author says,—"*However horrible, or offensive, or impure it may be, however violent the excitement, yet there is no sin unless we consent.*" The italics are his own. This particular phrase is used by him in reference to Satanic influence, but the idea extends throughout the whole "theory;" it is applied to all possible excitement which does not involve the "consent of the will," for, as before shown, he includes all our "internal excitable functions" as among the subjects of "excitement" in temptation, and predicates innocency of all, except when accompanied by volition.

Wesley not only asserts that these passions are sinful, even when resisted, but that they do not exist in the sanctified state. He continues in the same paragraph,—

"When it pleases our Lord to speak to our hearts *again*, [that is, in sanctification,] to speak a second time, Be clean, then only the leprosy is cleansed: then only the evil root, the carnal mind is destroyed; and inbred sin subsists no more. But if there be no such second change, if there be no instantaneous deliverance after justification, if

there be *none* but a gradual work of God, (that there is a gradual work none denies,) then we must be content, as well as we can, to remain full of sin till death; and, if so, we must remain guilty till death, continually *deserving* punishment. For it is impossible the guilt, or desert of punishment, should be removed from us as long as all this sin remains in our hearts, and cleaves to our words and actions. Nay, in rigorous justice, all we think, and speak, and act, continually increases it."

Again, in his sermon on the Wilderness State, he enumerates the "causes of our losing the light of God's countenance," and includes a number of the passions, calling them expressly "inward sins." "Pride" is one, and it is "an abomination to the Lord." "Anger" is another, even though colored with the name of zeal for the truth. Nothing is a greater enemy to the mild, gentle love of God, than this; they never did and never can exist together. "Desire" is another. "When fierceness and anger are asleep, and love alone is waking, we may be no less endangered by desire, which equally tends to darken the soul. This is the sure effect of any foolish desire, any vain or inordinate affection." The very thoughts are declared by Wesley to be holy in a perfect Christian. In his "Plain Account," &c., he says,—

"Only of grown Christians it can be affirmed that they are in such a sense perfect as to be freed from evil thoughts and tempers. Indeed, whence could they spring? 'Out of the heart of man,' if at all, 'proceed evil thoughts.' If, therefore, the heart be no longer evil, then evil thoughts proceed no longer out of it, for a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit."

Again,—

"They are in such a sense perfect as to be freed from evil thoughts and evil tempers.—God hath now laid the axe at the root of the tree, purifying their hearts by faith, and *cleansing all the thoughts* of their hearts by the inspiration of his Holy Spirit."

Again,—

"They are freed from evil thoughts, so that they cannot enter into them, no, *not for a moment*. Aforetime, when an evil thought came in, they looked up, and it vanished away. But now it does not come in, there being no room for this in a heart that is full of God."

In this last quotation we have described, as the condition of a merely justified person, the very state in which the theory supposes the perfect Christian to exist,\* viz., as exposed to evil excitement

\* Let it not be said that the theory has nothing to do with Christian perfection, but is a general definition of temptation. It has to do with it, and even with a higher state, for it applies its definition to the Adamic perfection of the first pair, and to Christ himself, and its whole tenor defines the extent of temptation without sin.

which is resisted—the justified person, says Wesley, “looked up and it vanished away;” but when sanctified, “they cannot enter, no, *not for a moment*.” What is meant by evil thoughts we shall learn in another place.

We might increase these quotations a hundred fold; (and we shall yet give more decisive ones;) they are scattered through the writings of Wesley from the beginning to the end. They present the common phraseology of all our standard writers on the subject, and the familiar dialect of the living witnesses of this truth throughout the church. Behold, again, the contrast between these passages and the explicit language of the theory. The latter declares that excitement of the *appetites* and *passions*, “tending to gratification,” (that is, *wrong* gratification, or there could be no *temptation*,) must exist in temptation. According to both the scientific and popular use of the terms, they include desire, hatred, anger, pride, jealousy, &c., and the animal propensities. The theory, then, teaches that these may be excited in temptation in the sanctified state, that is, are “not of the nature of sin.” Wesley declares that perfect love “excludes *every* kind and *degree* of envy,” expels “*all* anger,” “casteth out *all* jealousy, pride, desire,” [that is, lust,] that anger, “even the moment we are provoked,” and “however soon it is over,” is sinful; that “evil thoughts cannot enter, no, *not for a moment*,” and Fletcher asserts that “a momentary perversion of temper” is evil.

Let it not be replied that the theory speaks of the “natural” and “necessary excitement of the appetites and passions.” This is indeed its language, but words are nothing without meaning, and the author, as before said, defines fully his meaning; he tells us that this excitement, which he calls “natural” and “necessary,” is, as a temptation, “a sensible impulse or solicitation to do some *evil act*,” that it is “lust,” (*longing desire*—*Webster*,) that it tends to “unlawful gratification,” that it is that which a young convert feels, that it may be horrible, offensive, impure, violent; any thing, indeed, *short of being voluntary*. We aver, emphatically, that, if there is any meaning in words, this, and none other, is the very state of the appetites and passions referred to above by Wesley, as suppressed in a sanctified mind.

Let it not be replied, further, that the above quotations, by characterizing the state of the appetites and passions, to which they refer, as “evil,” “wrong,” “perverted,” &c., distinguish it from that stated by the theory—that they could not be of such a character without the consent of the will, and that the theory does not include the consent of the will in its “natural” and “necessary excitement.”



For, first, it is obvious, as just affirmed, that Wesley means by "wrong," "perverted," "evil," &c., the "excitement" to "unlawful indulgence," the impulse to "evil," the "impure reflections and imaginings," the "violent excitement," of which our author speaks; and popular language, also, calls such "evil," "wrong," &c., not referring to the will, but to their own intrinsic nature. Second, he expressly asserts them to be thus "evil," "wrong," &c., when the will *does not consent*. This we have shown.\* If further proof is necessary, a reference to his sermon on "Sin in Believers" will be decisive. He says, "Christ, indeed, cannot reign where sin *reigns*; neither will he dwell where any sin is *allowed*. But he *is*, and *dwells* in the heart of every believer who is *fighting against* all sin, although it be not yet purified according to the purification of the sanctuary." The italics are his own. Here sin *exists*, though not *allowed*; here the justified believer is represented as in a state of sin, though *fighting against* all sin. Again, he says, that believers are delivered from "the *power* of sin, we allow; that they are delivered from the *being* of sin, we deny. A man may have the Spirit of God dwelling in him, and may 'walk after the Spirit,' though he still feels 'the flesh lusting against the Spirit.'" Is not this the very state which our author describes as without sin, and, therefore, the condition of the sanctified? Yet Wesley exhibits it as that of a merely justified man, and distinguishes the former from it as having no longer this *being* of sin, this "lusting of the flesh against the Spirit." In the same sermon he says,—

"We are reconciled to God [that is, justified] through the blood of the cross, and in that moment the *φθονημα σαρκος* corruption of nature, which is enmity with God, is put under our feet; the flesh has no more dominion over us. But it still *exists*: and it is still in its nature enmity with God, lusting against his Spirit.—A man may be in God's favor, though he feel sin; but not if he *yields* to it. *Having sin* does not forfeit the favor of God; *giving way* to sin does. Though the flesh in you 'lust against the Spirit,' you may still be a child of God; but if you walk after the flesh, you are a child of the devil."

The italics are still Wesley's. Mark here: 1. That this is described as the state of a merely justified man, and that the perfect Christian differs from it by being exempt from this "existence" of sin, as shown by the above quotations; 2. That this "lusting" of the "flesh" having "no more dominion over" the will; "not yielded to," &c., which the theory declares *not to be of the nature of sin*, Wesley pronounces the "corruption of nature," "enmity with God," "sin." And, as before quoted, he asserts that there is

\* See page 428.

still a "desert of punishment." In the next sermon (on Repentance in Believers) he says,—

"A conviction of their *guiltiness* is another branch of that repentance which belongs to the people of God, [that is, to the justified.] But this is to be understood cautiously, and in a peculiar sense. For it is certain there is no condemnation to them who are in Christ Jesus, that believe in him, and in the power of that faith 'walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit.' Yet they can no more bear the strict justice of God than before they believed. This pronounces them still *worthy of death*. And it would absolutely condemn them thereto were it not for the atoning blood. Therefore, they are thoroughly convinced that they still *deserve* punishment, although it is hereby turned aside from them. They still deserve, strictly speaking, only the damnation of hell. But what they deserve does not come upon them, because they have an Advocate with the Father."

Nothing can be clearer than that, 1. Wesley speaks in the preceding passages of precisely what our author means by "involuntary excitement;" 2. That he considers it limited to a justified state, while our author allows it in the sanctified man, and ascribes it to Christ and the original state; 3. That Wesley pronounces it, even when "resisted," "guilt," "sin," "enmity toward God," "corruption," "worthy of death," and "deserving only the damnation of hell;" while our author pronounces it "neither sin, nor of the nature of sin."

Thus have we shown that, according to our standards, the "excitement" for which the theory contends cannot exist in the sanctified state, that it is "of the nature of sin," and that, therefore, the theory conflicts with the Wesleyan doctrine of perfection. But we proceed still further.

It may be asked, Does not Wesley define sin to be "a voluntary transgression of the law;" and, if so, how can we reconcile this definition with the above quotations? This is his definition of sin; but he unquestionably means *actual sin*. But are "voluntary" and actual transgressions of the law *alone*, "sin, or of the nature of sin?" So teaches Socinianism; so teaches the New-Haven neology; and so teaches the theory: but not so taught Wesley, as seen above; not so teaches any standard authority in orthodox theology. Orthodox theology teaches, if we understand it,—

1. *That there is an "involuntary," an original infection of human nature.* That it pervades not only the *will*, but the *appetites* and *passions*, so that when, by the aid of the divine Spirit, we *will* to do right, still we cannot till the appetites and passions are, to some degree, purified. This is St. Paul's doctrine: "For I know that in me (that is, in my flesh) dwells no good thing; for

to will, is present with me, but how to perform that which is good I find not."

2. *That this original and involuntary infection is "of the nature of sin."* It is called "original sin," and "natural depravity:" the first, in reference to its being innate; the second, in reference to its being inherent; and by Wesley, as above, "guilt," "corruption," and "enmity toward God." All orthodox churches agree that it must be cleansed before we enter heaven, and that it did not exist before the fall, nor in Christ.

3. *That it is not eradicated in justification as distinguished from entire sanctification.* Most believe that it continues till death, and is the occasion of constant sin in the believer. All believe that the "excitement" of the "passions and appetites," "tending to unlawful indulgence," and "impelling or soliciting to evil acts," arises, in a regenerated person, entirely from it. Wesley, in his sermon on Sin in Believers, says,—

"Herein our own Church (as, indeed, in most points) exactly copies after the primitive; declaring, in her ninth article, that 'original sin is the corruption of the nature of every man, whereby man is, in his own nature, inclined to evil, so that the flesh lusteth contrary to the Spirit. And this infection of nature doth remain, yea, in them that are regenerated, whereby the lust of the flesh, called in Greek *φρονημα σαρκος*, is not subject to the law of God. And although there is no condemnation for them that believe, yet *this lust hath, of itself, the nature of sin.*' The same testimony is given by all other churches; not only by the Greek and Romish Church, but by every reformed church in Europe, of whatever denomination. Indeed, some of these seem to carry the thing too far; so describing the corruption of the heart in a believer, as scarce to allow that he hath dominion over it, but rather is in bondage thereto, and by this means they leave hardly any distinction between a believer and an unbeliever."

4. *The followers of Wesley believe that it need not remain till death, but is extinguished in the state of Christian perfection, which they teach to be attainable.*

The first three of these propositions have been received by orthodox churches in all nations and in all ages; all of them are received by the followers of Wesley. A glance at them will suggest the capital faults of the theory—not only its incompatibility with perfection, but with another, and, in the opinion of most of the Christian world, a far more fundamental truth—not a mere faultiness of language, as has been intimated by newspaper criticisms, (though it is not distinguished by too much exactitude in this respect,) but we fear a radical defectiveness in doctrine. We have made full allowance for either the scientific or popular application



of its terms. We have waived all dispute about their propriety or impropriety, and have discussed only their obvious, *designed* meaning, as defined, emphasized, reiterated throughout its whole statement, and from this alone we deduce what we think are its errors.

What, then, are these errors? 1. It asserts that state of the "appetites and passions," which the church believes to arise from original sin, to be "neither sin, nor of the nature of sin," and thus virtually *denies the doctrine of natural depravity*; and, 2. It implies that *what the church* recognizes as depravity, exists in the sanctified state, and thus virtually *denies the Wesleyan doctrine of Christian perfection*. Both of these results we conceive to be inevitable.

Again, we say, let it not be alledged that the reviewer has only given a general statement of temptation. If he has presented a *general* proposition, he has, nevertheless, made particular explanations of it; if he has stated a general theory, he has, nevertheless, given it particular applications, and these exhibit his meaning. We have shown from his own words what that "excitement" is which he contends exists in temptation; we have shown that, according to our own standards, and all orthodox churches, it arises from our natural depravity, and is sin; we have shown that he declares it to be "neither sin, nor of the nature of sin." What, then, is this but a denial of natural depravity? When did the New-Haven divines more fully deny it? Is it replied, that our author, in asserting the excitement of which he speaks, "not to be sin, nor of the nature of sin," means only *actual sin*, that, with strictly qualified language, he would admit it to be sin, in the sense of natural depravity? We then answer, that he contends that this very "excitement" existed in the first temptation, and in that of Christ. If, then, he admits it to be sin, in the sense of natural depravity, he must either abandon his theory or admit that natural depravity existed *before* the fall, and *in Christ*, who "knew no sin."

It is evident, too, from these propositions, as well as the foregoing quotations, that he denies the Wesleyan doctrine of Christian perfection. He does not, we acknowledge, mention expressly this doctrine, but the theory contemplates it throughout; it is applied to Adam and our Lord, and if it is applicable to Christ and the original state, it is, of course, not too low a standard for the perfect Christian. But we have shown that its "excitement," &c., arises, according to all orthodox churches, from natural depravity, and is "of the nature of sin," and that the Wesleyan doctrine implies the destruction of this state of the appetites and passions,

whether the author of the theory chooses to call it natural depravity or any thing else. We repeat, then, that, in our humble opinion, the theory denies the doctrines of natural depravity and Christian perfection.

These are judged to be among the consequences of the theory ; yet we are frank to say, that we do not believe its author designed to interfere with the established opinions of the church on these subjects. From an incidental suggestion of Bishop Butler he was led to construct an hypothesis, which, at first view, seemed to afford plausible solutions of what have been deemed mysterious facts in religion. But its induction was not sufficiently comprehensive. While it appears to harmonize some facts, it is at utter variance with other and more fundamental ones. The latter seem to have eluded our author's attention, while the former were seized with avidity.

The question may be asked, How, then, is the perfect Christian tempted if not as the theory asserts ? It does not, logically, devolve upon us here to answer this query, but merely to prove that *whatever* may be the nature of temptation in the sanctified state, it is not *such* as the theory describes. Still, if the reader will indulge us in the digression, we shall give what we understand to be the true answer ; and we do so more readily because it will afford the opportunity of introducing further quotations from Wesley ; quotations which, while they sustain the view we are about to present, furnish, also, more decisive testimony, if possible, than the preceding against the doctrine of the theory. These testimonies are innumerable and overwhelming. We have already produced a superabundance ; still, in quoting more in support of another point, we cannot but request the reader to appreciate, at the same time, their direct bearing against the theory.

We have admitted that such an excitement as our author contends for may exist in a merely justified person, because he is not entirely purified from natural depravity ; but it does not exist in the perfect Christian, for he is cleansed not only from actual, but original sin. We do not say that he feels no excitement, but *no such* excitement as the theory teaches, no excitement of the appetites and passions that is impure, that tends to *evil acts*, to *unlawful indulgence*. The "solicitation to evil" may be presented to his *thoughts*, but is not felt in his *passions*. There may be excitement, intense excitement, but instead of its tending to "unlawful indulgence," &c., it has precisely the opposite tendency ; the excitement of horror against it, or of conscious triumph over it, accordingly as he may contemplate at the time the sin suggested, or

the grace by which he escapes it. When we say, therefore, that the sanctified person is tempted *intellectually*, not sensitively, it is of course understood that we mean by the latter phrase, that his sensibilities are not excited *favorably* toward the temptation. The difference between the temptations of the sanctified and the justified states may be illustrated thus:—Two Christians, one sanctified, the other not, perceive an opportunity of becoming independently wealthy by the use of some improper means. The sanctified person *perceives* the opportunity—nothing but imbecility could keep him from the perception—but it has no exciting influence upon his passions; he may intellectually dwell upon the circumstances, and wonder at the facilities they afford to an evil mind; but, at the same time, not only feel no excitement to the evil, but abhor it, and exultingly thank God for his exemption from it. On the other hand, the unsanctified Christian may feel the cravings of avarice, he may go the whole day in sore conflict with these cravings, beating them down, and yet feeling them. The following opinion of a distinguished writer in the “Guide to Christian Perfection” we gave in our former strictures. We cannot do better than repeat it:—

“Temptations, it will undoubtedly be conceded by those who have paid attention to the subject, are objects which are presented by the intellect to the sensibilities and the will; and are of such a nature that they have a tendency to induce or cause in those sensibilities, (that is to say, in the appetites, propensities, and affections,) and also in the will, an inordinate, excessive, or perverted action. The incipient, and what may be termed the *innocent* stage of the temptation, is when the object which is the medium of temptation is first presented to us intellectually; that is to say, in our mere thoughts or perceptions. Our Saviour was tempted by having the kingdoms and wealth of this world presented before him, as objects of desire; but the temptation went no further than the thoughts. It had no effect upon his desires or will; but was immediately rejected. It was necessary that the object of temptation should exist intellectually; in other words, that it should exist in the thoughts, or be perceived and thought of. Without this, viz., the perceived or intellective presence of the object, it is entirely clear that there could not possibly be any such thing as temptation. But the temptation may exist to this extent without sin. The temptations, for instance, to which the Saviour was subjected, were in every instance entirely without sin; for the simple reason, that they did not go beyond the thoughts; they did not enter into the emotions and desires; they excited no favorable or assenting feeling; they caused no accordant action of the will; but were instantly and fully repelled. They were not like sparks thrown upon tinder, and kindled into a blaze; but rather like sparks thrown upon the ocean, and instantly extinguished.”



This view, so totally at variance with the theory, we believe to be thoroughly Wesleyan. In his Plain Account of Christian Perfection, Wesley has given it himself in detail.

"One commends me. Here is a temptation to pride. But instantly my soul is humbled before God. And I feel no pride; of which I am as sure as that pride is not humility.

"A man strikes me. Here is a temptation to anger. But my heart overflows with love. And I feel no anger at all; of which I can be as sure, as that love and anger are not the same.

"A woman solicits me. Here is a temptation to lust. But in the instant I shrink back. And I feel no desire or lust at all; of which I can be as sure, as that my hand is cold or hot.

"Thus it is, if I am tempted by a present object; and it is just the same if, when it is absent, the devil recalls a commendation, an injury, or a woman, to my mind. In the instant the soul repels the temptation, and remains filled with pure love.

"And the difference is still plainer when I compare my present state with my past, wherein I felt temptation and corruption too."

Let it not be said that in the last sentence he speaks of "*feeling* temptation," for it is obviously in the general sense of recognizing it, or how could it be reconcilable with the preceding words? If it is said, he felt temptation in the sense of the theory, that is, felt desire or lust, how could he say, "I feel no desire or lust at all; of which I can be as sure as that my hand is cold or hot." Here, then, we have Wesley's theory; how far it agrees with that of the reviewer the reader can judge.

But by allowing that temptation may exist *intellectually*, do we not contradict the quotations already made from Wesley; which assert that even the *thoughts* are holy in the sanctified state? He answers for us in his sermon on Wandering Thoughts.

"But here let it be observed, that thoughts concerning evil are not always evil thoughts; that a thought concerning sin, and a sinful thought, are widely different. A man, for instance, may think of a murder which another has committed, and yet this is no evil or sinful thought. So our blessed Lord himself doubtless thought of, or understood, the thing spoken by the devil, when he said, 'All these things will I give thee, if thou wilt fall down and worship me.' Yet he had no evil or sinful thought; nor, indeed, was capable of having any. And even hence it follows, that neither have real Christians: for, 'every one that is perfect is as his Master,' Luke vi, 40. Therefore, if he was free from evil or sinful thoughts, so are they likewise."

The theory refers to our Lord's temptation as an instance of its "excitement;" yet Wesley here asserts it to have been simply of an intellectual character, a thought, like that of a man who "thinks of a murder which has been committed." We have shown that

Wesley does not allow evil thoughts in the sanctified state. It is here obvious that he means by evil thoughts, such as reach the sensibilities—the “passions and appetites”—such, in fine, as our author ascribes to the original state and to Christ, and declares not to be evil. This distinction he makes at length in the same discourse. He states what wandering thoughts are evil, and what not. Under the former are enumerated all that

“Spring from a revengeful temper, from pride, or lust, or vanity; ‘also all those which either *produce* or feed any sinful temper; those which either give rise to pride or vanity, to anger, or love of the world.’ Hence, even those thoughts which are occasioned by weakness or disease, by the natural mechanism of the body, or by the laws of vital union, however innocent they may be in themselves, do, nevertheless, become sinful, when they either produce or cherish and increase in us any sinful temper; suppose the desire of the flesh, the desire of the eye, or the pride of life. In like manner, the wandering thoughts, which are occasioned by the words or actions of other men, if they cause or feed any wrong disposition, then commence sinful. And the same we may observe of those which are suggested or injected by the devil.”

If these are not the same with those which our author declares not to be of the nature of sin, there is no meaning in words. The distinction is further confirmed by his enumeration of innocent wandering thoughts. These include such as “wander,” from the effects of disease, delirium, variety of objects presented to the senses, and suggestions of the devil; the character of the latter is fully distinguished by reference again to our Lord’s temptation. In all his remarks on this class, no such excitement as in the former is recognized. They neither rise from, nor lead to, any tendency of the passions and appetites to evil.

We happen to have two of Mr. Wesley’s sermons in juxtaposition, which make, also, this distinction: the one treating on temptation in the justified state, the other in the sanctified.\*

Temptation, in the former, is attended with *darkness*; in the latter, with *heaviness*, but no darkness. He enumerates minutely the causes of the state of darkness. They are sins of commission and of omission; inward sins, such as “pride,” “anger,” “desire,” “any kind or degree of inordinate affection,” &c., and “ignorance,” “temptation,” &c. He also enumerates the causes of “heaviness” in the perfect Christian; the last of the above list, “temptation,” is mentioned, but none of the “passions and appe-

\* Sermons xlvii and xlviii, on the “Wilderness State,” and “Heaviness through manifold Temptations.”

tites." No "pride," "anger," "desire," &c. And these are not omitted because the enumeration is not minute, for it is particularly so, comprising "acute diseases," "protracted diseases," "poverty," "the death of those near and dear to us," "the irreligion and danger of those who are connected with us by the closest ties," &c. He says of temptation, in the latter case, that Satan will "take advantage of these afflictions, and will *labor* to inject unbelieving, or blasphemous, or repining thoughts; he will *endeavor* to stir up the heart against God, to renew our natural enmity against him." Yet it is labor in vain, for as we have quoted elsewhere, the perfect Christian "is freed from evil thoughts, so that they cannot enter into him, no, not for a moment"—it is a useless "endeavor," for as above said of St. Paul, "he could no more have the inward stirrings than the outward expressions of pride, anger, or lust." It may be remarked, also, that while this heaviness co-exists with "faith, hope, love, peace, and joy, even joy unspeakable," the state of "darkness" is hostile to them all.

One view more, though a slightly digressive one. In his sermon on Christian Perfection he distinctly shows "in what sense Christians *are not* perfect"—they are not free from "ignorance," from "temptation," nor from "infirmities." We have shown what he means by temptation, and it is manifest that he does not include in it our author's "excitement of the appetites and passions." It will not be contended that he includes it in "ignorance." Does he, then, include it among "infirmities?" Let him speak for himself.

"But I mean hereby, not only those which are properly termed *bodily infirmities*, but all those inward or outward imperfections, which are not of a moral nature. Such are weakness, or slowness of understanding, dullness or confusedness of apprehension, incoherency of thought, irregular quickness, or heaviness of imagination. Such (to mention no more of this kind) is the want of a ready or retentive memory. Such, in another kind, are those which are commonly, in some measure, consequent upon these; namely, slowness of speech, impropriety of language, ungracefulness of pronunciation; to which one might add a thousand nameless defects, either in conversation or behavior. These are the infirmities which are found in the best of men in a larger or smaller proportion. And from these none can hope to be freed till the spirit returns to God who gave it."

Again, in his "Plain Account," &c., he describes what Christian perfection is, and then admits that there still remain defects; but what are they? The violent state of the "appetites and passions" described by our author? Far otherwise. Hear him,—

"But even these souls dwell in a shattered body, and are so pressed down thereby, that they cannot always exert themselves as they would,



by thinking, speaking, and acting precisely right. For want of better bodily organs, they must at times think, speak, or act wrong; not, indeed, through a defect of love, but through a defect of knowledge. And while this is the case, notwithstanding that defect, and its consequences, they fulfill the law of love."

These he considers defects in the sanctified state, the worst that it admits. Yet what a contrast is there between these and that "impulse to evil," those "horrible, offensive, impure reflections and imaginings" which the theory allows! Another equally conclusive consideration is, that in his descriptions of the justified man, he is emphatic in asserting the existence of the state of the passions and appetites described by the theory, but never in any account of Christian perfection; nay, the former is generally placed in contrast with the latter.

Thus we see that however we vary our interrogation, the response of Wesley is uniformly and uncompromisingly against the doctrine of the reviewer. We have, 1. Given his testimony, in express declarations against the theory; 2. Answered objections, or rather summoned him to answer them; and, 3. Deduced, and presented in his own words, a theory as a substitute for the reviewer's, which is compatible with our doctrine of Christian perfection; and throughout these successive views we have seen an unvarying and unquestionable contradiction of the doctrines of the review. It is too manifest to be doubted for a moment. No acknowledgment of an irregular or unfortunate use of words by the theory can evade it; prove that the author does not mean what we attribute to him and you prove that he means nothing, you set at defiance every principle of interpretation. Nor will any emphasis on the difference between the popular and scientific use of language be of avail here; however construed, scientifically or popularly, the sense of our author, and the sense of Wesley, are clear and definite, and are clearly and definitely opposed.

We have appealed, in the preceding pages, to the highest standard of the Methodist views of Scripture truth—the writings of Wesley—a standard referred to as authoritative by the trust-deeds of Wesleyan chapels, and appealed to as decisive of Wesleyan ecclesiastical affairs, in the chancery of England.\* It is not here our province to establish the doctrine of Wesley as above presented. It is taken for granted that, as Methodists, we receive it. The advocates of the theory, holding, as they do, responsible trusts of the church, it is presumed recognize her doctrines. In the denial of these, the controversy must assume an entirely new phasis; it

\* See the Warren Schism.—*Fisk's Travels*.

would then devolve upon us, not merely to test the theory by our standards, but first to establish the authority of the latter. Though, in our humble opinion, they conflict, yet believing the theory not to have been wittingly put forth with such an intent, but rather with the impression that its views were fully Wesleyan, we have deemed it necessary, thus far, only to recall the minds of our readers to the established doctrines of the church. If the theory contradicts these, we must either abandon it as false or controvert our standards. When the latter is proposed, it will be relevant to attempt their vindication. Nevertheless, if, as we have attempted to prove, the hypothesis of the reviewer conflicts with our doctrines, then, also, do the arguments in its defense, however unintentionally, and we are logically bound to consider them. Let us, then, turn to the second article under review.

The reader will observe that the learned writer presents the question in a manner most favorable for the theory. He says, that it relates "not to the *extent* to which the excitement is allowed by the reviewer to go without sin, but to the *existence* of the excitement." This is true, so far as our theory, in its bearing on the precise "excitement" of the reviewer, is concerned; but the overthrow of ours does not necessarily imply the truth of the reviewer's. Both may be false. It devolves upon the advocates of the theory to prove not merely that "*excitement*" of the appetites and passions must exist in temptation, but that it can exist to the extent taught by the theory, and not be "of the nature of sin." But let us proceed to the arguments adduced by the reviewer.

The first is repeated from the preceding article; it is presented thus:—

"'And when the woman saw that the tree *was good for food*, and that it was *pleasant to the eyes*, and a tree *to be desired to make one wise*, she took of the fruit thereof, and did eat, and gave also unto her husband with her, and he did eat.' In this temptation there is exhibited, beyond the possibility of controversy, *excitement*, and an excitement of both an *appetite* and a *propensity*, (or, in the language of the [first] reviewer, of a '*passion*,') and that *by an object God had appointed as their natural excitant*; the intervention of Satanic influence, as we shall by and by see, not materially affecting the case. See also Dr. Clarke on this passage, the italicising being his own:—'The fruit appeared to be wholesome and nutritive. *And it was pleasant to the eyes*—The beauty of the fruit tended to whet and increase the appetite. *And it was to be desired to make one wise*, which was an additional motive to please the palate. From these three sources all natural and moral evil sprung; they are exactly what the apostle calls the *desire of the flesh*, the tree was good for food; *the desire of the eye*, it was pleasant to the sight; and *the pride of life*, it was to be desired to make one wise.'"

The passage from Genesis is italicised by the reviewer. But suppose he had italicised one more word, viz., the fifth, so that it might read, "And when the woman *saw* that the tree was *good for food*," &c., which theory would it then most favor, Wesley's doctrine of intellectual or perceived temptation, or the sensual excitement of the reviewer? A brief historical, if not allegorical, passage would not be admitted by the severest critics as the solution of a metaphysical problem like the present; but if its exact verbal construction is admitted as authority here, we claim it entirely in our own favor. "When the woman *saw*," &c.; here is "the innocent stage of the temptation," as it is described in a former page. That there was excitement after the intellectual stage of the temptation, we admit; but the reviewer must demonstrate that this excitement was *mere temptation*, and not "of the nature of sin," before he can avail himself of the text in support of the theory. This point he surrenders, in the judgment of most sound theologians, by the quotation from Clarke; the latter does not say that the excitement was "necessary," "involuntary," "without sin," but the contrary, for he shows that it was "exactly what the apostle calls the *desire of the flesh*, the *desire of the eye*, and the *pride of life*." What evangelical commentator teaches these not to be of the nature of sin? Wesley himself says, (*Notes*, 1 John ii, 16,) "That all these desires are not from God, but from the prince of this world."\* St. John says, in the immediate context, "The love of the Father is not in him" who thus "loves the world." Yet the reviewer proceeds to argue that "this excitement was *involuntary*, and, under the circumstances of the case, *necessary*." The italics are his own. We did not imply in our strictures that an "unfallen nature" could not feel this excitement, (for how, then, could man have fallen?) but that such a nature could not thus feel and remain unfallen. The temptation was "*involuntary*," the excitement was not; when the woman "*saw*," she knew her duty, and could have escaped, but she consented to hear the seducer, and fell. The promise to show that "Satanic intervention did not materially affect the case," we have not found fulfilled in the remainder of the article. How it can be practicable, we know not; for it was not a *natural* or *necessary excitement* that principally tempted the woman, but a preternatural and fictitious suggestion that *she should not die*, and that the *tree was to be desired to make one wise*.

\* See also his sermons on "Original Sin," "The Circumcision of the Heart," "Repentance of Believers." He invariably pronounces these "lusts" incompatible with perfect love.



Bishop Butler's opinion is next quoted; so far as it applies to the natural man, or the merely justified Christian, it does not come within our present consideration. Such an excitement as the theory allows, we have fully admitted, except in the unfallen state and that of entire sanctification. In respect to the latter, Butler will not, we presume, be referred to as an authority. He lived in that remarkable period of spiritual declension, which preceded the birth of Methodism, when the doctrine of perfection, as it was afterward announced by Wesley, had no definite expression as a distinct theological tenet, and was, apparently, never thought of by clergy or laity. If the opinions of distinguished authorities without our own pale, respecting the doctrine, or respecting adjunct truths, are essential to its orthodoxy, we must abandon it in despair. Bishop Butler is not considered a safe authority on the evangelical doctrines, though unapproached in the talent of his great work. Bishop Wilson, after enumerating his defects, speaks thus of him :\*

"But, in truth, all these deficiencies, if we are right in our judgment about them, spring from an inadequate view of the fallen state of man.—We cannot, therefore, conceal our conviction that Butler's view of human depravity does not fully meet the truth of the case, as delineated in the inspired writings, and confirmed by uniform experience.—In short, the whole of what we would advance amounts to this, the standard of Christianity, as applied to the heart and life of man, which the readers of Butler would form from his general language, is far below what we conceive to be the standard of the sacred Scriptures.—Our objection to Bishop Butler's language is, that it is not Scriptural. He substitutes weaker and more ambiguous expressions. He lowers every thing."

The next argument is a psychological one founded upon what our author calls the "only" process of mental action. It is thus presented by the reviewer from Professor Upham :—

"He considers the mental states under the three general divisions; the intellect, the sensibilities, and the will. The *natural* sensibilities are considered under the heads, emotions and desires; and the *moral* sensibilities under the heads, moral emotions, and feelings of moral obligation. When we add, that the *desires* embrace the instincts, the appetites, the propensities, and the affections, we have an outline of the entire mental action before us. Nor is the *order* of the mind's action left by him in obscurity, or in doubt. It commences with the intellect, and passes on to the will, through the medium of the emotions and desires, on the one hand, and of the moral emotions and feelings of obligation, on the other. This is not represented as the occasional, or

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\* The Analogy of Religion, a Criticism of Butler's Treatise. By Daniel Wilson, Bishop of Calcutta. Boston: James Loring. 1834.

even the *usual* order; but as the *only* way in which the will can be addressed.—Temptation obviously implies danger; and danger here must imply some connection between the impulse of temptation and the *will*, from which alone can proceed a moral action. But from the general view which we have presented of the mind's action, this temptation, which must first be addressed to the intellect, can reach the will only through the emotions and the desires.—Locke says, 'Good, though appearing, and allowed [to be] ever so great, yet till it has reached *desires* in our minds, and thereby made us uneasy in its want, it reaches not our wills.'—From all this it clearly appears that the temptation cannot reach the will, or produce action of any kind without passing through the region of the sensibilities.—The mere moral emotions, viz., of approval and disapproval, do not, of themselves, reach the will. They operate on the will through the feelings of obligation; that is to say, they are always succeeded by the latter feelings before men are led to action. *All other emotions operate through the desires, so that the will, in making up its determinations, takes immediate cognizance of only two classes of mental states, viz., DESIRES and FEELINGS OF OBLIGATION."*

The argument of the reviewer is this: there can be no temptation without danger; there can be no danger without access to the will; there can be no access to the will but through the sensibilities; therefore, there can be no temptation without the excitement of the sensibilities. No subject of mental science remains more dubious and more disputed than that upon which this argument depends—the human will. We have no standard text-book or authority which is altogether satisfactory to Arminians. All are more or less necessarian. Our Calvinistic brethren were never, perhaps, more uncertain and perplexed respecting it than at present.\* The effect of any argument based upon it will be much qualified, to sober thinkers, by these considerations.

The Calvinistic opinions on the will are mostly the theory, or modifications of the theory, of Edwards—the theory of motives. The Arminian theory admits the ordinary influence of motives, but denies their *controlling* power. "Has the mind a *self-determining* power by which it can *spontaneously* decide, independent of the *control* of motives, or is the mind absolutely controlled by motives? We maintain the former—our opponents the latter."† "It is absolutely false," says Wesley, "that the mind must be determined by that motive which appears, upon the whole, the best. It is flatly contrary to the experience of all mankind. Who may not say, on many occasions, *video meliora*? [I see better things.] I know

\* See the Biblical Repository and other Calvinistic Reviews for the last five years.

† Fisk's Calvinistic Controversy, No. 8.

what I do, is not, upon the whole, the best. The will does not necessarily obey the judgment. *The mind has an intrinsic power of cutting off the connection between the judgment and the will.*"\*

If, then, the "connection between the judgment [that is, intellect] and the will" is the "emotions and desires," as the reviewer contends; and if "the mind has the power to cut off this connection," as Wesley contends, then is the mind responsible for this connection—for the character of these emotions and desires, and if it is responsible, then is there danger without access to the will, and the condition on which the reviewer's argument proceeds is met. Wesley distinguishes liberty from the will; "it is," says he, "a power distinct from both the will and the understanding;"† "capable of being exerted with regard to all the faculties of the soul, as well as all the motions of the body."‡ He not only denies the opinion that "the *actions* of men are wholly independent of their choice," but, also, that their "passions and tempers" are so. He even denies that man is "altogether passive in receiving the impression of things. Even here much depends upon his choice. In many cases he may or may not receive the impression, in most he may vary it greatly."§ And may we not say of the "necessary excitement" of the theory, what he says of Edward's system, provided it *should* be true? "Let Mr. Edwards say all he will or can concerning the *outward appearance of things*, as giving rise to sensations, associations of ideas, passions, dispositions, actions; [that is, impressing, in necessary order, the intellect, sensibilities, and will;] yet allowing this to be the order of nature, what then? See one superior to nature. What is the course of nature to him?" That is, if we understand the context, divine grace is a part of the system under which man is placed, his full liberty depends upon its power in his soul, and, by it, what would otherwise be the inevitable course of his nature, may be modified—he may not only control his will, but he may "cut off," when proper, the "connection between it and the judgment," and may even "choose or vary the impression of things."

We have not denied that in the original state, and in the sanctified man, the *natural* appetites and passions exist, and that they are subject to their *natural* excitement; but we deny that what the theory, and its learned defender, calls their natural and necessary excitement, *is such*. They contend that this "involuntary and necessary excitement" may take an "unlawful" direction before consent, and that without guilt, until the will does consent. We

\* Thoughts on Necessity.

† Ibid.

‡ Sermon on Man.

§ Ibid.



deny that it can take such a direction without consent, and that, therefore, there is guilt in the tendency, and not merely in a *subsequent* act of the will. We contend that the sensibilities in a sanctified man are so pervaded, prepossessed by a prior influence, by the love of God, that all unlawful influences can be kept out—that the purified moral sense acts coetaneously with the intellect in perceiving the character of the excitant, and need allow it no admission, if wrong, or, when the excitant is proper, and its excitement exists, can, not only *suspend*, but *prevent* any wrong direction of the natural excitement. Hunger, for instance, is a natural appetite. The sanctified man may feel it; after feeling it for hours, or, as in our Lord's temptation, for days, he may see bread which he cannot lawfully use; must now the appetite crave the forbidden object? It was a general appetite for food before, must it now take the *particular* direction of the unlawful object—must it *desire* it? Nay, we believe that in a wholly sanctified mind the perception of the immoral character of an excitant, which may be coetaneous with the perception of the object itself, will array the sensibilities against it rather than allow them to be attracted by it, and, for a time, the general appetite itself may be suspended by the reaction. Does Christ's interdiction of inward lust allow us to feel it, provided we do not consent? Does the Decalogue prohibit only covetous volitions, not desires? Does that "cleansing from all filthiness of the flesh and the spirit," promised to the people of God, mean only a power of the will, sooner or later to exclude, not preclude, unholy tendencies of the passions? Does the perfect Christian feel, in common with the unregenerate man, the influence of excitants, however unholy the tendency of that influence? Must it, in both cases, equally pass through the region of the sensibilities to the will, the Christian having a superior power of the will to throw it off only when it has passed through the intermediate region? When the appetite is in a proper condition to be excited by a lawful excitant, would it, in a sanctified mind, feel the least excitement from this unlawful, but equally natural excitant? Would not the excitement produced by the *thought* be horror instead of desire—a horror which, for the time, would suppress all desire, even that which is lawful?

If the reviewer, by his "*only* order of the mind's action," means merely that the mind is composed of successive departments, so mechanically arranged, that there is no passage from the first to the last but through the interjacent one—that the will, occupying the last, is perfectly inert, asleep at its post, until some messenger can enter and awaken it—and that, when it is awakened, it has a

spontaneous power of directing its action, independent of the character of that messenger, then does not our theory of temptation still meet his demands? We have admitted that temptations to *unlawful indulgence* may be presented to the *intellect*—we have admitted that they may produce excitement, intense excitement, yet not an excitement like that of the reviewer's, tending *toward*, flowing in the *direction* of, the unlawful object, but an excitement of abhorrence *against* it—not an excitement which must be resisted, but *consented* to as altogether holy. This is the very excitement which the learned defender of the theory includes among the sensibilities under the name of “feelings of moral obligation,” and places “in direct contact with the voluntary power.” If, then, the will needs merely to be aroused in connection with the intellectual perception of temptation, and if a *desirive* excitement is not absolutely necessary to arouse it, the difficulty vanishes. And our author seems (though, as we shall show, in contradiction of himself) to admit, on the very next page, that a non-desirive excitement is sufficient; for he states that “excitement, as he has defined it, and as the term seems to be used in the first article, does not imply a *disposition* to indulgence of any kind, nor does it necessarily imply a state of *desire*. This excitement may be weak, or it may be almost overwhelming in its power.” If the excitement must be in the sensibilities, and if these include only the emotions and desires on the one hand, and the moral feelings on the other, and if he here admits, as he certainly does, that it need not exist in the desires, then it must exist in either the moral feelings or the emotions; if in the former, then he grants exactly our point; if in the latter, the concession is still sufficiently express, for the emotions are not desirive, they are merely excitive; and if excitive influence alone is demanded, irrespective of its desirive or non-desirive character, then, however we may doubt his theory of the mind, we certainly need not quarrel with our esteemed friend, for our own hypothesis meets his conditions.\*

But suppose the preceding views of the mind to be unsatisfactory (as doubtless they will) to the reviewer, as unsatisfactory as his own must be to the believers in Christian perfection—what then? Why, he relieves us immediately by abandoning his “*only*

\* There are cases in which such a spontaneous power of the will cannot possibly be denied. A friend extends to me his closed hand, containing a valuable gem, which he offers me if I say correctly whether it is a diamond or a sapphire. I have a motive to say something; but if I say a *diamond* or a *sapphire*, it must be entirely because I *will* so to say; there is no motive to induce me to say one rather than the other. Motives are the conditions, not the causes of volitions.

order of the mind's action." In this case, the accommodative view we have just presented becomes ineligible, but it becomes, at the same time, *unnecessary*. We have given his theory of mental action. It is briefly this: 1. The intellect; 2. The emotions; 3. The desires; 4. The will. When we repeat that he asserts there can be no temptation without danger, and there can be no danger without access to the will, we have all the grounds of his present argument. He quotes Locke and Upham as authorities, and both affirm that the *desires* must be excited before the will can be reached; he tells us, that Locke says, "Good, though appearing, and allowed to be ever so great; yet till it reaches *desires* in our minds, and thereby makes us uneasy in its want, *it reaches not the will*." The italics are his own. In his quotation from Upham, the fact that the *emotions* do not reach the will, but through a *subsequent* medium, viz., the *desires*, on the one hand, and feelings of *moral obligation*, on the other, is still more positively affirmed. We give it again with all the reviewer's italics and capitals. "The mere moral emotions, viz., of approval and disapproval, do not, of themselves, reach the will. They operate through the feelings of obligation, that is to say, they are always succeeded by the latter feelings before men are led to action. All other emotions operate through the desires, *so that the will, in making up its determinations, takes immediate cognizance of only two classes of mental states, viz., DESIRES and FEELINGS OF OBLIGATION*." This is decidedly said. How, then, in the name of all logic, we ask, does the reviewer, on the very next page from one on which he affirms this theory, declare, "that the excitement, as here defined, and as the term seems to be used by the [preceding] reviewer, does not imply a *disposition* to indulgence of any kind, nor does it necessarily imply a state of *desire*?" And how, on a subsequent page, can he say, that "the peculiar character of the temptations of the sanctified person is then doubtless this:—that while they *tend*, in common with the temptations of feebler Christians, and of all other men, *to the excitement of the desires*, he does not allow them to take hold on these desires; he has attained the power to arrest them *at this point*?" This last quotation appears to us quite ambiguously expressed, but it is doubtless designed to convey the same idea as the preceding one, and it is unquestionably this: that the *emotions*, not the *desires*, must be excited in temptation. But the whole force of our author's argument consists in the proposition that there can be no temptation without access to the will, and, according to his mental philosophy, there can be no access to the will by the emotions except *through the desires*. Though the



emotions be excited, still the absence of the desires leaves an impassable chasm between the temptation and the will. We contend for the intellectual state of the temptation; the reviewer replies that we are wrong, because we allow an impassable interval between it and the will; he then presents his own view, and we find, on a little scrutiny, that it allows a chasm, not quite so broad, but as absolutely impassable, and thus contradicts his whole hypothesis of mental action. The language of the poet, with a slight change, expresses our thought,—

“Whatever link you break,  
Tenth or ten thousandth, breaks the chain alike.”

The fact is manifest that our author, after asserting so emphatically that there can be no danger but from the will, transfers the danger at last to a mere preliminary state of the mind, the *emotions*—we do the same by placing it in the intellect, and our view involves danger as well as his; if the temptation may be dangerous in the emotions, because it may pass on through the desires to the will, it may also be dangerous in the intellect, because it may pass on through the emotions and desires to the will.

But this is not all. He contradicts, also, his own previous reasoning, and the theory of the original writer. Here he asserts that the *desires* are not excited in a sanctified man, but only the emotions, yet in reasoning on temptation in the Adamic state, (which Wesley allows to have been superior to Christian perfection,) he contends that there existed “the *desire of the flesh*, the *desire of the eye*, and the *pride of life*—the excitement of both an *appetite* and a *propensity*, or, in the language of the [preceding] reviewer, of a ‘*passion*.’” Professor Upham, acknowledged by the reviewer as authority, places the *appetites*, *propensities*, and *passions* above the *emotions*, among the *desires*. Does not the reviewer also contradict the theory of the first article? It allows the “excitement of the appetites and passions,” a “violent excitement,” attended with “impure imaginings,” &c. The appetites and passions are not merely emotions, they are desires in both the popular and scientific use of the terms. We have shown, also, that the first article allows *any* excitement short of the *will*—that there “*is no sin but in consent* ;” the writer of the second admits, in his philosophical system, that the desires *precede* the will, and yet declares on the next page that the term excitement, as used in the first article, “does not imply a *disposition* to indulgence of any kind, nor does it necessarily imply a state of *desire*.” Is not this a most palpable contradiction, or do we misapprehend our friend? If he

thus abandons the ground of his argument, it is superfluous for us to consider it further. Let us then proceed.\*

The reviewer asserts that our views do not agree with the common language of Christians.

"One says, he *was never tempted to steal*; another, that he *was never tempted to take the name of God in vain*; and the fact of their making these statements, showing that they are matter of *intellectual perception*, that they exist in the thoughts. When men have no theory to sustain, they do not call these temptations."

We *have* a theory to maintain: the blessed one of Christian perfection. Few believe it; the language of common Christians does not imply it; few if any of their temptations are unattended by the excitement of their remaining depravity, for, "can a man take fire into his bosom and his clothes not be burned?" Further, this view of intellectual temptation is very different from our own. The above "thoughts" may be accidental, momentary, whereas, we admit their suggestion by Satan. He may reiterate them for

\* We have taken side with no system of psychology in our remarks, and we certainly express no rare sentiment, when we say that there is none with which we are satisfied. Amid the uncertainty of such speculations, it is sufficient for us to base our views of temptation on the facts of Christian experience and the purity demanded by the Scriptures. These, we think, are decisive against the excitement allowed by the theory. We have given them as understood by our standards in the former part of this article. The two great faults of our psychological systems are, that those which are based on the "common sense," as it is called, of the Scotch and English mind, are formed by a too rigid induction of the superficial phenomena of the intellect, while the continental systems generalize extravagantly. The former divide and sub-divide the mind, according to its manifestations, until we almost forget the fact that it acts as a unit in its every function; while the latter render it almost inappreciable by transcendental generalizations. The system adopted by the reviewer is an example of the former. A medium method is perhaps the right one. The minute and various induction of the physical sciences does not apply to the mind; it applies not even to the mathematics: still such a method is preferable to the opposite extreme. Two works have lately appeared from the American press, which, though not satisfactory, show a disposition to avoid both extremes. We refer to the volumes of Drs. Rauch and Schmucker. The classification of the latter is substantially that of Cousin. One of the most remarkable men of our country, whose ability Cousin has acknowledged, and most of whose errors have the excuse of arising from a reaction of his mind from still greater, though sanctioned ones, is now preparing a work which, with fundamental faults, will, nevertheless, present, we think, the right doctrine on the subject of the will, sustaining the views we have given of the moral character of the passions, and asserting a standard of purity far above that of our friends, the reviewers. The reader will perhaps be surprised to hear such assertion in reference to Orestes A. Brownson.

hours or days to the mind, in defiance of all its resistance, until they become haunting spectres ; he may accompany them with heaviness and depression, and even with an agony of excitement—an excitement not “*tending to*” the evil suggested, as admitted by the theory, but of horror *against* it. It was understood of course, by the readers of our former “*strictures*,” that we would not deny *such* an excitement; it would have been superfluous, if not absurd, to state it. Could any one, for a moment, suppose we denied that the mind (*especially* of a sanctified man) could feel the excitement of abhorrence and horror *against sin*? It is obvious that the excitability of his “moral emotions and feelings of obligation” is greater than before he was sanctified.

St. James’ definition of temptation is next presented. “Every man is tempted when he is drawn away of his own lust and enticed. Then when lust hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin,” &c., James i, 14. “Here,” says our author, “temptation *precedes* sin.” It does ; but it is actual, not inward sin, of which the apostle speaks, or the definition would not agree with the Scriptural standard of purity, as elsewhere stated, and as presented by Wesley in the former part of this article. The whole character of the epistle shows that it was not addressed to sanctified Christians. Its definition is that of the ordinary temptations of justified men ; and even of such it may be said, “Blessed is the man that endureth temptation, for when he is tried he shall receive the crown of life, which the Lord hath promised to them that love him.” Temptations show him his depravity, as well as test his faith, and his course, from conquering to conquer, is also a progress from grace to grace, until he is purified for heaven. Wesley’s notes (*in loco*) show the above to have been his view of the passage. The italics are his.

“The *desire having conceived*—by our own will joining therewith ; *bringeth forth*—actual *sin*. It doth not follow that the *desire* itself is not sinful. He that begets a man is himself a man.”

To the reviewer’s question, whether “Mr. Wesley does not clearly subscribe to his principle when he speaks of an ‘irregular’ and ‘wandering imagination’ as an ‘innocent infirmity?’” we answer, decidedly, No. We have already shown what he means by *innocent infirmities*. The sermons referred to, as containing these phrases, are those on Temptation and Perfection. In the former he says,—

“How weak the understanding ! How liable the wisest man to mistake ! To form false judgments, to take falsehood for truth, and



truth for falsehood, evil for good, and good for evil! What starts, what wanderings of imagination, are we subject to! And how many are the temptations we are to expect even from these innocent infirmities!"

Here he speaks of mere intellectual acts, not even temptations, though they may lead to them. This is further evident in the passage referred to in the other sermon, in which he expressly says they are not *moral*.

"I mean those inward or outward imperfections which are not of a moral nature: such are weakness or slowness of understanding, dullness or confusedness of apprehension, incoherency of thought, irregular quickness or heaviness of imagination."

The quotations show their own meaning, and are further explained by those given in the preceding pages. Is this, then, the only sanction given by Wesley to the reviewer's theory? How does it contrast with what he gives to that which we defend and have presented in his own words?

The reviewer next presents some qualifying remarks, which strike us as not a little remarkable.

"But when it is said that temptation, as we have defined it, is 'not sin, nor of the nature of sin,' *actual sin* is of course meant."

He has defined temptation to be "an excitement of the appetites and passions," &c.; the reader will remember how far extended and how strongly characterized. Does he, then, at last admit that it is inward or natural depravity which is excited? If not, why distinguish and emphasize it as "*not actual sin*." If he makes the admission, what will he do with the application of the definition to Christ and to Adam, who had no natural depravity, and in the latter of whom he declares the excitement to have been "involuntary and necessary?"

"This [actual sin] is the only sense in which Wesley uses the term *sin*, or in which he considers it ever to be used in the Scriptures."

Wesley, we believe, wrote an elaborate work, the very title of which is ORIGINAL SIN, and also a sermon bearing the same name. No one will question his belief in natural depravity, whether he usually called it by the name *sin* or not. If the reviewers then mean by their "excitement not being sin," merely that it is not what Wesley generally calls sin, that is, *actual sin*, but admit that it is "of the nature of" natural depravity, then, according to Wesley, their definition cannot be applied to the sanctified state, then it cannot apply to Adam, nor to Christ, and at once they deny their own theory, and confirm that of our "strictures."

"Had the [first] reviewer been writing a popular essay on Christian perfection, he would doubtless have told the young Christian, that by the exercise of an effectual faith, and by patient continuance in well-doing, these periods of painful 'excitement' and agitation would pass away."

How can an "*involuntary and necessary excitement*," produced by "natural excitants" on the "excitable functions and powers of our constitution," be cut off? Does religion change the physical world or our natural constitutions? Or, in the case of Satanic temptations, does Satan cease his attacks? How, then, does advancement in grace take away the susceptibility of this excitement? Grace takes away nothing that is physiological and "*necessary*;" it removes only sin and its effects. But granting that it does remove the excitement of what our authors call temptation, if the "young Christian" can be encouraged with the *hope*, can we not affirm of the perfect Christian the *fact* of its cessation? If not, in what state can the young Christian realize the hope? In our strictures we made this affirmation, and our good brother writes a profound article against our position, holding forth, nevertheless, to the "young Christian" the hope of all we affirmed. This, with the other contradictions which we have noticed, lead us to believe that his theology is, after all, much better than his philosophy would seem to indicate.

The writer proceeds to object to our view of temptation.

"The first and chief point which attracts our attention, is the cold and philosophical sort of temptation which is set forth in these strictures, as the only one free from 'the nature of sin.' A temptation which, in the language of the editor, 'has no exciting influence upon the passions,' and in which the person is represented as 'feeling no excitement to the evil.'"

We have indeed declared that such an excitement—an "*excitement to the evil*"—does not exist in the sanctified heart; but we have admitted excitement—the most intense excitement—excitement of the "*moral emotions*," &c. We have admitted that the intellectual temptation may be urged and reiterated in most terrible conflict with the "*feelings of moral obligation*," accompanied with heaviness, sorrow, perplexity, and a hundred other trials, but not with "*appetites and passions excited to the evil*." Satan thus strives to compel the child of God to unbelief, repining, or despair. Were not the temptations of Job—"a perfect man," as the history calls him—of a similar character?

"Then the young Christian's temptations must partake of the nature of sin. [Not all of them; when the 'passions and appetites are ex-  
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cited to evil,' and accompanied by 'impure reflections and imaginings,' they do.] But what does experience say on this subject? When he has resisted successfully, and overcome these impulses, he will be conscious of a feeling, not of *gratitude* that he has escaped—but of *innocence*, and not only of innocence, but of *approbation* and *desert of reward*."

We hesitate not to say that, however common this language may be in the ethical discussions of mere philosophical speculators, it is not to be found, unqualified, in any truly evangelical work of theology. Philosophers and moralists may speak and write thus, but a true child of God, never, unless in adopting the dialect of a philosophical system foreign to his heart. A merely justified Christian in every conquest of the remaining tendency of his passions and appetites to evil, indeed rejoices, he exults, but it is an exultation "of gratitude that he has escaped," and never, if he has right views of himself, is it attended with a feeling of "*approbation* and of *desert of reward*." These are altogether new terms in evangelical theology. On the contrary, while he gratefully rejoices that he has escaped, he discovers in the unholy tendencies of his appetites and passions the deep depravity of his nature, and mourns over it before his God. These are Wesleyan views, and the Christian reader can verify them by a reference to his own heart.

"How stands this case in reference to the perfect Christian? Has he no fiery trials? Has he no conflicts at all?"

Yes; abundance of them, as we have shown.

"This view [that desire may be excited in temptation without sin] we shall also support by a quotation from Wesley: 'The more any believer examines his own heart, the more will he be convinced of this: that faith, working by love, excludes both inward and outward sin, from a soul watching unto prayer; that, nevertheless, we are even then liable to temptation, particularly to the sin that did easily beset us; that if the loving eye of the soul be steadily fixed on God, the temptation soon vanishes away; but if not, if we are *εξελκομενοι*, (as the apostle James speaks, chap. i, 14,) drawn out of God by our own desire and *δελεαζομενοι*, caught by the bait of present or promised pleasures; then that desire, conceived in us, brings forth sin, and having, by that inward sin, destroyed our faith, it casts us headlong into the snare of the devil, so that we may commit any outward sin whatever.' Here we shall notice but two points:—The one is, that the believer, from whose soul 'is excluded both inward and outward sin,' is nevertheless liable to *temptation to sin*; and the other, that 'sin' does not result from the working of this temptation, till it is *brought forth* by the action of the *desire* which is conceived in him. We believe this general doctrine is also strongly expressed by Dr. Clarke, when he says, 'That to be tempted, *even to the greatest abominations*, (while the person resists,) *is not sin*.'"



The text of Wesley's sermon from which the quotation is taken is 1 John iii, 9, "Whosoever is born of God doth not commit sin." Wesley in his sermon on Christian perfection says that this passage refers to merely regenerated Christians, and that the word sin means *actual* sin. It is obvious from the discourse that he gives it the same application in the present instance. The reader on referring to it will observe particularly the introductory passages, and the one under the second division, in which he defines the word sin as here used by the apostle. In several of his sermons he represents the believer as exempt before sanctification from "both inward and outward sin," while he "keeps himself;" not, of course, free from all natural depravity, but from its voluntary action, either "inward or outward." We have already given his view of the passage from St. James. With our own theory we can join the reviewers in adopting the language of Clarke on the temptation of Christ, that "to be tempted to the greatest abominations, while the person resists, is not sin; for Christ was tempted to *worship* the DEVIL." The question is not whether temptation is sin, but whether the "excitement" of the theory is mere temptation or is sin. Clarke says nothing respecting such an excitement in the temptation of Christ, and we have given the opinion of a greater—of Wesley, against it. We may ask, *en passant*, if "any one, not having a theory to sustain," can imagine that such an excitement of the passions entered into the particular temptation of our Lord here referred to by Clarke? "The devil sheweth him all the kingdoms of the world, and the glory of them, and saith, All these things will I give thee if thou wilt fall down and worship me." According to the theory, this is wrongly called a temptation unless it reached the passions—that is, as the word imports, (and as we have shown the theory demands, notwithstanding the self-contradiction of the reviewer,) the *desires*. Now, is it presumed for a moment that the ambition, the desires of Him who created the heavens and the earth were excited by this display of the petty tetrarchies of Judea, or even the dominions of the whole earth? How much more probable is Wesley's view of this temptation?

In the digression of the reviewer on Edwards' account of the origin of depravity, we observe nothing with which our views interfere. We also would "have our affections regulated, not extinguished."

The only remaining argument which it will be required of us to consider, is presented as follows:—

"Let us paraphrase one of our Saviour's temptations according to this hypothesis, and see what it is:—Being on the pinnacle of the

temple, the 'thought' was presented to his mind to cast himself down—trusting to Providence to prevent his destruction. This is all that can be made of it. There is evidently nothing remarkable in this—nothing, in fact, which, in the experience of an ordinary man, would be considered worth recording. This thought may indeed have been suggested to the minds of thousands when standing in a similar situation; and if it has never been before, it will be likely to enter the mind of the reader, the next time he shall be in such a place."

It will be perceived that the author proceeds again on an utter misapprehension of our view of temptation. We have not denied all excitement, we have allowed that of the "moral emotions and feelings of obligation," of horror against sin, and of many other modes of spiritual grievance, which may exist in a sanctified mind, all producing profound affliction. As above said, it would have been superfluous, if not absurd, for us in denying the "excitement of the appetites and passions," as taught by the theory, to have stopped and reminded the reader that a holy man *can* feel excitement, horror *against sin*, or that his temptations may be accompanied with depression, heaviness, &c., through a diabolical and continued reiteration of the intellectual suggestion. We have only denied that the reviewer's excitement of the appetites and passions can exist in a perfect Christian. He gives a definite statement of this excitement and of the whole theory.

"When, under proper conditions, the external exciting object is presented, its corresponding appetite or passion is necessarily excited, and tends to seek gratification; and this involuntary and necessary excitement, when it tends to unlawful or excessive gratification, is called *lust*, and properly constitutes temptation.—It is not sin, nor of the nature of sin."

This definition the author says is "clear and precise, and prevents the possibility of misconstruction," and it is this definition, this "lust," this "excitement of the passions and appetites tending to unlawful or excessive gratification," that he applies to the perfect Christian, to paradise, and even to our adorable Redeemer. *This* we have controverted, but meanwhile have described the temptations of the perfect Christian as far otherwise than is implied in this paraphrase. What if we should paraphrase one of our Lord's temptations, according to the reviewer's hypothesis, and represent the Son of God as excited with a "passion" or "desire" to worship the devil, that he might receive an earthly sovereignty, would it appear more plausible than the above? And yet the latter is a total misconstruction.

We have thus rapidly, though at some length, canvassed the

theory and its defense. We have written with the most respectful consideration of its able advocates. The task has been performed with reluctance, and will not probably be resumed. After the theory had appeared in elaborate articles in two successive numbers of this work we still delayed, hoping that its extraordinary character would command the pen of an abler opponent. None has appeared. We have, therefore, presented our humble tribute to the truth, and with no other confidence than the truth inspires. We have referred to Wesley as our standard expositor of the divine word. In conclusion we would urge, and were it not for the liability of misapprehension, urge with admonitory emphasis, the example set us by our Wesleyan brethren of an unwavering adherence in all vital opinions to that high and venerable authority, and especially so, when our chief reasons for a deviation are founded in the dubious speculations of metaphysical philosophy—the least authoritative, yet most potent cause of theological error in every age. Every examination (and it is not a rare pleasure with us) of the Works of that admirable man exalts our estimation of his authority, especially on the fundamental doctrines of revelation. He had faults—his Works abound in them—but they were the defects of his times, while his excellencies were his own. The opinions he adopted from his contemporaries are frequently in contrast with the improved intelligence of our day; but in those which he deduced from revelation we are always struck with a transparency, a vigor, and an evangelical purity, which for his age were pre-eminent, if not peculiar. On him devolved the high and providential duty of calling the attention of the Christian world anew to the three great principles which comprehend the experimental divinity of the Scriptures, relating respectively to the *nature*, *evidence*, and *extent* of personal piety, viz., *justification by faith*, the *witness of the Spirit*, and *sanctification*. What a radiant, yet steady, illumination has his great mind thrown on these great truths! How conservative and efficacious have been their influence on our character and career as a people! Far off be the day when, for any questionable consideration, we shall be disposed to modify any one of these, the most vital elements of our creed, and the most mighty elements of our strength.

S.

*Boston.*



ART. VI.—*The Christian Year ; being Thoughts in Verse for the Sundays and Holy-days throughout the Year*. Second American edition. Philadelphia : Lea & Blanchard. 1841.

WE are well aware that "*procul este prophani*" would be an appropriate motto to this and all such works as are comprised within the class to which it belongs ; for we are not ignorant of the fact, that they ill endure the "rude, uncivil touch" of such uncourtly hands as ours. We shall, therefore, endeavor to handle it with all the delicacy, which a strict regard to truth, and a sense of the solemn obligations by which we are bound to discharge our duty in this matter, will permit.

But how shall we approach this elegant volume of devotional poetry with due respect ? The mysteries it contains suit not the vulgar ear ; the instruction it conveys—the consolation it imparts—are for those who wear fine linen, and fare sumptuously every day ; its appropriate place is the centre-table of the richly furnished room ; and its office is to beguile the tedium of the sabbath evening, to such as have some vague idea that it should not be spent either in reading novels or visiting. It is true it may be taken up occasionally for a higher purpose—personal pain, and sickness, and domestic affliction, and even death itself, may have entered there—for the rich have no immunity from these things any more than the poor, and, in the end, will be found to have paid their full contingent to the contribution levied on mortality ; and then consolation, not amusement, will be sought for. We can fancy that we see some fair sufferer, whom sorrow and sickness have brought down to the point of wishing to "lay hold of the hope set before us in the gospel," of which hope she has heard, indeed, but her idea of which is indefinite and confused ; we can fancy her turning over its pages, with a sincere desire to be benefited, an earnest expectation of meeting some sweet promise of assistance in her time of need—some cordial for her wounded spirit. Alas ! alas !

"She reads—and reads—then lifts her eyes in doubt,  
And gravely wonders—what it is about :"

her devotional feelings are chilled ; her thoughts are turned into other channels ; and despondent, and hopeless of "any consolation in Christ, any comfort of love, any fellowship of the Spirit," she resigns herself to the cheerless destiny of toiling on, in the formal, unmeaning observance of saints' days, and the heartless repetition of prescribed prayers. Nor should this be thought unreasonable

on her part; for is not the volume, which has thus disappointed her, written by a distinguished Oxford tractist; and is not its American editor a bishop of her Church, in the unquestioned possession of the delegated power of the apostles, to bind and to loose?

That results similar to the one just imagined, must naturally flow from the setting forth of works called devotional, with the highest pretensions, and most authoritative names, in which there is no inculcation of the doctrine of the "faith once delivered to the saints;" no invitation to "sinners poor and needy;" we conscientiously believe: and this belief has induced us to select the work in question, not that it differs in any essential from a host of others of the same nature; but that having the sanction of such high names as Professor Keble and Bishop Doane, we consider ourselves at liberty to hold it up as a fair sample of the unmeaning sentimentality which is foisted on the gay world under the notion of its being devotional. But we, it may be said, have nothing to do with the gay world. Now under favor, be it spoken, we have much, very much, to do with it. It forms a component part of society, and its influence, deleterious as it is, is awfully powerful. Who has not felt the attractions of its refinement, as evidenced in the countless courtesies of polished life; of its high grade of education, in all the harmonious operations of its diversified branches; of the allurements which it holds forth to our ears and our eyes? Who has not perceived, if he has not felt, the power of wealth; of station; of rank; yes, we repeat it, of rank, however ridiculous and imaginary its pretensions? Who will so far deny weight to all these things, as to assert that they have not an important bearing, even on that part of society who might seem to be either above or below their influence? And is all this nothing to us? Is it nothing to us that the wealthy and the educated, strong for evil and for good, should be suffered to stand afar off—and while the humble ministers of the gospel are crying, "Come ye to the waters," should be told, "Ye need *not* come, we will bring the waters to you; not, indeed, without money and without price, but rest you content, we will bring them?" Is it nothing to us that the young and inexperienced, among those whom we may more peculiarly call our own people, should see the streams of His grace thus dammed up, and its waters led off, and adulterated by human devices and superstitious ceremonies, until, like salt that hath lost its saltness, they are fit for nothing but to make glad, not the real garden of the paradise of God, but the earthly, perishing gardens of the paradise of this world? To speak without a metaphor, we hold it to be our

solemn duty, as faithful guardians of devotional literature, to warn the sentimental reader, as well as the careless votary of fashion and folly, that the effort to reconcile the jarring interests of the two worlds is fruitless; and that the declaration, that whoso would be Christ's disciple, must take up his daily cross, and follow him, stands in as full force now as it did at the moment it was uttered. "Go not after them," is our cry, who would seem to be carried on toward heaven "on flowery beds of ease." There is no such path to glory. We would say, if you are indeed seeking salvation, be not turned out of the true and only road, as thousands have been, by the jeers and scoffs of those who think they have found, not a more excellent, or, in the end, a more pleasant, but a more gay and flowery, and, if we must speak it, a more sentimental and poetical way.

Before we proceed to a review of this particular work, we would be indulged in a few general remarks on the subject of sacred poetry. Let us not be misunderstood, when we say, we do not admit the term *uninspired* when applied to devotional poetry: we believe that whatever turns to God, must first come from him; thus though we use the term in a restricted sense, we consider all really devotional poetry to be, to a certain extent, inspired by the influence of the Holy Spirit. Hence it is, that no poetic effusions, breathed from an unconverted soul, however classically beautiful, have ever won their way with believers, or maintained their stand in the affections of a really Christian people. The cause of this must, we think, be very obvious; when we express those sentiments and emotions which rise spontaneously in the mind, under the influence of strong devotional feeling, we do not naturally seek for fine, or involved language, in which to express them; they come from us in an unpremeditated burst of exclamation, straight, clear, continuous. In minutely examining those hymns which have been dear for a century to the ears of the pious, what most forcibly strikes our attention, is their extreme simplicity of thought and language:—every word tells—and every idea has a direct reference to the subject of the piece.

He who affects to write religious poetry, and is himself a stranger to experimental religion; who has none of that rapturous glow, which they only can understand whose spirits witness with God's Spirit that they are sons and kings, and by which they call him Father; in order to gratify a love of novelty, and indulge the luxury of fancy, must set in motion all the powers of fiction, while the imagination is employed without control to create new images; discover uncommon resemblances, and produce unexpected asso-



ciations. He must ransack the universe for objects of brilliant and unusual comparison, and value sentiment, not as the real object of an emotion, but as susceptible of ingenious turns, striking contrasts, and pleasing illusions. Poetry thus produced, may surprise and dazzle the understanding, but can never cause permanent feeling.

But it is time to introduce the volume we have undertaken to review to the notice of our readers; though, on a second perusal of the American editor's preface, we are well nigh overwhelmed at the audacity of the attempt. Well may we be diffident to express our opinion of poetry written by a professor of poetry, and that, too, in the learned and orthodox University of Oxford; and which a dignitary of the Church, in our own country, declares "he has read with unmingled delight; and that no volume of uninspired poetry has ever given him such rich and continued satisfaction." Nay, "it has seemed to him," as Charles the emperor thought of Florence, "a book too pleasant to be read only on holy-days."—*Preface*, pp. 7, 8. This passes. The bishop has given this fine thought to old Isaak Walton; we claim it, however, for a certain William Shakspeare, who, in his play of "*Much ado about Nothing*," has the following:—

"*Duke*.—Will you have me, lady?

"*Beatrice*.—Not unless I might have another for week days; your grace is too costly for any day but Sunday."

Begging our reader's pardon for our lightness, but really the bishop's hyperbolic compliment betrayed us unwarily into it, we proceed to say, that we must protest against his earnest recommendation of this volume as "a family book," that is, as we understand him, a book to be used for the purpose of aiding devotion. First, because the great fundamental doctrines of the New Testament—as, the necessity of the new birth; the Holy Spirit bearing witness with our spirit; justification by faith; and sanctification by the same faith; are nowhere, throughout all the three hundred and twenty pages of the book, either stated or alluded to; and, secondly, because, even if they were, there is so much glare and glitter thrown over the whole performance that they could not be understood.

And now, that we are about to produce some proof of what we have so roundly asserted, will the reader suffer us to remind him that the author of this poetry writes himself professor of poetry, in the University of Oxford. Much of it is very pretty, some of it is almost, not altogether, but nearly as good, as Mrs. Hemans, or

Mrs. Sigourney, or Mrs. Southey could have written; but does it deserve to be set forth as a manual for Christian devotion? Let the reader judge. We open, positively, at a venture, for absolutely such is the sameness of the whole performance that there is no choice.

"SECOND SUNDAY IN ADVENT.

Not till the freezing blast is still;  
Till freely leaps the sparkling rill;  
And gales sweep soft, from summer skies,  
As o'er a sleeping infant's eyes [O, pretty!]  
A mother's kiss; ere calls like these,  
No sunny gleam awakes the trees;  
Nor dare the tender flowerets show  
Their bosoms to the uncertain glow."

*Jam satis*, although we assure the reader there are six stanzas more of it, each more beautiful than the other.

"FIRST SUNDAY AFTER EPIPHANY.

Lessons sweet of spring returning,  
Welcome to the thoughtful heart;  
May I call ye, sense or learning,  
Instinct pure, or heaven-taught art?  
Be your title what it may,  
Sweet and lengthening April day,  
While with you, the soul is free,  
Ranging wild on hill and sea.  
Soft as Memnon's harp at morning,  
To the inward ear devout."

Does the reader require any more of this beautiful, incomprehensible piece? If so, he must go to the book: there is *plus* and *plus* behind.

"THIRD SUNDAY AFTER EPIPHANY.

I mark'd a rainbow in the north,  
What time the wild autumnal sun,  
From his dark veil, at noon look'd forth,  
As glorying in his course half done:  
Flinging soft radiance far and wide,  
Over the dusky heaven, and bleak hill side."

We hope the reader understands it—but *allons*.

"It was a gleam to memory dear,  
And as I walk and muse apart,  
When all seems faithless round, and drear,  
*I would revere it in my heart:*  
And watch how light can find its way  
To regions furthest from the fount of day."

We would fain ask if this can possibly be some of that poetry, which, like the city of Florence, and his grace "the duke, is too good to be read on any day but Sunday."

"SAINT MATTHEW'S DAY.

*Ye hermits blest, ye holy maids !  
The nearest heaven on earth !  
Who talk with God in shadowy glades,  
Free from rude care and mirth :  
To whom some viewless teacher brings  
The secret lore of rural things ;  
The whispers from above that haunt the twilight vale."*

The reader is assured that the above has not been selected with any view to direct attention to the popery contained in the italicised lines ; not at all : it was to give an opportunity to introduce an elaborate note of the American editor. Note on Matthew :—

"Matthew, called also Levi, was a publican, or collector of taxes, under the Roman government. He was sitting at the receipt of custom ; when, called by Jesus to be his disciple, he arose, and followed him. He was appointed one of the twelve apostles of our Lord, and wrote one of the four gospels."

All this is very well ; but it does not, by any means, explain what connection there was between St. Matthew and hermits and holy maids. Seriously, though, for what description of readers did Bishop Doane pen that note ?

"ASCENSION DAY.

Soft cloud, that while the breeze of May  
Chants her glad matins in the leafy arch ;  
Draw'st thy bright veil across the heavenly way,  
Meet pavement for an angel's glorious march :  
My soul is envious of mine eye,  
That it should soar, and glide with thee, so fast."

"Soft, soothing poetry," says the bishop. Very ! and very silly, withal. Heard ever any man of one's soul being envious of his eye ?

"By glimpses, such as dreamers love,  
Through her gray veil, the leafless grove  
Shows when the distant shadows rove ;—  
Such trembling joy the soul o'eraws,  
As nearer to thy shrine she draws :—  
And now before the choir we pause.  
The door is closed—but soft and deep,  
Around the awful arches sweep,  
Such airs as soothe a hermit's sleep.



From each carved nook, and fretted bend,  
Cornice and gallery, seem to send  
Tones that with seraph hymns might blend.

Three solemn parts together twine,  
In harmony's mysterious line ;  
Three solemn aisles, approach the shrine."—P. 154.

Will the reader favor us with a conjecture as touching the idea the foregoing is intended to convey? If he should be so fortunate as to discover that it is for "Trinity Sunday," will he contrast it with the following, and tell us, in honest truth, which is most germane to the matter?

"Hail! holy, holy, holy Lord!  
Whom One in Three we know;  
By all thy heavenly host adored,  
By all thy church below.

One undivided Trinity  
With triumph we proclaim;  
Thy universe is full of thee,  
And speaks thy glorious name.

Thee, holy Father, we confess;  
Thee, holy Son, adore:  
Thee, Spirit of truth and holiness,  
We worship evermore.

\* \* \* \* \*

Three Persons equally divine  
We magnify and love:  
And both the choirs ere long shall join,  
To sing thy praise above.

Hail! holy, holy, holy Lord,  
(Our heavenly song shall be,)  
Supreme, essential One, adored  
In co-eternal Three!"

Or this,—

"O that we now, in love renew'd,  
Might blameless in thy sight appear;  
Wake we in thy similitude,  
Stamp'd with the triune character;  
Flesh, spirit, soul, to thee resign;  
And live and die entirely thine!"

"HOLY BAPTISM.

What sparkles in that lucid flood,  
Is water, by gross mortals eye'd;  
But seen by faith, 'tis blood,  
Out of a dear Friend's side.

A few calm words of faith and prayer,  
 A few bright drops of holy dew ;  
 Shall work a wonder there,  
 Earth's charmers never knew."—P. 283.

Is Mr. Keble a professor in a Protestant university ? Is Bishop Doane a bishop in a Protestant Church ?

"COMMINATION.

The prayers are o'er ; why slumber'st thou so long,  
 Thou voice of sacred song ?  
 Why swell'st thou not like breeze from mountain cave,  
 High o'er the echoing nave ?  
 The white-robed priest, as other while to glide,  
 Up to the altar's northern side ;  
 A mourner's tale of shame and sad decay  
 Keeps back our glorious sacrifice to-day."—P. 297.

This same commination puzzled us sadly ; not one particle of information could we gain from the verses affixed to the caption. The American editor, to be sure, kindly came to our assistance, under the similitude (as John Bunyan would say) of a note : though candor forces us to admit, he does little more for us than to make the darkness more visible. "A commination," says he, "on denouncing of God's anger and judgments against sinners ; with certain prayers to be used on the first day of Lent, and at other times, as the ordinary shall appoint. This service," he adds, "is not retained in the Liturgy of the American Church." Certainly not. The able and pious men who framed that Liturgy had abjured popery in every guise and shape.

"FORMS OF PRAYER TO BE USED AT SEA.

The shower of moonlight falls as still and clear  
 Upon the desert main ;  
 As where sweet flowers some pastoral garden cheer,  
 With fragrance after rain :  
 The wild winds rustle in the piping shrouds,  
 As in the quivering trees ;  
 Like summer fields, beneath the shadowy clouds,  
 The yielding waters darken in the breeze."—P. 299.

"Thou, too, art here—with thy soft inland tones—  
 Mother of our new birth \* \* the Church."

Will these reverend gentlemen read Mr. Addison's noble hymn, "How are thy servants bless'd, O Lord !" and then come with their showers of moonlight, and pastoral gardens, and wild winds rustling on the piping shrouds, and shadowy clouds, if they dare. But let us have a little more of it.

"Far, far away, the homesick seaman's hoard,  
Thy fragrant tokens live;  
Like flower-leaves in a precious volume stored,  
To solace and relieve  
Some heart too weary of the restless world:  
Or like thy sabbath cross;  
That o'er the brightening billow streams unfurl'd,  
Whatever gale the laboring vessel toss."—P. 300.

We think poor Jack would open his eyes very wide if told the above had any thing to do with "forms of prayer to be used at sea."

We have now, as we believe, quoted quite enough of Mr. Keble's poetry to substantiate all that we have said of it; if more be wanting, more could be had: but we are ourselves tired of it, and we fancy our readers by this time are not less so; indeed, notwithstanding all the encomiums passed on it, we had not read many pages ere we began to suspect that there was a misnomer in the title-page, and that, instead of thoughts in verse, we should read penances in verse—it would accord well with Mr. K.'s creed, and, to our apprehension, nothing would serve the purpose better. To be made to commit to memory the stanzas for any one saint's day would be penance enough for once; as much, indeed, as the penitent could bear, short of dying of a surfeit of sweet poetry: and whether repeated backward or forward, we take it upon us to say, would be equally efficacious, and equally intelligible.

If our memory serves us, our neighbor, the New-York Churchman, expressed, on a certain occasion, his objection to what he called "unbaptized tunes:" now we have, as we believe, in a much higher sense, an objection to unbaptized poetry; we speak it most reverently, "unbaptized with the Holy Ghost and with fire;" that is, if it is to be set forth for the purposes of devotional exercises. We repeat, that such poetry should be the devout breathings of a converted soul, or it is nothing worth. The most brilliant effort of genius fails to interest us; when a few plain words, from a heart under the influence of divine grace, effect the purpose in the highest degree. May we be permitted to illustrate our position by quoting a few stanzas from a poem called "*The Grave*," and found in the September number of the London Quarterly for 1840, which the editors of that Review (and they are most competent judges) pronounce to be worthy of any one of their greatest poets in his happiest moments?—

"One place alone had ceased to hold its prey;  
A form had press'd it; and was there no more;  
The garments of the grave beside it lay,  
Where once they wrapp'd Him, on the rocky floor.



He only, with returning footsteps, broke  
 The eternal calm, wherewith the tomb was bound ;  
 Among the sleeping dead, alone he woke :  
 And bless'd with outstretch'd hands the host around.

Well is it that such blessing hovers here,  
 To soothe each sad survivor of the throng ;  
 Who haunt the portals of the solemn sphere ;  
 And pour their wo the loaded air along.

They to the verge have follow'd where they love,  
 And on the insuperable threshold stand,  
 With cherish'd names, its speechless, calm reprove,  
 And stretch in the abyss their ungrasp'd hand."

Will the reader contrast the foregoing beautiful lines, and they are surprisingly beautiful, with the following—the former, having all the advantage of the gloss of novelty ; the latter, familiar to us from our infancy—and say which most stirs us to love and gratitude, which most thrills the heart with the hope of the resurrection and the life promised in Him who died for our sins, and rose again for our justification. If, as we anticipate, the preference is accorded to the latter, our end is attained.

"The rising God forsakes the tomb ;  
 (In vain the tomb forbids his rise ;)  
 Cherubic legions guard him home,  
 And shout him ' Welcome to the skies !'  
 Break off your tears, ye saints, and tell  
 How high your great Deliv'rer reigns :  
 Sing how he spoil'd the hosts of hell,  
 And led the monster death in chains !  
 Say, ' Live for ever, wondrous King !  
 Born to redeem, and strong to save !'  
 Then ask the monster, ' Where's thy sting ?'  
 And, ' Where's thy victory, boasting grave ?'"

We have now taken our leave of Mr. Keble ; but to our countryman, Bishop Doane, we must say,—

"Soft you, a word or two before we part."

And, first, we would respectfully ask him, "Why he wishes to see a republication in this country of the *Icon Basilike*?" He would not agree with us, we know, in our opinion of *him*, whom he would call the royal martyr ; he would not consent to learn what is the truth, that he was a gloomy, selfish bigot ; faithless alike to his friends and his foes, a dissembler, and a hypocrite, from first to last. The bishop would not concede this ; yet of the "*Icon Basilike*" there cannot now be two opinions ; for it is incon-

testibly proved to be a forgery, written by a hireling wretch,\* who claimed and received of Charles the Second a *bishopric*, that being the reward which had been promised him for the imposition.

Secondly, we would ask of Bishop Doane why he should have imported from England, and "discharged upon us," the tediousness of Mr. Keble, when he himself could have furnished a work of the same description, much better, and more intelligibly written, without leaving the episcopal palace at Burlington: for we speak advisedly, and mean no less than we speak, when we say, we have ourselves seen specimens of Bishop Doane's poetry fully equal, if not superior, to Mr. Keble's. We fear these questions can be too readily answered.

It is because of that undying disposition which has ever prevailed among many of the ministers of the Protestant Episcopal Church in this country to be identified with the Established Church in England. Hence the frequency of clerical visits to that country, and the inflated accounts of the prosperous state of the Church, and of the piety, and activity, and humility (save the mark) of her dignified and beneficed clergy. Well, let us suppose that the whole convocation of archbishops, bishops, deans of chapters, prebendaries, *et id omne genus*, have forgiven the sin of the rebellion, that the Church is restored to favor, and the *status ante Bellum* fully established, what then? do they really believe that the members of the Church here will ever consent to subscribe to the pretensions of the Church there? Never; there is too much light, and knowledge, and piety in the Protestant Episcopalians here to admit the supposition for one moment; they too well understand the principles of civil and religious liberty to permit themselves again to be placed under subjection to a Church of which, it has been well said, that "it was built on the foundation of the lords and commons, Queen Victoria, at this present, being herself the chief corner-stone."

January, 1842.

\* Dr. Gauden.

## ART. VII.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

1. *The Life of the Rev. Charles Wesley, M. A., some time Student of Christ-Church, Oxford: comprising a Review of his Poetry; Sketches of the Rise and Progress of Methodism: with Notices of Contemporary Events and Characters.* By THOMAS JACKSON. 1 vol., 8vo., pp. 797. New-York: G. Lane & P. P. Sandford. 1842.

THE present work makes its appearance at a time when the facts which it develops are of special interest to the church and the world. Any thing calculated to reflect additional light upon the history and times of the Wesleys becomes more important with the lapse of years. For as the magnitude and grandeur of that revival of primitive Christianity which has been the fruit of their labors extend, the various causes in which it had its origin, and to which, under the divine Hand, it owed its efficiency, become matters of increased interest not only to the Christian, but to the philosopher. This fact induced the keen-eyed Southey to make "Wesley and his coadjutors" the subject of a work which, by interesting the reading public, he shrewdly calculated would enhance the amount of his reputation and of his income. But the special emergency which the present work is designed to meet has been occasioned by the productions of a new class of theorists, who have taken their cue from Hildebrand, Loyola, Bancroft, and Laud, and very naturally commenced a crusade against all Protestant dissenters, and more especially against Methodists. These pseudo-Catholics have thought it a matter of importance to show to the present age the *high-Churchmanship* and the *strict canonical regularity* of the Wesleys. This they have often done at the expense of historical truth. By supposing facts which have no existence except in their own imagination; by bringing matters into juxtaposition which are separated by distance of time and by diversity of circumstances; by viewing facts in an isolated state which can only be understood in their proper connections and relations; and by misconstruing, either from ignorance or perverseness, the declarations of the Wesleys, and the fundamental principles by which they were actuated from the first, they have labored hard to prove that the present generation of Methodists have widely and fatally departed from Methodism as it was in the days of its founder. In Mr. Jackson's *Life of Charles Wesley* we have an ample remedy for the wounds inflicted upon us by these Jesuitical manœuvrings.

The work in its present form, for circulation in this country, it is hoped, is an improvement upon the original. Though it has been somewhat retrenched, nothing is left out that has been thought to be of material interest to American readers, while occasionally a note of



explanation is given for the purpose of obviating obscurities. The present edition is therefore most earnestly and confidently commended to the attention of the American public, with fervent prayer that it may greatly subserve the cause, not merely of Methodism, but of our common Christianity.

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2. *Memoir of the late Miss Lucy Richards, of Paris, Oneida County, N. Y.* Written by herself. Edited by another hand. 18mo., pp. 272. New-York: G. Lane & P. P. Sandford. 1842.

THIS unpretending little volume is one of no ordinary merit. With the subject of it we had but a partial personal acquaintance. With the fame of her great Christian excellences no one living in her neighborhood (as we did for a few years) could be wholly unacquainted. We once visited her at the mission-house, where she was laboring for the benefit of the Oneidas, when, for the first time, we were permitted to witness the devotions of converted natives. A sermon was preached in "the old log school-house" by the missionary, the late Rev. Dan Barnes, after which two Indian exhorters delivered each a most thrilling and animated exhortation; the intervals being filled up with the sweetest singing that ever fell upon our ear. We were amazed—melted to tears—convulsed with sobs—dissolved into gratitude, love, and praise! God was there—"The voice of the turtle was heard in the land" of darkness, and "the time of the singing of birds had come."

But we must return from this digression to the book before us. It is made up mostly from the diary of Miss Richards. It is, however, corrected by the editor, and enriched with numerous biographical notices of persons whose names are mentioned. The thanks of the Christian public are due to the editor (Rev. Z. Paddock, of the Oneida Conference) for thus wresting from oblivion the precious relics of one whose praise, for her ardent piety, great moral courage, and her exemplary patience under suffering, was in all the churches in the region where she lived, labored, and fell asleep in Christ.

Let the Memoir of Lucy Richards be read, and let her character and piety be imitated. No Christian can sit down and read this little work carefully without being made better by it. But to us it has peculiar interest. *The preachers* of whose names she makes such honorable mention, and so many of whom the editor has informed the reader *are now no more*, were our foster parents in our spiritual childhood, and during the early years of our ministry. The names of persons and of places are constantly occurring, which revive in us the tenderest and most interesting recollections. But the savor of holiness which pervades the effusions of this blessed and devoted Christian female, and

which will find sympathy in all Christian hearts, is the highest recommendation of the work, and will not fail to render it a most welcome and useful companion to the pious reader.

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3. *The Life of Wilbur Fisk, D. D., first President of the Wesleyan University.* By JOSEPH HOLDICH. 1 vol., 8vo., pp. 456. Harper & Brothers.

WE have seen the remark somewhere, that "the memory of a good man is more precious to the world than his actions while living;" and we doubt not it often proves so. It has fallen to the lot of few to be more distinguished for piety, virtue, and usefulness, than the lamented subject of this memoir; and yet who shall say, great as was the sum of good accomplished by him, that his example, widely known, and handed down through a long period of the future, shall not, in the end, accomplish even more? Who can tell how many may be excited thereby to greater holiness, and a more zealous discharge of every duty? At all events, it is to us a delightful reflection, that it may be so; and it was suggested by this beautiful portraiture of the life and character of our departed friend. Verily, "though dead, he yet speaketh;" and will continue to speak, in tones even more persuasive than the music of his living voice, wherever this bright record of his virtues shall go.

There is no occasion, at this time, for dwelling upon Professor Holdich's biography, and, certainly no call for criticism. It probably has defects, for no human work is without them; but our sympathies and our admiration have been too powerfully excited to see aught except the great and good man it is intended to exhibit. We shall return to it again, after a more calm and deliberate perusal. We should, however, do great injustice to our own convictions, as well as to the respected author, not to say, that we regard it as a noble tribute to the memory of one whose fame and whose praise are in all the churches—as fully justifying our highest expectations, and every way worthy of its exalted subject. That such a work, illustrative of the virtues of one whose memory is affectionately cherished in every Christian heart, will be eagerly sought for, there cannot be a doubt; but there is one circumstance in this connection which should be mentioned—and that is, that the copy-right is in the name of the bereaved and excellent consort of the deceased, left inadequately provided for, and the work is published principally for her benefit.

4. *Sermons and Sketches of Sermons.* By the Rev. JOHN SUMMERFIELD, late a Preacher in Connection with the Methodist Episcopal Church. With an Introduction by the Rev. THOMAS E. BOND, M.D. 1 vol., 8vo., pp. 437.

WE can do little more in our present number than announce the publication of this volume: it will hereafter receive a more extended notice. The name of Summerfield is dear to the church; and awakens emotions of peculiar interest and tenderness. His precocious and wonderful eloquence, his indefatigable labors, his deep and ardent piety, and his early death, all conspire to give an interest to his memory, that will cause it to be affectionately cherished by generations yet unborn. It should be stated that none of these sermons were left by their lamented author in a finished state. Some of them, it is true, are nearly complete; while others are no more than mere outlines, intended to be filled up by the living voice. The wonder therefore is, that they are so perfect, in composition, arrangement, and thought. We cannot enter now into a critical consideration of their merits; but these are neither few nor inconsiderable. They bear the impress of the admirable mind of which they are the transcripts; and are distinguished by earnestness, force, and great logical clearness. Though but sketches, they are the sketches of Summerfield; and cannot be read without deep interest, and corresponding Christian improvement. The Introduction, by Dr. Bond, presents an animated and graphic picture of this celebrated preacher.

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5. *Italy and the Italian Islands.—From the Earliest Ages to the Present Time.* By WILLIAM SPALDING, Esq., Professor of Rhetoric in the University of Edinburgh. With engravings and illustrations, maps and plans. Vols. 151-153 of the Family Library. Harper & Brothers.

WE hardly know how to characterize this work. It is not properly a history of Italy, for it notices only remarkable eras and important revolutions. It is not professedly a treatise on the political, civil, and social institutions of that country at different periods, though these are pretty fully considered. It does not trace in detail the progress and decline of literature and the arts, in ancient and modern times, though these receive a large share of attention. Neither does it give a minute account of the antiquities of this celebrated country; of the character, manners, and customs of its inhabitants; of its productions, resources, and natural features; nevertheless, much is said of each one of them. It is a compendious view of whatever is most worthy of notice, or deserving of consideration, in regard to a people and country that have



exercised a wider and more enduring influence on human affairs than any other. It is a work, too, it appears to us, of uncommon merit—evincing profound research, great accuracy, and intellectual resources fully competent to the undertaking. The reader may gain from it nearly all the information that is of much importance, in reference either to ancient or modern Italy.

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6. *Means and Ends, or Self-Training.* By the author of "Redwood," "Hope Leslie," "Home," "Poor Rich Man," &c., &c. 1 vol., 18mo. Harper & Brothers.

THIS work is written in the usually happy manner of the ingenious and amiable author, whenever she addresses herself to the young for the purpose of instruction. It is intended for young ladies, or, rather, to use her own language, "for girls from ten to sixteen years of age," whether "ladies," in the somewhat invidious and anti-republican sense of that term or not—and its object is to correct the common mistake, that education is limited to mere scholastic learning, which is, in fact, its smallest part. Having done this, and shown that we are, in reality, being educated, either for good or for evil, by every event and circumstance of our lives, she proceeds to enforce the duty of keeping this constantly in mind, so that nothing shall appear indifferent or unworthy of attention; but every thing be made subservient to some useful end—either our intellectual or moral culture, our religious improvement, or our physical health. This is followed by a separate consideration of various duties, errors, improprieties, vices, &c., to show the extent to which the practical effects of this principle are carried, and how far the formation of character is dependent upon the neglect, abuse, or right employment of self-training. The advice that is given is excellent, and the book is full of useful instruction to parents as well as their youthful daughters. We except, however, to the "dancing."

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7. *History of the Expedition under the Command of Captains Lewis and Clarke to the Sources of the Missouri, thence across the Rocky Mountains, and down the River Columbia to the Pacific Ocean: performed during the Years 1804, 1805, 1806, by Order of the Government of the United States.* Prepared for the Press by PAUL ALLEN, Esq. Revised and abridged by the Omission of unimportant Details, with an Introduction and Notes. By ARCHIBALD M'VICKAR. Harper & Brothers. Vols. 154 and 155 of the Family Library.

WE notice with much pleasure the republication of these travels. Messrs. Lewis and Clarke were the first to explore this vast western region, and their account of it is not only the earliest, but the best that

we have yet had. No other work has given as full a description of the physical features of the country, its climate and productions, its animals, and the savage tribes that inhabit it. The passage across the continent has now become comparatively easy; but to these pioneers every thing was new. Hence they had numberless difficulties to encounter, and their narrative is filled with adventure. Every thing is related in a simple, impressive, and lively manner, and the style of the work is not its least recommendation. It has been decidedly improved, we think, by being somewhat abridged; and Mr. M'Vickar's introduction, giving a general view of the most interesting events relating to the country, is a valuable addition. The territory west of the Rocky Mountains is beginning to be regarded with a lively interest. Its importance is better understood; its virtual occupancy by a foreign power is looked upon with increasing dissatisfaction; its rapid settlement by hardy emigrants from the east is prevented only by this undecided political question; and it has already become the theatre of one of our most interesting and hopeful missions. At such a period these volumes are peculiarly acceptable, and will be eagerly sought for and read.

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8. *Uncle Sam's Recommendation of Phrenology to his Millions of Friends in the United States.* 1 vol., 18mo. Harper & Brothers.

THIS is a queer title to what, to us, appears a very queer sort of a book—owing, no doubt, to our want of faith in the positions which it assumes. As yet we have been unable to give up our old-fashioned metaphysics for this new science of mind. To those who have, it may be, we can readily imagine, quite an amusing book; for it is not a little original both in style and matter, and by no means destitute of humor. We have been, we confess, very remiss in watching the progress of discovery, and are now informed, for the first time, of the wonderful aid which animal magnetism is contributing to phrenology, by detecting, almost at pleasure, some new cerebral organ. Seventeen of these are named, concluding with two etceteras; leaving us to infer that there are a multitude of others, too numerous to mention. Should future experiments continue to be as prolific of discoveries as those already made, our present phrenological map is but the mere skeleton of what it is destined to become. But we are unable to enter into particulars, and must refer the reader to the book.

9. *The Kingdom of Christ delineated: in two Essays, on our Lord's own Account of his Person and the Nature of his Kingdom, and on the Constitution, Powers, and Ministry of a Christian Church, as appointed by himself.* By RICHARD WHATELY, D. D., Archbishop of Dublin. 12mo., pp. 280. New-York: Wiley & Putnam. 1842.

THE author of this work is known to the reading public as the learned and shrewd author of a system of logic, of rhetoric, and of several other publications of high literary merit. The present work is a truly Christian and Protestant exhibition of the character and government of the church. The style and spirit of the work are of high order. And for those who are satisfied with the clear decisions of *Scripture*, and of common sense, *versus* the indefinite and self-contradictory responses of *tradition*, the archbishop's book is a perfect extinguisher upon Oxfordism. We earnestly commend this timely production to the attention of our readers.

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10. *An Exposition of the Creed.* By JOHN PEARSON, D. D., late Lord Bishop of Chester. With an Appendix, containing the principal Greek and Latin Creeds. Revised by the Rev. W. S. DOBSON, A. M. 8vo., pp. 616. New-York: D. Appleton & Co. 1842.

THIS work of Bishop Pearson is an exhibition of profound reasoning, deep thought, and patient investigation. It has ever been regarded not only as a standard of the orthodox faith, but as a most triumphant vindication of that faith from the assaults both of infidels and heretics. We most cordially thank Messrs. Appleton & Co. for giving this truly Protestant work of a truly Protestant bishop to the public in an American dress, and at an *American* price. We hope the enterprise will be amply rewarded. Nothing need be said by us upon the character of a work so often quoted by the best theologians of the present age. Every minister of the gospel should, if possible, possess himself of a copy of Pearson on the Creed, and should, by no means, be satisfied with a hasty perusal of its contents.

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11. *An Exposition of the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England.* By GILBERT, Bishop of Sarum. With an Appendix, containing the Augsburg Confession, Creed of Pope Pius IX., &c. Revised and corrected, with Copious Notes, and Additional References. By the Rev. JAMES R. PAGE, A. M. 8vo., pp. 585. New-York: Appleton & Co. 1842.

THIS work is one scarcely less interesting to Methodists than to Churchmen. For, *first*, it embraces the Latin original, history, and exposition of our own articles, all of which were selected from the



thirty-nine articles of the Church of England. And, *secondly*, the bishop's expositions are not only learned, but liberal. He was, what in his time was called, a *low Churchman*. He distinctly admits the validity of presbyterian ordination, and explicitly declares that the articles were constructed upon the broad basis of a recognition of the continental churches as true churches of Christ. These liberal views have, of course, brought upon him the wrath of high Churchmen and semipapists, who have not ceased to condemn him as a latitudinarian, if not indeed a heretic. We are happy to see this work issued in this country, and hope it may be extensively circulated.

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12. *Thirty-four Letters to a Son in the Ministry.* By Rev. HEMAN HUMPHREY, President of Amherst College. 12mo., pp. 352. Amherst: J. J. & C. Adams. New-York: Dayton & Newman. Boston: Crocker & Brewster. 1842.

THIS is no trifling or common-place production. Such counsels are here imparted as would naturally be expected from a minister of age and experience to a dear son upon his entering upon the ministerial functions. No minister, young or old, can read this volume without profit; though we cannot disguise the fact, that the venerable author often crosses our path. To his general views of the importance of ministerial education we do not object; though we cannot concede the impropriety of an entrance upon the functions of the ministry without his course of theological training. His honest bluntness pleases us, but now and then an unkind thrust a little disturbs the harmony of our sensibilities. To give an instance:—The author cautions his “dear E.” against endeavoring to keep his congregation from being scattered by the extraordinary efforts of “other denominations,” by “out-preaching them.” Says he,—

“Could you out-preach them? Could you keep up with them? No, my son. You might break down your health. You might sacrifice your life in this unprofitable, if not unholy emulation; but how could you expect to succeed, when, as is commonly the case, these noisy itinerant ‘troublers of Israel’ take no time for preparation, but when as soon as one pair of lungs is worn out, another is ready to take up and prolong the sound.”

Now we know not where this promising young minister is settled, and we certainly have no desire that he should “break down” his “health,” but we have little doubt, wherever he is, that these noisy “itinerant troublers” will give him an opportunity to practice upon the advice of his venerated sire. And we venture to predict that the advice will prove to be erroneous. He will find that he must absolutely “out-

preach them," or he will run under. Indeed, we most ardently hope he may be put to the test, and that "lungs" may not be wanting, but may be brought into requisition in sufficient numbers until the experiment is perfectly satisfactory. "These noisy itinerants" make terrible work with the good old settled habits of such men as Dr. Humphrey; and if the succeeding generation follow in the wake of their fathers, they will be likely to suffer from them still greater inconvenience. The present is a "noisy" age. And the world is full of "noisy itinerants," who are calling public attention to every imaginable subject, good, bad, and indifferent. And shall the church sleep? Shall there be no evangelists? Shall the gospel keep at home? No, doctor. You are a little too late in the day. Get a little acquainted with these *rambling preachers*, and see if some of them, instead of being justly considered "troublers of Israel," should not even by you be acknowledged as fellow-laborers in the kingdom and patience of Jesus.

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13. *The Great Awakening.—A History of the Revival of Religion in the Time of Edwards and Whitefield.* By JOSEPH TRACY. 8vo., pp. 433. Boston: Tappan & Dennett. New-York: Dayton & Newman. Philadelphia: Henry Perkins. 1842.

How true is that saying of the wise man, "There is nothing new under the sun!" In the progress of the church, ever and anon, things have sprung up which have been denounced as *novelties*, but which the faithful page of history recognizes as old acquaintances. Thus it has happened with most of the peculiarities of Methodism. The very features of the system, and the phenomena which have accompanied the great revival of evangelical religion which is the result of its propagation, and have been the butt of the heaviest assaults, are the recurrence of what has characterized and marked the progress of true religion at different periods, ever since the days of the apostles.

And can it be possible that our Presbyterian and Congregational brethren, before Methodism had been planted in this country, had among them "itinerants" and "exhorters," who turned the country upside down? who gathered congregations in the fields and groves—and under whose powerful appeals the people "cried out" and "fell down," "groaned," "wept aloud," fell into "fits?" &c., &c.

Of all this we have long been apprised by several publications, from President Edwards and others. But the extent of these ebullitions of "enthusiasm" has been very little known among our people, and still less, we fear, among those who have unceremoniously condemned in us what others condemned in their fathers.

These reflections naturally arise from the developments of the work

now upon our table. Mr. Tracy has brought out a mass of facts which has been concealed and neglected for half a century, and which reflects a world of light upon the religious history of this country. The volume is one of great interest, and we hope will correct many mistakes. And though we cannot say that the author has, in his reflections and inferences, always been happy, or even fair, he doubtless has intended to set every thing in a true light. For the present, we would simply commend his work to the attention of our readers. On a future occasion we hope to be able to give it a more extended notice.

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14. *Sermons on Important Subjects.* By the Rev. SAMUEL DAVIES, A. M., President of the College of New-Jersey. With an Essay on the Life and Times of the Author, by ALBERT BARNES. In three vols., 12mo., pp. 497, 556, 499. Second edition. New-York: Dayton & Saxton. 1841.

PRESIDENT DAVIES was one of the most zealous, powerful, and useful preachers of his time. His Sermons have, perhaps, gone through more editions than those of any other modern author except Mr. Wesley; and, like those of the founder of Methodism, they will continue to be read, and to pass current in the market, while a multitude of productions of the class, far more elegant in their diction, will be consigned to oblivion.

These Sermons were prepared for delivery, and were published after the author's decease. But if they made a great and permanent impression upon hundreds and thousands when they were pronounced by the lips of the living author, their beneficial effects are still more extensive in their present enduring form, since his tongue is cold and silent in death. By this means "he, being dead, yet speaketh."

The reader of the present edition of this work will feel himself much indebted to Mr. Barnes for the sketch he has given of the author's "Life and Times." He seems to have been instrumentally concerned in "the great awakening" which occurred in the days of Edwards, and to have sympathized deeply with the leading spirits concerned in aggressive movements at that period upon the kingdom of darkness, which were productive of most glorious results. He imitated Edwards and the Tenants in zeal, and surpassed them in eloquence. He lived and labored to do good, and was cut down by a mysterious providence in the midst of a most glorious career. We are happy to see so neat and yet so cheap an edition of these excellent Sermons before the public as the one before us, and we hope the publishers may be amply rewarded for their noble enterprise in thus making them so easily accessible to the churches.



15. *The Millennium of the Apocalypse.* By GEORGE BUSH, Professor of Hebrew and Oriental Literature in the New-York City University. Second edition. 12mo., pp. 206. Salem: John P. Jewett. Boston: Tappan & Dennett, Crocker and Brewster. New-York: Day-ton & Newman. 1842.

THE subject of the millennium is now passing through the ordeal of popular discussion. Ever since the apostolic age the church has been favored or *perplexed* with the visitations of expositors or *prophets*, who have, to *their own apprehension*, clearly defined the *time* and the *character* of Christ's second advent, and this sublime event has generally been declared to be *near*. Now we are told by some that the glorious millennium will come in 1843. The verity of this prediction will soon be tested without argument, so that, if it be well founded, our prophets cannot long remain liable to the charge of presumption or too hasty conclusion.

But Professor Bush maintains that *the millennium is past already!* This theory is attempted to be sustained by the learned professor by a critical analysis of the symbols of the Apocalypse, and a comparison of them with historic facts. "The millennium hypothesis" is combated with no small amount of ingenuity, and his theory supported by the whole weight of his great skill in Biblical criticism. We are not a convert to the author's theory; but still we would not condemn his book. It is no mean production, and certainly has high claims to be consulted in connection with the labors of the most learned students of prophecy.

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16. *Theopneusty; or, the Plenary Inspiration of the Holy Scriptures.* By S. R. L. GAUSSEN, Professor of Theology in Geneva. Translated by E. N. KIRK. 12mo., pp. 343. New-York: John S. Taylor & Co. Boston: Tappan & Dennett. 1842.

FROM the cursory examination which we have been able to give the above work, our impressions with regard to its merits are decidedly favorable. The author is of the evangelical school of Geneva, and takes most elevated and thorough ground as to the inspiration of the Holy Scriptures. He combats the too commonly received notion, that a portion of the language of the Bible, if inspired at all, is so only in a very low degree, and insists that Holy Scripture, *all* Holy Scripture, is given *by inspiration of God*. The translator of this work is entitled to the thanks of the churches in this country for clothing, in an English dress, so conclusive an argument in favor of a vital truth, which, in too many instances, has been underrated or misunderstood.

17. *Lectures on Universalism.* By REV. JOEL PARKER, D. D., President of the Union Theological Seminary. 12mo., pp. 202. New-York: John S. Taylor & Co. 1841.

THIS is a clear and conclusive argument against a doctrinal and practical corruption of Christianity. The style is perspicuous, the method natural, and the reasoning unanswerable. When Universalism is no more, Dr. Parker will be entitled to a share of the reward which shall be given the instruments, who will, under God, and with his blessing, have contributed to its final overthrow.

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18. *Tellstrom, the First Swedish Missionary to Lapland. With an Appendix, giving an Account of the Stockholm Mission.* By GEORGE SCOTT, Pastor of the English Congregation at Stockholm. 18mo., pp. 86. New-York: John S. Taylor & Co. 1841.

THIS little work, besides the interest it excites in an individual, providentially prepared for the work of a missionary to the frozen regions of Lapland, reflects much light upon the state of religion in the north of Europe. Mr. Scott, the author, is the Wesleyan missionary to Sweden, who visited the United States last year for the purpose of raising funds to liquidate the debt upon the church in Stockholm.

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19. *The Missionary Daughter; or, Memoir of Lucy Goodale Thurston, of the Sandwich Islands.* 18mo., pp. 233. New-York: Dayton & Newman. 1842.

THIS is a most edifying little volume. What a help to a missionary in a heathen land must such a daughter be! When the truth set forth by the devoted missionary is so exemplified in his offspring, and particularly by his *daughters*, what practical efficacy must it have, and how forcibly must it strike the heathen mind! Let the Missionary Daughter be read.

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20. *Contributions to Academic Literature.* By CHARLES H. LYON, A. M., one of the Principals of the Irving Institute. 12mo., pp. 144. New-York: H. & S. Raynor. 1842.

THIS work is made up of original addresses, dialogues, &c., designed for the use of students in our academies. It contains forty-six short pieces of suitable length for declamation. The topics, the style, the sentiment, and the spirit, are all appropriate. Let students procure this book, and *they* can strike out into a new track, and no longer be obliged to use over and over Curran, Philips, & Co.

21. *The Mute Christian under the Smarting Rod: with Sovereign Antidotes for every Case.* By the Rev. THOMAS BROOKS, of London, 1669. 18mo., pp. 246. Boston: Seth Goldsmith & Co. 1841.

WE love the good old authors—and we are glad to see their golden remains snatched from oblivion. Here is a most precious cordial to the fainting spirit. The true method of turning all evil into good is here explained. Let the sorrowful, the persecuted, the poor, the sick, the care-worn, the deserted, take the advice of experience. Let them learn here how to triumph over all the woes of this mortal state.

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22. *A Complete Hebrew and Chaldee Concordance to the Old Testament, comprising also a Condensed Hebrew English Lexicon, with an Introduction and Appendixes.* By Dr. ISAAC NORDHEIMER, Professor of Oriental Languages in the University of the City of New-York, assisted by WILLIAM W. TURNER. Part first, חֵטֵּא—וָוָו. New-York: Wiley & Putnam, 161 Broadway.

IT must be gratifying to every lover of sound Biblical learning, that Biblical scholars are about to be presented, from the American press, with a complete Hebrew and Chaldee Concordance to the Old Testament, a Lexicon, and various useful accompanying appendixes. It is a noble enterprise, both on the part of the editor and publishers,

Although it is founded on the great work of Fürst, yet it is something more than a mere reprint. The lexicographical part may be looked upon as entirely new—the result of the author's own original investigations. For a work of this kind, we can assure the community, that Dr. Nordheimer is peculiarly well fitted. Trained from his boyhood in the rabbinical schools of Germany, perhaps there are few men living who have a better *traditional* knowledge of Hebrew words. To him the language is almost vernacular. Of his *critical* knowledge we hardly need speak. His very elaborate and profoundly philosophical work on Hebrew grammar, which was reviewed in a former number of this work, demonstrates him not to be a whit behind any of the great competitors for eminence in this branch of Hebrew study. In some respects he has far surpassed them all—we refer particularly to his explications of the anomalies of the language.

With such qualifications, we were prepared to expect much that is new and valuable in the Lexicon, and we have not been disappointed. The comparisons of roots of the Hebrew stock are unusually copious, and the effort to show the connection between the signification of roots and their derivatives is remarkably successful. We might adduce



many examples in proof of this, but the limits of a mere notice will not permit.

The first number of the work now before us, is for typographical beauty almost unrivaled. It will be completed in nine numbers, at intervals of two or three months, at one dollar per number. Thus our Hebrew students may be furnished with a work surpassing every other of the kind, and very much cheaper than such works could heretofore be obtained. We cannot forbear to add a few words in regard to the appendixes. A simple statement of what they are, as presented in the prospectus, will be sufficient.

1. An etymologico-alphabetical index of all the words in the Old Testament, with references to the pages of the concordance on which they are to be found.

2. A purely alphabetical index of the same with similar references, (this will prove of much use to the beginner.)

3. A tabular view of all the forms of nouns, with their origin and mode of formation, (highly important to the grammarian and lexicographer.)

4. An alphabetical list of all the particles, that is, of all the pronominal roots, with their compositions and formations.

5. An alphabetical list of all the proper names belonging to the Old Testament language.

6. A list exhibiting all the corresponding Hebrew and Arabic roots.

We commend this truly great and useful undertaking to the unhesitating patronage of the friends of Hebrew and oriental learning.

23. *The Great Commission; or, the Christian Church constituted and charged to convey the Gospel to the World.* By Rev. John HARRIS, D. D. With an Introductory Essay by Rev. W. R. WILLIAMS, D. D. 12mo., pp. 482. Gould, Kendall, and Lincoln. 1842.

WE are happy that this spirited and powerful writer has directed his attention and labors to the great cause of missions. His work on this subject comes before the American churches at a time when they especially need to feel the paramount claims of this holy cause. The writings of Harris are deeply imbued with the spirit of primitive Christianity, and we hope, by the blessing of God, will do much toward expanding the benevolence and inflaming the zeal of the churches. We most cordially thank the American publishers for so promptly bringing out a work of so much interest, and calculated to act so effectively upon the great and glorious work of the world's subjugation to the reign of our Lord Jesus Christ.

24. *Mormonism and the Mormons. A Historical View of the Rise and Progress of the Sect self-styled Latter-Day Saints.* By Rev. DANIEL P. KIDDER. 18mo. New-York: G. Lane & P. P. Sandford. 1842.

IT is a matter of astonishment that such an imposture as Mormonism should in the nineteenth century, and in the United States, obtain the least consideration. It is a revival of Mohammedanism, under the auspices of an ignorant knave—a most senseless imposition from beginning to end, and yet it is making thousands of converts, both in this country and in England. In the work before us, we have an account of the origin and progress of this truly blasphemous and revolutionary system. The “Latter-Day Saints” are a political and military faction, as dangerous to the peace of the country as to the interests of true religion. We shall review the book hereafter.

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25. *A Practical Grammar of the English Language; or, an Introduction to Composition: in which Sentences are classified into Verbal Forms and Phrases* By EDWARD HAZEN, A. M., author of “The Symbolical Spelling-book,” “The Speller and Definer,” and “The Panorama of Professions and Trades, or Popular Technology.” New-York: Huntington & Savage.

So many English grammars have been published within the present century without materially improving the science, that we hardly expect to meet with a new work on this subject worthy of particular attention; but, from the reputation of Mr. Hazen for diligence in his investigations, we were prepared to expect from him valuable improvements, if not new discoveries, in the mode of communicating a knowledge of the grammar of our language. We can only glance at the peculiarities of his system.

The author proceeds upon the principle that the leading object in the study of grammar is to learn the constructions of the language, and that these can be thoroughly learned only by forming these constructions. He has, therefore, made every example proposed for parsing a model for imitation. This method of learning the language is rendered easy by the classification of sentences into *verbal forms* and *phrases*, which are as distinct and as easily understood as the parts of speech themselves. These constructions are presented, and fully discussed, one at a time, so that pupils are not liable to be confused.

Though Mr. Hazen has proposed a radical change in the method of teaching the grammar of our language, yet it is so easy and practical, that instructors need not be alarmed. We commend this grammar to their attention. Though we have not been able fully to scan its merits, we have little doubt but it will be found to contain some valuable improvements upon existing systems.

26. *Sanders' Series of School Books; comprising Sanders' Spelling Book, Primary School Primer, and School Readers, First, Second, Third, and Fourth Books.* New-York: Dayton & Newman.

THIS Series furnishes a gradual and complete system of spelling and reading exercises suitable for all classes, from the young tyro to the highest classes in our schools. The orthography and orthoepy, adopted by the author throughout his works, are in agreement with Dr. Webster's Dictionary, which, if generally adopted, cannot fail to bring about a uniformity in spelling and pronunciation, so very desirable. The scheme for parsing or analyzing words, orthographically presented on the seventeenth page of the Spelling Book, must be a pleasing and profitable exercise for the scholar in acquiring a knowledge of the elementary principles of our language. In addition to the usual exercise in the Spelling Book, the more difficult words that compose the reading lessons in the Readers are arranged together at the head of each lesson for spelling, with their definitions given primarily, according to the sense in which they are used. Questions are subjoined to each of the reading lessons in the Third and Fourth Readers—the answers to which are calculated not only to bring out the most important ideas contained in the lessons, but also the appropriate inflection, modulation, tones, &c., to be observed in the reading, reference frequently being had to the rules of rhetoric and exercises in the fore part of the book. Mr. Sanders is exerting himself with commendable zeal in endeavoring to provide our primary schools with such books as will aid the young mind in the first stages of its developments. We wish every such effort all the success that its merits deserve.

27. *The Domestic Circle; or, Moral and Social Duties explained and enforced on Scriptural Principles, in a Series of Discourses.* By the Rev. M. SORIN. 12mo., pp. 260. Second edition. Philadelphia: J. Harmstead. 1841.

THE subject of this book is one too little studied, and, consequently, too little understood. Our author has clearly and ably discussed the great laws which should govern the domestic circle, and has exhibited in a strong light the interests which are staked upon their uniform execution. We most cordially recommend this *family directory* both to parents and children. Had we space we could say much more of a commendatory character.

28. *Devotional Melodies.* By CHARLES M. F. DEEMS, A. B. 12mo., pp. 48. Raleigh, N. C.: Thomas Jefferson Lemay. 1841.

WE are as far from being a poet as possible. And if a poet only can judge of poetry, our opinion is absolutely good for nothing. Hence we would always speak with reserve of this species of compositions. In the effort now before us, there are things which, to us, seem not a little beautiful. We wish the amiable author great success in his intercourse with the muses.

29. *Scenes in the Wilderness: an Authentic Narrative of the Labors and Sufferings of the Moravian Missionaries among the North American Indians.* By Rev. WILLIAM M. WILLETT. 18mo., pp. 208. New-York: G. Lane and P. P. Sandford. 1842.

WE venture to promise our readers, young and old, a rich reward for the purchase and perusal of this little work. The author has selected his facts with care and judgment, and they are of a character both to interest and instruct the reader. The work was not edited in our department, and, of course, we have no claim to credit for the editorial touches which it may have received. We hope it may have a wide circulation.







Engraved by C. MacKenzie after Jackson & A.

I am Yours very affly  
R D Watson

